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PREFACE 
This dissertation was born through preparation, rejection, and 
opportunity. 
First, my course work and preparation for comprehensive examinations 
prepared me for this topic. Dr. Larry Hynson's course on industrial organization 
and Dr. John Cross' course on complex organizations prepared me to deal with 
the topic of labor relations. Both courses gave me a grounding in the literature 
on the different theories of organizations as well as a familiarity with the current 
process of deindustrialization associated with changing global product markets 
and the reorganization of labor markets. Through Dr. Larry Perkins' course on 
qualitative research methods, I had my first opportunity to engage in qualitative 
research and to use theoretical sampling strategies, triangulation, grounded 
theory approaches to data analysis, and analytic induction approaches to data 
analysis. Along with Dr. Chuck Edgley, he also introduced me to the literature 
on the idealist and realist debate in social science. 
By having manuscripts rejected and then successfully reworked for 
publication, I came do adopt Foucault's analysis of practices as a framework for 
doing sociology. As I was preparing for comprehensive examinations and 
taking a directed reading course with Dr. David Knottnerus, I submitted a paper 
on Max Weber that I had prepared for Dr. Cross to Dr. Michael Katovich for 
review for publication in the Social Science Journal Dr. Michael returned the 
paper with a suggestion that I might want to use the work of Michel Foucault to 
develop a theory of organizations. After consulting with Dr. Knottnerus, I did 
concentrated reading on Michel Foucault and Anthony Giddens and developed 
a paper which was the beginning of the theoretical and methodological 
foundation for this dissertation. At the suggestion of Dr. Knottnerus, I submitted 
the paper to one journal. It came back rejected with suggestions for further 
reading regarding antifoundationalist approaches to social science. After 
further reading and revision, the paper was published in another journal 
(Cooke, 1993). 
The first topic for a dissertation that I developed was l;ln application of 
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Foucault's approach to the analysis of social practices to the process of 
secularization in England and the United States. This particular topic would 
require archive research in England and in New Jersey and Texas. Even 
though I was a finalist for a national fellowship to study this topic, I failed to be 
awarded the fellowship and the necessary funding to carry out the research. 
After failing to receive funding to pursue my first research topic, I began a 
dissertation to apply Foucault's approach to examine the relationship between 
technologies of property assessment and the construction of urban ecologies. 
Then, a phone call from an acquaintance who worked for the electric utility 
studied in this dissertation opened the door to examine the deterioration of 
labor relations in this utility. 
To apply Foucault to study a topic, one must discover how people make 
relationships problematic. Since trust was the way that both the company and 
the union made their relationship problematic in this study, the principal 
research question was: What had changed in the relationship between the 
union and the company in this study to cause the relationship between them to 
deteriorate? Since Foucault's genealogy of power examines the reversals of 
practices, his approach seemed appropriate to explore this issue. 
I wish to express my gratitude to the individuals who assisted me with this 
dissertation and my graduate work at Oklahoma State University. First, I wish to 
thank my spouse, Mary Lou Albitz Cooke. She was a willing listener as I talked 
through ideas and a helpful editor. Her love and support enabled me to make a 
significant mid-life career change. 
Second, I wish to thank the Faculty of Sociology at Oklahoma State 
University. I wish to thank my major advisor, Dr. Larry Hynson, for his guidance 
and support through out my graduate program. Besides being an excellent 
professor and mentor, he was also a colleague with whom I would explore 
ideas. I am indebted to him for his editorial assistance on papers that I have 
published. I am also grateful to the other committee members -- Dr. John Cross, 
Dr. Larry Perkins, Dr. David Knottnerus, and Dr. Richard Batteiger -- for their 
advice, tutelage, and colleagueship. Their suggestions were especially helpful 
in a revision of the chapter on research method, "Method as Ruse. " 
Third, I wish to thank the people in the company and in the union in this 
study for their cooperation. It is my deepest hope that they one day devise 
practices for relating in which they can trust. 
Finally, I wish to thank my extended family for their support in my 
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academic journey over four decades. Joe and Mary Lee C+e. my parents, 
have always encouraged me in the face of adversity. My son, Francis, inspired 
me through his persistence in wrestling through years of his own adversity as 
he finally became a regional contender. My uncle, Nicholas Francis Cooke, 
was my role model. He was one of the few people I knew who was able to step 
out of his own culture into a radically different point of view. 
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A person who supervised a unit of a midwestern electric utility once told 
me how the company had sent her1 to a sensitivity training which was set up to 
force her to deal with feelings and with sharing. She came to realize that 
trusting meant that you had to be open with people and that they had to be open 
with you. She said that trust and open communication worked well at home, at 
church, and with friends. But, trust seemed impossible at work. You always 
know that you are holding something back from the workers as a manager. And 
you always know that the workers are holding something back from you as a 
manager. The purpose of this study is to develop a method of study based on 
Foucault's (1965, 1972, 1979, 1980, 1982a, 1982b, 1984, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 
1991a, 1991b) genealogy of power to explore the problem of trust and distrust 
voiced by this manager in the labor relations of an investor owned, midwestern 
electric utility. 
To use Foucault's approach, one must discover how things are made 
problematic by members of an organization and use that to define the research 
question. I was hired as a labor relations consultant by the human resources 
department of an investor-owned, midwestern electric utility company because 
management perceived that the relationship between management and the 
union had become strained. After initial interviews with several managers at the 
strategic level of the company (vice presidents and higher and members of the 
central business planning group), at the human resources level of the company 
(the specialized department dealing with personnel issues, individual and 
organizational capacity development, remuneration, benefits, and labor 
relations), and at the work group level of the company and after interviews with 
several leaders of the union, they all seemed to agree that the relationship 
between the company and the union was once fairly good but had been 
growing increasingly problematic and conflictual over the last two years. Thus, 
the principal research question is: Mat had changed in the relationship between the union 
1 
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and the company to cause the relationship between them to deteriorate? 
If one now applies Foucault's framework to begin to elaborate -- and 
regulate -- the discourse, one must ask: What practices were used by the union 
and management to construct a relationship which both took to be good? What 
practices were adopted by one or both parties to begin to make the relationship 
problematic? The chief way that managers and union members seemed to 
make their relationship problematic was around the practice of trust. This 
caused me to elaborate the research question by focusing on trust: Did a 
practice or practices of trust exist among the practices used to construct a good 
relationship? If so, what did it look like and how did it work? What other 
practices were employed by the union and the company to construct a 
relationship perceived as good? How did they work? What practices were 
adopted which seemed to contribute to the deterioration of the relationship? 
How did they work? How did these practices affect the practice or practices of 
trust? What practices regulated the consideration of these practices by those 
who eventually adopted them? 
Before turning to develop some initial considerations, let me first 
endeavor to briefly note why this approach to the study of labor relations might 
be of interest. First, if one examines all eighteen computerized social science 
indices and abstracts, one notes that trust with respect to labor relations is a 
relatively unstudied area. Out of 3,492 citations involving labor relations among 
all eighteen files, only forty-six citations dealt with trust and labor relations. Of 
these, thirty-seven were dissertations. Second, if one examines all eighteen 
files, one finds seven studies in which Foucault was used in some way to 
examine labor relations. There were no items in the eighteen files in which 
Foucault was used to analyze trust or trust in the context of labor relations. 
Even though there is no way that the lack of the use of a perspective or a 
concept guarantees that their use will produce research results with relevance, 
this cursory glance does indicate that the proposed topic of study represents a 
relatively unplowed field. 
With respect to the area of complex organizations, this study could be 
considered to be an approach similar to what Powell and DiMaggio (1991) 
have called the new institutionalism in organizational analysis. According to 
Powell and DiMaggio, the new institutionalism rejects the rational-actor model, 
treats institutions as independent variables, places cognitive and cultural 
explanations at the center of analysis, and explores the properties of 
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supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations of 
individual acts. By focusing on social practices (Foucault, 1980, 1984), by 
treating rules and symbols as having power effects (Foucault, 1972), and by 
demonstrating how the individual in both objective (Foucault, 1979) and 
subjective (Foucault, 1982a, 1982b, 1988a, 1988b, 1990) forms are constructed 
by various -social practices, Foucault rejects the rational-actor model. By 
focusing on social practices as technologies of power which set up certain lines 
of action and inhibit others, Foucault (1980, 1984) treats institutions --
understood as social practices -- as independent but not as variables. By 
utilizing the concept of power/knowledge to explore how social practices are 
used to establish truth and how truth is used in social practices, Foucault (1980) 
places an emphasis on cognitive and cultural explanations. Finally, by placing 
an emphasis both on how social practices are effective at the individual 
application level and on how social practices as technologies both circulate and 
are colonized by others, Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984) treats social practices as 
supraindividual entities which are both seen at the level of individual acts and 
yet transcend a simple aggregate of individual acts. 
In addition to the potential academic significance of this topic, there are at 
least two points of practical significance for this study. First, Freeman and 
Medoff (1984), Gilbert (1989), and Whyte (1991) have noted that, with good 
labor relations, unionized companies are more productive than nonunionized 
companies. However, such is not the case if labor relations are strained. They 
all note that trust is an important factor in good labor relations. Or again, 
Friedman ( 1991 ) has pointed out that trust profoundly affects economic 
performance by making exchange and collaboration possible. When economic 
participants fear each other's motives, they move to protect themselves by 
specifying every detail in work rules or contracts. Thus, if one could discover 
how various practices by which management and labor relate to each other 
either set up the possibility of trust of make it problematic, one could enhance 
the trust factor and, by doing do, increase productivity. Last, but not least, the 
issue of trust is the way in which both the union and workers covered by the 
labor contract and the management of the company studied made their 
relationship problematic. If one is to apply a Foucauldian analysis to a situation, 
one must examine the actual practices and discourses used by actors in a 
situation to understand how it works. 
Before beginning the analysis of labor relations in the electric utility 
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studied, I will first outline in this introduction Foucault's understanding of power 
and social practices. Then, recognizing that Foucault (1988b) identified 
academic disciplines as one of the forms that a technology of social practices 
could take, I will explore in chapter one the social practice of trust, other 
technologies of controlling work relations, and the labor relations area as these 
are described by academic disciplines. In chapter two, I will develop an analytic 
or method of study based on Foucault's own analytic and describe how I will 
carry out the study. Finally, in the following chapters I will explore social 
practices associated with the use of the techniques for controlling relations as 
found in practical manuals and in actual social practices carried out in the 
industrial setting studied to explore how those techniques either make possible 
or inhibit trust in labor relations. 
The Ruse of Agency: A Brief Exploration of Foucault's 
Analysis of Social Practices2 
When one thinks of power, most of our concepts are rooted in the 
intentions and capacities of actors or in the resources and constraints of society. 
Social practices as such tend to be the place where these antecedent aspects 
of actors or scenes have their effects. Even theorists such as Giddens (1984) 
who foc1,.1s on social practices tend to rely on the nature of the actor or the scene 
as the unmoved mover which affects social practices while acknowledging the 
affect of social practices on scenes (Cooke, 1993). 
If one begins to look at various concepts of power in the context of normal 
science as competing paradigms, one finds that the location of the unmoved 
mover shifts with the way in which the problem is framed. For example, Weber 
(1978) identified charisma, the unique qualities of a leader, as one source of 
power. Given this line of inquiry, power to affect practice lies in the essential 
qualities of an actor. Yet, Collins ( 1982) has noted that the norms and values of 
an institution define what characteristics a leadermust have. Here, power is 
exerted by the scene -- the institution -- to affect practices. Even practices 
themselves have been the location from which power emerges. Wasielewski 
( 1985) has demonstrated how framing rules used in social interaction affect 
I 
whether or not a person is seen as charismatic. As Cooke (1~90) has noted, 
most social scientists treat this situation by using the unique ~olution 
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requirement from the concept of truth in traditional logic (Copi, 1978) to sort out 
concepts and levels with data and reasoning to find the right answer from 
alternative possibilities. 
However, Berndtson's (1970) phenomenological analysis of power 
makes a unique solution problematic. He observed that power has no 
antecedent and therefore is a self-caused cause. The appearance of 
permanence and the endurance of being is created by overcoming the novel 
from moment to moment. One does not know power except as change is 
observed and as power is inferred as a source of that change. Thus, as Cooke 
(1990) noted, power is ubiquitous. Using the unique solution of logic with any 
theoretical framework forces one to ignore most of that which is everywhere with 
a frame which cannot ask beyond itself. "Thus, any attempt to compare frames, 
or notions of power, to find the unique answer about cause with respect to 
power is doomed to failure" (Cooke, 1990: 123). 
While Cooke (1990) concluded that the search for power in terms of 
causality as understood by normal science is doomed, Foucault does provide 
one with a way to think about power in terms of agency -- the means or 
instruments used in practices themselves (Burke, 1969) -- without relying on the 
need for unmoved movers located in actors or scenes while at the same time 
acknowledging the power effects of the frameworks and methods of inquiry and 
the ubiquitous nature of power. Foucault began by creating an analysis 
couched in terms of the symbolic domain of the signifying structures with the 
archaeological approach of his works prior to the May 1968 events in Paris 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Smart, 1985; Phelan, 1990). Here, Foucault 
tended to use the Platonic idea that symbolic structure is the unmoved mover of 
practices. His later genealogical approach shifted analytic reference away from 
the model of language and signs to that of war and battle (Foucault, 1980). With 
the genealogical approach, conflict plays the central role in dissolving and 
reconstitut!ng order against a background of change. The focus of the 
genealogical analysis is on treating social practices as tactics and strategies of 
conflict by which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others, as 
subjects of knowledge, and as moral agents (Foucault, 1984). Since truth is 
established by the tactics and strategies of conflict, one cannot say that any 
particular theory of human action is true or mistaken. One can only describe the 
tactics and strategies used to establish and resist. With his turn to examine the 
genealogy of the subject (Foucault, 1990), Thiele ( 1986) has pointed out that 
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Foucault replaced the metaphor of war with that of governance. Thus, Foucault 
is interested in tactics which encourage and incite as well as those which are 
used to overcome resistance. 
By focusing on social practices as techniques of power or governance, 
Foucault recognizes that the practices which are often rendered in terms of 
power neutral rules or descriptions (Giddens, 1984; Agar, 1988; Geertz, 1988) 
are in fact not power neutral. For example, I see white stuff falling to the ground 
in the middle of winter, and I have a rule which assigns the term "snow" to it. If 
that rule is··a metaphor -- A is B -- it tends to encourage me to call it snow. If the 
rule if a simile -- A is like B -- it encourages me to have some doubt about the 
adequacy of the term "snow" for the white stuff falling. An Eskimo would have 
as many as twenty words to apply to the scene. The rules for appropriately 
identifying white stuff falling in winter -- in the words of Goffman ( 1967) -- set up 
certain lines of action and inhibits others. Rules are not power neutral for 
Foucault (1972). The production of discourse is governed by various 
procedures. Foucault (1972) classified such procedures as rules of exclusion --
including prohibition, division and rejection, and the opposition between true 
and false -- or as internal rules concerned with principles of classification, 
ordering, and distribution. 
By focusing on social practices as techniques of power or governance, 
Foucault recognizes that the practices which are often rendered in terms of 
objectivity and subjectivity are constructed by practices such as discipline and 
confession. In Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979), Foucault demonstrates how 
the techniques of discipline are used to fabricate the individual as an object with 
objective characteristics. For Foucault, discipline constructs the individual as an 
object through enclosure, partitioning, the functional coding of sites, and the 
ranking of individuals. Ranking individualizes bodies, distributes them, and 
circulates them in a network of relations. Activity is controlled through the use of 
time tables, the temporal elaboration of acts, the correlation of the body and 
gesture, the articulation of the relationship between the body and objects, the 
exhaustive use of the body and acts, and a system for signaling commands. 
Once the relationship between various aspects of the individual, acts, space, 
objects, and time are marked out, discipline proceeds by training, which utilizes 
hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. 
Normalizing judgment is not aimed at expiation or repression. · It relates 
individual acts to a field of comparison in terms of minimal thresholds or in terms 
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of an optimum toward which one must move. As individuals cire ranked in a 
field of comparison, they are marked with respect to a hierarchy of qualities and 
skills and are rewarded and punished by the ranking itself. The examination 
combines the observing hierarchy and normalizing judgment to make 
individuals visible in a way to differentiate and judge them. 
Subjectivity emerged from the technology of the confession. The 
confession is analyzed by Foucault (1990) as a ritual of discourse in which the 
speaking subject is also the subject of the statement. The confession is told in 
the presence of an authority who requires, prescribes, appreciates, and 
intervenes in the confession to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile. 
In the confession, truth is confirmed by the obstacles and resistance which it 
must overcome to be formulated. The process of expression independent of its 
external consequences produces intrinsic modifications in the person who tells 
it. It exonerates, redeems, purifies, unburdens, liberates, and promises 
salvation. In the nineteenth century, the sexual confession came to be 
constituted in scientific terms. By combining the confession with examination 
and interrogation, the procedure of confession was placed in the field of 
scientific observation. The postulation of a general and diffuse causal power of 
sex justified having to tell everything. The principle of latency made the ways of 
sex obscure and elusive. In the one who spoke, truth was incomplete and blind 
to itself. Therefore, truth could only reach completion in the one who 
assimilated and recorded it. The revelation of the speaker required the 
interpretation of the hearer for truth to be complete. The purpose of confession 
through medicalization was health instead of redemption. Thus, Foucault was 
able to account for meaning and subjectivity by way of the technique of 
confession. 
Foucault's perspective which renders social practices in terms of tactics 
and strategies or techniques of governance which encourage certain lines of 
action and inhibit others has been criticized by many. Most of these criticisms 
rely on realist assumptions which posit either the essential nature of the actor, 
scene, or both. For example, Giddens (1984) criticized Foucault for turning the 
subject into an epiphenomenon of the tactics of power. As noted earlier, 
Giddens must do this because he needs a source of motivation in the actor to 
utilize power neutral rules. In a similar fashion, Taylor (1984) criticized Foucault 
for attributing strategic patterns to a context without attributing 'such strategic 
patterns to anyone's conscious plan. Again similarly, Bhaska~ (1986) has 
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pointed out that actors intentionally create contexts which contain both the 
intended and unintended consequences of the actor such that the strategic 
patterns of the actor could continue through the strategic patterns of the context 
even in the absence of the actor. Yet, in a critique of Taylor, Patton (1989) has 
noted that Taylor's concept of power is built on the exercise of power while 
Foucault's concept of power is built on capacities. Patton demonstrated that 
power as capacity is prior to all other senses of power. In other words, agency 
stripped of purpose is prior to exercise. Realists, such as Giddens, Taylor.and 
Bhaskar, require purpose to motivate agency. In fact, Bhaskar (1986) claimed 
that purpose is caused by good reasons. However, good reasons are parts of 
apparatuses and are themselves replete with asymmetries which encourage 
certain lines of actions and discourage others. The only way that power can be 
separated from the asymmetries of apparatuses is to locate a principle of 
decision making in some essence which is not modified by the apparatuses by 
which distinctions are made and by which actions are executed. This is 
precisely what Foucault refuses to do. By focusing on social practices from a 
tactical viewpoint, he renders actors, purposes, acts, and scenes in terms of 
agency. 
Realists attack Foucault's epistemology by pointing out that practice 
implies a reality separate from the practice. Margolis (1986) noted that there 
can be no practice without a recognition of a reality within the life of a practice. 
That is, one is always searching for the necessary within the contingent. 
Shapiro (1990) has pointed out that science assumes a causal mechanism that 
operates independent of our ability to perceive it. Bhaskar (1986) has observed 
that there are three levels of reality: the real, the actual, and the apparent. 
While our research practices affect what is apparent, there is a reality that 
makes it possible to refine the efforts of our research practices to more 
accurately approximate the real. Unlike the realists, Foucault is unwilling to 
privilege any picture of reality as true because there is no way to separate 
knowledge from the practices used to .establish it. At the same time, Cooke 
(1993) has pointed out that Foucault at least avoids solipsism by the minimal 
realism of recognizing sources of recalcitrance and asymmetries set up by the 
practices of other actors. While one cannot claim a truth trans~endent of the 
apparatuses used to establish it as the realist would have one do, one can use 
Foucault to describe the apparatuses and resistance involved; in social action 
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and the consequences associated with those apparatuses and resistance. 
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Now that Foucault's perspective has been briefly outlined and his critics 
have been briefly answered, consider his perspective again in relation to the 
new institutionalism in organizational analysis. If one looks at Foucault's 
development of the idea of social practices as techniques of power, one can 
see similarities and differences between Foucault's conceptualization of social 
practices and those used by those engaged in the new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis. According to Powell and DiMaggio (1991), the 
cognitive and cultural model used by most new institutional analysts are those 
of the limited rationality perspective of Simon and March (Simon, 1945; March 
and Simon, 1958), phenomenology (Schutz, 1962, 1967), or ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, 1967; Cicourel, 1974). In so far as these perspectives attend to the 
asymmetric aspects of limited cognitive capacities, typifications, and acts with 
respect to setting up of inhibiting lines of action, they are similar to Foucault's 
perspective. For example, Simon (1945) noted that habits direct one to attend 
to selected aspects of a situation. Or again, drawing on Schutz (1962, 1967), 
Garfinkel ('1967) has demonstrated how the assumption that your 
taken-for-granted reality is the same as mine makes possible lines of action 
consistent with that assumption. However, to the extent that habits, rules, and 
typifications are rendered descriptive without attending to how these elements 
set up asymmetries with respect to action, new institutional analysis departs 
from Foucault's perspective. For example, Meyer and Rowan (1991) noted that 
taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications rather than norms and 
values are the elements that constitute institutions. But, if I cannot see these 
scripts, rules, and classifications in terms of the asymmetries they set up for 
action, they just sit there and do not help one to understand how things work. 
By attending to actors, acts, scenes, and purposes in terms of the agency of 
social practice, Foucault gives one a ruse which allows one to look at how 
things work. 
To use Foucault's perspective to study labor relations is not to enter the 
research arena with a new theory. Rather, it is to enter the research arena with 
a particular perspective. All situations are treated as practical systems which 
concentrate on what people do and on the way they do it. By treating social 
practices as techniques, one can concentrate on the asymmetries of the 
deployments used. That is, one can concentrate on how certain lines of action 
are enticed or inhibited. Rather than starting with.practices as ,a system, 
Foucault (1984) starts with how practices actually work at the micro level of 
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control over things, actions upon others, and actions upon oneself. Once one 
has identified how things work at the micro level, one can then explore how the 
techniques identified emerged, circulate, and are colonized by others in other 
practices. 
Chapter II 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: TRUST, OTHER 
TECHNOLOGIES OF CONTROLLING RELATIONSHIPS, 
AND THE LABOR RELATIONS ARENA 
Introduction 
There are three issues which must be considered before developing the 
actual analytic to conduct this study. First, if one is to apply Foucault's approach 
to an analysis of trust, one must understand trust as a technique for managing 
relations. This perspective tends to fly in the face of our understanding of trust 
as a natural, nonmanipulative approach to interaction. However, remembering 
that all social practices set up asymmetries with respect to different lines of 
action, trust as a technique will be explored. Second, Bradach and Eccles 
(1989) have noted that trust is one of three types of mechanisms -- price, 
authority, and trust -- that govern economic transactions between actors. Given 
Foucault's (1979) work on discipline, Taylor's (1939) work on scientific 
management, Braverman's (1974) work on deskilling, and Edwards' (1978) 
work on the control of the labor process, discipline as well as other mechanisms 
at work in labor relations should be added to the list with market, authority, and 
trust. On the one hand, Bradach and Eccles (1989) have suggested that these 
different techniques of managing relations are not mutually exclusive but can be 
used in combination. On the other hand, Sackmann (1991) found that the 
beliefs and strategies used by firms need to be aligned. Is it possible to train 
work groups and first line supervisors in the ways of participatory management 
and trust while practicing union avoidance and suppression in official labor 
relations and cost containment and flexibility with changing labor requirements 
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at the strategic level of a company? In other words, are practices of trust and 
other practices of managing relations compatible and reinforcing of each other 
or are they problematic for each other? Finally, labor relations studies have 
1 1 
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traditionally been conducted exclusively around practices connected with how a 
company and a union relate: elections, arbitration, grievance procedures, 
negotiations, strikes, and lock-outs. However, it will be argued with Kochan et 
al. ( 1986, 1991) that the strategic, industrial relations, and work group levels all 
must be considered to understand labor relations in a company. 
Trust as a Technology of Managing Relations 
For one to apply Foucault to the issue of trust, trust must be understood 
as a social practice which can be analyzed as a technique for governing 
relationships. While Bradach and Eccles (1989) in a review article claim that 
trust can be seen as a control mechanism along with price and authority to 
govern economic transactions among actors, most analyses of trust do not treat 
trust as a mechanism in the sense of social practice as technique. Instead, they 
root trust in some aspect of the actor or scene in various ways. In this section, I 
will begin by outlining and criticizing trust understood as a natural state, as the 
taken-for-granted nature of the natural attitude of actors, as expectations 
generated from social learning, as an organizational climate, and as a social 
practice. Then, I will make a general criticism of most of the literature on trust by 
noting that it assumes a situation of secondary relationships and totally ignores 
the situation of primary relationships. I will also note that it is built on the 
subject-object dichotomy set up by technologies of discipline and confession. 
Then, I will argue that relationship itself is a social fiction which is built on social 
practices which must be examined with respect to trust rather than the fictions of 
self, other, risk, or goals in the first instance. I will show how relationship 
involves a set of practices, can become an object to be worked on in interaction, 
and has implications for defining the self and the other for both primary and 
secondary_relationships. I .will then explore the problem of trust as it appears in 
the academic literature in the context of primary and secondary relations. 
A Critique of Concepts of Trust 
One understanding of trust roots trust in the natural, unfettered state of an actor. 
"Trust can be and often is instinctive; it is unstrategized and freely given. It is 
something very much like love ... " (Gibb, 1978: 14). When Gibb contrasts trust 
with defensiveness, he contrasts "being me" with "playing a rol.e." While he did 
13 
not make such an approach central to his analysis of trust, Luhmann (1979) 
similarly relates willingness to trust to inner security. Foucault makes such a 
viewpoint problematic. In his work on sexuality (Foucault, 1990) and 
subjectivity (Foucault, 1982), Foucault demonstrates that the assumed identity 
required to "be me" is tied to a conscience or self-knowledge which cannot exist 
independent of the devices by which such self-knowledge is created. Knights 
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and Willmott (1989) tie the development of self-knowledge to technologies of 
work which separate people from each other, which make these separated 
individuals more directly and intensely responsible as persons for their own 
actions, and -- as a result -- which make people's sense of what and who they 
are more problematic. Yet another line of inquiry which makes 'being me" and 
"trust" problematic is presented by Zurcher (1986). Here, "being me" is part of a 
script that is marketed through awareness-training organizations. Trust is one 
of the "stages" one can reach through self-awareness training. So, does the 
training unfetter me to trust or does it simply use trust as a way to mark and 
define me or to create an open-ended process to keep me coming back for 
more training? 
Another way oflooking at trust is rooted in the taken-for-granted nature of the 
natural attitude of actors. Schutz ( 1967) points out that an actor has an expectation 
about situations, assumes that the other with whom the actor is interacting has 
the same expectation, and assumes that the other assumes that the actor has 
the same expectations as the other. For Garfinkel (1963), interaction within this 
set of assumptions constitutes trust. Several researchers use some or all of 
Garfinkel's basic notion. Even though they move beyond the consistency of 
expectations to include issues of risk in their understanding of trust, Luhmann 
(1979) and Barber (1983) both recognize that trust is fundamentally the 
expectation that the natural order will persist and be realized. Williams (1988) 
is even more careful to adopt Schutz's (1967) description of the natural attitude 
with respect to trust by claiming that trust means knowing each other's 
preference schedule and knowing that each other knows that each other knows 
the preference schedule. In one way, Garfinkel's equation of the natural attitude 
with trust seems tautological. What keeps it from being so can be seen in 
Cicourel's ( 197 4) and Collins' ( 19.81) specification of this notion of trust by 
placing the issue of trust in the midst of acts which breach or violate the natural 
attitude which Garfinkel equates with the natural attitude. For Cicourel (1974) 
and Collins ( 1981 ), trust means that participants in an interaction are willing to 
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do accommodative work to normalize interactions that seem fo violate the 
expectations of the natural attitude. In other words, trust means that people are 
willing to continue to rely on the natural attitude and to continue to act as if the 
assumptions were true to keep the interaction within the bounds of the natural 
attitude. But, what happens if the accommodative work does not work or if the 
breach is such that it cannot be normalized? Garfinkel (1963) claims that the 
result is confusion. The real question is what kind of attributes are made about 
the breach. Is the person who breaches the taken-for-granted assumptions 
crazy? Zucher (1986) notes that, in addition to the perspective of the natural 
attitude, one must consider a specific assumption of interaction: The other 
person will put self-interest aside in favor of an Hother-orientati.on. H In other 
words, for trust to be an issue, the violation of the taken-for-granted expectations 
of actors must be attributed to opportunism on an actor's part and not to mental 
illness or to some other motive. Thus, placing the issue of trust only in the 
natural attitude of the actor is not a totally satisfactory way to understand the 
issue. 
One final way in which Garfinkel's understanding of trust can be criticized 
is to raise problems with the adequacy of the use of the taken-for-granted nature 
of the natural attitude as causal agent. That is, the unmoved mover in 
Garfinkel's model is the natural attitude. If I have expectations and ways of 
acting taken from the typifications in my stock of knowledge (Schutz, 1967), my 
natural attitude is adequate for me to use these and for these to prevail. If there 
is a challenge to my actions, I use my assumption that we are acting as if we are 
sharing a common definition of reality and keep on acting to fulfill that 
assumption. Simon and March (Simon, 1945; March and Simon, 1958) create 
a similar situation by placing the unmoved mover in a limited stock of 
knowledge rather than in the natural attitude. While acknowledging that the 
natural attitude and a limited stock of knowledge do have an asymmetry to 
them, the typifications and rules in one's stock of knowledge are not power 
neutral. 
Second, as Goffman notes (1959), actors use various devices .to maintain a 
single definition of a situation. They do so by what they express, and this 
expression must be sustained in the face of disruptions. From [Goffman's 
perspective, trust is created in interaction rather than interaction being created 
by the Htrusr of the natural attitude. 
Yet another perspective which places the issue of trust in some aspect of the actor is 
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social learning theory. Here, Rotter (1967) defines trust as an expectancy that one 
party that can rely upon the word or promise of another party. Similarly 
Dasgupta (1988) and Gambetta (1988) define trust as a particular level of 
subjective probability or expectancy about the actions of other people whose 
actions affect the truster without the ability of the truster to monitor or to monitor 
before hand the actions of those on whom the truster must rely. While Rotter 
(1967) and Braun and Foddy (1988) are interested in how generalized an 
attitude of trust is toward various types of actors, Dasgupta (1988) and 
Gambetta (1988) tend to focus on expectancy in terms of probability. 
Two lines of criticism have been raised against these lines of analyzing 
trust. First, Luhmann (1979) notes that decision makers. often do not have 
knowledge about others on whom they must depend at the time of a decision. 
Furthermore, such knowledge is rarely in the form of calculable probability. 
Dasgupta (1988) notes the difficulty of assessing probabilities with respect to 
trust. So, he suggests that trust be assessed in terms of the cost that has to be 
paid by each party to trust. Of course, the problem here is that expectancy 
theories rely on a scheme which multiplies probabilities of events with values of 
outcomes to make decisions. With Dasgupta's suggestion, one term is missing 
in the calculation. Most likely -- given the dichotomy of trust/distrust --
judgments about trusting are a dividing practice with all or nothing designations 
and consequences rather than any kind of continuous probability function. 
Second, in an attempt to validate his Interpersonal Trust Scale, which is 
designed to explore the generalizability of trust to various types of actors, Rotter 
( 1967) used a two-person non-zero-sum game with people who had various 
levels of trust in terms of generalizing a trusting attitude to various classes of 
actors. Hs found that the game was reacted to by many if not all subjects as a 
competitive game regardless of instructions to ameliorate the competitive affects 
of the game. This would suggest that the practices actually involved in 
interaction have more to do with the practice of trust than do responses to a 
questionnaire about whom people trust which are designed to mark the tested 
as trusters or nontrusters. 
Whereas the previous approaches to studying trust utilize devices to 
plant trust in some aspect of the actor, other approaches const~uct a way to 
attribute trust to some aspect of the scene. Slyton et al. (1982) utilize the concept 
of organizational climate to talk about trust in an organization. "Organizational climate 
is generally viewed as a variable, or set of variables, that represent the norms, 
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feelings and attitudes prevailing at a workplace ... " (Slyton et al., 1982: 208). 
In a way similar to how Rotter (1967) uses the Interpersonal Trust Scale to get 
responses on a five point scale to rate statements about the types of people that 
one trusts, the organizational climate approach of Slyton et al. (1982) gets 
responses· on a five point scale to statements about an organization's norms 
and atmosphere. One variant (Zett-Otte, 1989/1990) to this approach is to ask 
people to respond to items about organizational behavior rather than about 
organizational climate. If one examines the organizational climate factors found 
by Slyton et al. (1982) as compared with the organizational behaviors found by 
Zett-Otte (1989/1990), one finds several similarities: Hostility is similar to power 
plays and conflict, mutual regard and trust are similar to trust, joint participation 
and cooperativeness are similar to cohesiveness, and apathy is similar to 
motivation. 
A most obvious criticism to this approach to studying trust in the work 
place is that of reification: How can an "organization" have behaviors or 
beliefs? One way out of this problem is to unhinge culture from the measuring 
device in order to identify elements of culture. Then, one can explore how they 
work in interaction. This was what Rice (1986) did as he explored how 
differences between American and Japanese cultural attributes found in 
individual and social identities affected intra-firm conflicts. However, the whole 
reification argument is finally built on a realist perspective with the actor 
constituting that which is real. Foucault (1980) might instead encourage one to 
recognize that those questionnaire devices used to "measure trust" as "an 
individual attribute" or as an aspect of "an organization" are actually used and 
are treated as if they were measuring something real. He would encourage one 
to explore how they are used. For example, the organization in which this study 
was done hired a management consultant firm to assess the company's 
organizational climate. The purpose for this study was to identify problematic 
work groups so intervention strategies -- such as team building and active 
listening skill training for management "'.'" might be implemented to deal with 
labor-management and management-management problems. As Gamson 
(1968) noted, persons in authority need the trust of those over whom they 
exercise authority to more effectively and efficiently have their commands 
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carried out rather than questioned or fought. The "knowledge" about "trust" with 
each work group set up different treatments on different work groups. While not 
done in the company in this study, one could use Rotter's (1967) Interpersonal 
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Trust Scale, correlate it with various ucritical behaviorsu associated with a job 
classification (Landy, 1985), and use it as a barrier to job entry. Again, utrustu 
has differential effects on workers. And, the uobjective, u uquantitativeu 
methodology of the questionnaire and correlation in test construction helps to 
erect the appearance of utruthu while hiding the managerial decisions regarding 
ucritical behaviorsu and questionnaire construction. 
In yet another vein, trust can be understood as a social pmctice. The situation 
of trust according to Griffin and Patton (1971) seems to contain three elements: 
reliance upon another, risk, and goal achievement. With respect to risk, 
Luhmann (1979) similarly points out that risk is present in situations of trust 
because the future contains more possibilities than have been realized in the 
past or present. Powell (1990) observes that our abounded rationalityu does not 
allow us to foresee all possibilities. Trust is an alternative to rational prediction · 
(Lewis and Weigert, 1985). As Luhmann contends, trust handles risk by 
tolerating it rather than by monitoring, developing contingencies, socializing 
through insurance or other such mechanisms, etc. With respect to reliance 
upon another, Luhmann (1979, 1988) claims that reliance upon another is what 
differentiates mere familiarity from confidence and trust. Similarly, Williams 
(1988) distinguishes between cooperation and dependence. Cooperation is a 
symmetrical relationship which does not really require trust. However, 
dependence is asymmetrical in that what X gets out of a venture depends on Y 
doing her part, and Y does not depend on X. Good (1988) extends the analysis 
of reliance by pointing out that Y also displays trust in X's representation of the 
conditions of the request made by X. Finally, with respect to goal achievement, 
Luhmann (1988) uses goal achievement to differentiate trust from confidence. If 
one has to rely on others but considered other alternatives, one is in a situation 
of trust. Reliance on others with no consideration of alternatives is what 
Luhmann (1988) terms confidence. 
To deal with being in a situation of relying on someone in a risky situation 
to achieve a goal, Griffin and Patton (1971) point out that a person must assess 
the other, assess the risk, and assess the value of the goal. In earlier 
discussions of trust and social learning theory, it was shown how social learning 
theory is built on devices for assigning probability with respect ;to risk and for 
assigning values to goals. It was also noted that this is a diffic~lt task which may 
be done by deployments used by the economist, the accountant, or the actuary, 
but it probably is not done by the average person. So, most of the average 
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person's efforts go into an assessment of the other. Simmel (1978), Luhmann 
(1979), and Lewis and Weigert (1985) claim that the problem of trust with 
respect to the other is whether or not the identity of the other is what it appears 
to be. Practically, Good (1988) observes that people use reputation to assess 
trustworthiness. Cantrell (1984) claims that we try to determine the integrity, 
competence, consistency, and loyalty of the other. Similarly, Barber (1983) 
observes that we look at whether or not the other is "technically competent" and 
can be relied on with respect to "fiduciary obligation and responsibility."3 
The Assumed Secondary Relationship and Subject-object Dichotomy in the 
Conceptualization of Trust 
As one glances at trust as a social practice, one is struck by how the 
setting is put together. First, the "other" is turned into an object who has 
instrumental value but who cannot be controlled and therefore represents a risk. 
So, one is left with a dichotomous decision -- trust or distrust. To decide 
whether one should trust or distrust, one can work on the meaning of the other --
again, treating the other as an object -- with respect to the other's 
trustworthiness in terms of reputation. While Griffin and Patton ( 1971) carried 
out experiments with this theoretical framework in the context of interpersonal 
relations, it seems to me that the theoretical framework rests more on secondary 
relations than on the primary relations usually implied by interpersonal 
relations. For Cooley (1962), primary relationships are like those found among 
friends and within families. Here, the welfare of the other is more important than 
the achievement of goals. In fact, one wonders if "other" is an appropriate term 
to mark a friend or family member. Primary relations are based on affection and 
face-to-face interaction. Secondary relationships (Cooley, 1962) focus on goal 
achievement. Here the other is "other" and the other has instrumental value for 
goal achievement. Feelings of affection are replaced with rational 
considerations of self-interest. Thus, one can see that almost all theorization about 
trust rests on the assumption of secondary relations even when they are applied to scenes of 
primazy relations. 
Just as Foucault (1965) traces how the separation of reason from folly 
linguistically emerged from the physical confinement of the undesirables from 
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the rest of the population, Zucker (1986) traces the effect of changing social 
organization on the nature of trust as trust moved from process trust to trust 
based on characteristics or to institutional trust. When communities were small, 
migration was low, and business was conducted with a stable set of actors, past 
experience or expected future exchanges made trusting relatively 
unproblematic.4 Then, there were high rates of immigration with a resulting 
disruption in the stability of transactions. Here, trustworthiness was assessed 
by ascribed characteristics. Once exchange involves crossing group 
boundaries, geographic distance, and non-separable elements, institutional 
trust arose through such devices as credentials and escrow accounts. At this 
point, one has the full blown conditions on which trust has been theorized on 
the assumption of secondary relationships. Anderson (1971) identifies a similar 
development in England by identifying four variables which can be used to 
theorize about trust with respect to changes in social organization: (1) a 
positive relation between group homogeneity and trust levels, (2) a positive 
relation between connectedness of social networks and trust levels, (3) a 
negative relationship between the size and complexity of a community and trust 
levels, and (4) a negative relationship between the rate of social change the 
trust levels. 
Not only does most theorization about trust rest on the model of secondary 
relationships, it also rests on the subject-object dichotomywhich is built on techniques 
of discipline (Foucault, 1979) and on techniques of confession (Foucault, 1990) 
as discussed in the introduction. Here, even Foucault (1984) tends to be 
trapped into this dichotomy by focusing on techniques of social practices with 
respect to objects, others, and the self. Yet, a glance at the treatment of trust by 
a few academics suggests that relationship is the fictional substance on which 
one must concentrate rather than objects, others, and the self. Here, 
relationship can be seen as a set of practices for constructing trust, an object to 
be worked on in interaction, and a device for defining the self and the other. For 
example, relationship was made central in Macneil's (1978) theory of relational 
contracting which makes the maintenance of a relation of central importance. 
Relationship is suggested by Lewis and Weigert (1985) when they define trust 
as a property of a collective unit and applicable to relations rather than to 
psychological states. Relationship is raised by Coleman (1984) as he reacts to 
models which "measure" trust and then aggregate it instead of defining trust as 
a relationship between two actors. Relationship is pointed to by Granovetter 
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(1985) when he places trust in social relations and obligations inherent in them 
instead of placing trust in generalized morality or institutional arrangements. 
Relationship is hinted at by Powell (1990) as he gives place to relationship as a 
social practice for constructing social organizations through social networks. 
Thus, I claim that relationship itselfis a soda/ practice which one must examine with 
respect to trust as well as the self, the other, risk, or goals. 
Practices Used to Construct Relationships 
Let us first look at a few examples of how relations might be constructed and 
objectified in primary relationships . . Consider the practice of tutoiement in France 
(Hagiwara and de Rocher, 1977). In French, a distinction is made between the 
formal you (vous) and the informal you (tu). Such a distinction also existed in 
English once. Tu is used when speaking to children, animals, and with family 
members. To decide to use tu with someone outside of this context requires 
some discussion. Thus, Hagiwara and de Rocher (1977) develop a French 
conversation exercise around two acquaintances -- Jenny and Jean-Paul -- as 
they decide to use tu instead of vous with each other. In the conversation, 
Jean-Paul explains to Jenny that the majority of French students today use tuto 
denote their camaraderie, even between men and women. Since Jenny and 
Jean-Paul are good friends, she agrees. Here, the fictional substance being 
worked on in the first instance in the meaning of the relationship between Jenny 
and Jean-Paul -- tu or vous. The relationship is constructed and reconstructed 
by using tu with each other instead of vous. It redefines who they are and what 
is acceptable with each other and with others. 
Or again, consider the conversation between Jesus and Simon Peter in 
Christian scripture in the gospel according to John. In Jesus' third appearance 
to his disciples after his death (John 21: 1-14), Simon Peter fails to recognize 
Jesus until others first recognize him. Jesus then asks him (John 21: 15-17) --
and I will use the language used in many English translations .. - "Simon, do you 
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love (root: aywraw) me more than the others?" Simon answers that Jesus 
knows that Simon loves (root: ¢1;.Jw) him. This same question and response is 
then repeated a second time. The third time, Jesus asks, "Simon, do you love 
(root: ¢1;..[w) me?" The text records that Simon Peter was sad because Jesus 
asked the question a third time. Peter responds, "Lord, you know I love (root: 
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¢1;.lw) you." First, as with tutoiement, Jesus and Simon Peter are working on the 
meaning of their relationship. If you were to translate aymr~w and ¢1;.fw more 
accurately into English, the words would translate roughly into love and friend. 
So, Jesus asks twice if Simon Peter loves him, and Simon Peter responds that 
they are friends. Then, Jesus ask if they are really friends. Simon Peter is hurt 
by this question. He replies that Jesus knows that they are friends. Clearly, the 
use of the terms love and friend are a large part of what constitutes and 
reconstitutes the relationship. And again, which type of relationship they have 
clearly has meaning for whom they are to each other and to the other disciples. 
The use of relationship as a fictional substance constructed and objectified by social 
practices in secondary relationships can be seen in the assumptions of other sociological 
approaches. For example, Weber (1978) recognizes that social relations are 
often asymmetrical in that one person in the relationship has the ability to 
command another with the expectation that the command will be followed. 
Because Weber defined social relationship as "the behavior of a plurality of 
actors insofar as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of 
that of the others and is oriented in these terms" (Weber, 1978: 26), he was 
forced to explore asymmetry from the perspective of the legitimacy of the 
asymmetry of the relationship. Can one think about the issue of "legitimacy" 
apart from a hierarchical relationship and all of the practices that go into its 
construction: parent-child, employer-employee, master-disciple, 
master-servant, king-subject, etc.? In a bureaucracy (Edwards, 1984), one 
substitutes a set of rules for a person in the hierarchical relationship: job 
description/company goals/manuals of procedures - employee. So, issues of 
legitimacy are cast in terms of the legal/rational rules which construct the 
relationship. By focusing on the issue of legitimacy, Weber assumes but does 
not address the assumed relationship because of his focus on the subjectivity of 
actors. 
Because relationship in and of itself is not theorized, one might be 
tempted to add the element of material dependence as an adequate 
explanation of hierarchy. For example, Weber (1978) notes several 
dependencies in hierarchy. Additionally, theories of exchange and network 
analysis link dependency and hierarchy (Turner, 1991). But, consider the 
following two examples which indicate that hierarchy as a method of 
constructing a relationship and material dependency are not necessarily linked. 
First, it is often the case that one spouse is economically dependent on the 
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other in a marriage. Traditionally, there has been a hierarchical relationship 
between men and women in marriage. Yet, as Milton (1951) noted in the 
seventeenth century, companionship can -- and should from his point of view --
be the nature of the marital relationship. Companionship -- literally meaning 
breaking bread together -- is not hierarchy even if one spouse is materially 
dependent on the other. Second, in studying ownership in the work place, 
Russell (1985) notes that workers can be economically dependent on an 
organization while cooperatively controlling work and strategic decisions in 
cooperatives. Again, this is not hierarchy even though it is dependency. 
Another type of theorizing ignores the social practices of relationship by 
using the model of social structure. For example, Parsons (1951) used the 
status-rule-complex as the basic unit of the social system. But, what makes it 
possible to look at statuses as positions in a system? What makes it possible to 
specify expected behaviors of a person who occupies a status as a role? If one 
recognizes relationship as a social practice, one can identify the practice upon 
which the notion of structure is built. A second example of ignoring the social 
practices of relationship by using the model of social structure is network 
analysis. Here, Anderson (1971) notes that the greater the connectedness of 
social networks, the greater the level of trust. Would this be the same if it were a 
network of people who have been close friends since childhood instead of a 
network of actors with no relation beyond work in a highly competitive, changing 
order (Griffin and Patton, 1971 )? 
Finally, another line of social research into trust pays attention to the 
behaviors which engender trust without attending to the relationship itself. 
Deutsch (1958) and Gibb (1978) observe that trust can be encouraged by 
exhibiting the acceptance of the other or by revealing oneself and thus risk 
acceptance or rejection. Besides risking rejection, abuse, or misuse of shared 
information about feelings or the self, one can extend trust and risk opportunism 
on the part of the other by discharging obligations in advance (Luhmann, 1979), 
by discussing problems fully (Gibb, 1961; Tjosvold and Chia, 1989), or by 
openly and willingly sharing ideas and information (Butler and Cantrell, 1984). 
One can exhibit a refusal to opportunistically use information about the other's 
self or about the situation at hand by exhibiting spontaneity rather than strategic 
calculation (Gibb, 1961), by trying to understand each other's perspective 
(Tjosvold and Chia, 1989), or by integrating each other's ideas (Tjosvold and 
Chia, 1989). Such integration and communications of mutual goals and 
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benefits helps to create a common line of behavior and to avert opportunism 
(Tjosvold and Chia, 1989). While such behaviors are an integral part of tactics 
of trust, such an approach which does not explore the relationships within which 
these behaviors occur cannot distinguish between face-to-face situation which 
occur between friends and those that occur between employer and employee or 
seller and buyer. 
Trust in Primary and Secondary Relationships in the Work Place 
With respect to primary relationships, Maculay alerts one to the possible 
power effects of friendship and techniques of trust when he notes that 
relationships carefully worked out through devices such as contracts " ... 
indicate a lack of trust and blunts the demand of friendship" ( Maculay, 1963: 
64). Here, Maculay illustrates how this works with sales representatives and 
purchasing agents who have done business for years. Because they see each 
other as friends, they can call each other and solve problems because they can 
openly share information and problems. One's boss might want one to act 
opportunistically. But, because two people are friends, one cannot do so. 
Instead, one must level with one's friend and try to find a solution that does not 
hurt the friend or the relationship. Thus, friendship constrains opportunistic 
behavior. · 
What happens when trust is broken and yet the maintenance of a 
relationship is important? Here, the literature is silent. Yet, a reflection on one's 
own personal relations and on experiences in faith communities reveal rituals 
by which broken trust is restored: forgiveness, repentance, reconciliation, 
restitution, etc. In his work on the confession, Foucault ( 1991) totally ignores the 
relation repairing effects of the confession. Instead, he is interested in the 
effects of the confession on the teller and on the construction of subjectivity from 
the confession. Yet, confession is first a ritual for restoring and repairing a 
relationship. Primary relationships do not guarantee trust. But, if trust is broken, 
the valuing of the relationship and techniques for restoring and repairing trust 
make it possible to maintain the relationship. 
Even though two actors might act in a face-to-face situation, what 
happens when the relationship between them is not constructed as a friendship 
but as employer and employee or as seller and buyer? Here, there is no 
friendship which would be destroyed by opportunistic behavior. There is no 
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mutual intrinsic valuing of each other and our feelings and fates. There are no 
rituals for repairing and restoring relationships. Hierarchy, market, discipline, 
and the confession turn the person into an instrument, a scientific object, a 
commodity, or a combination of them through the deployment of a number of 
devices. Another look at the literature on trust assumes such a situation -- a 
situation of secondary relationships. 
The first type of secondary relationship which appears in the literature on trust 
assumes a division of actors into closed groups (Lansberg, 1989) such that relationships 
are across boundaries (Zucker, 1986). Groups and boundaries set up the 
possibility of front and back regions of interaction (Goffman, 1959). Such a 
division into groups utilizing physical or social distance is an integral part of 
hierarchy and discipline (Foucault, 1979) and of the market (Appadurai, 1986). 
How is one to assess a command, the execution of a command, or a potential 
transaction in this situation? Since one knows that something is going on in the 
back region, one is left trying to decide whether or not the "identity" and "order" 
presented in the front region is what it appears to be (Luhmann, 1979; Lewis 
and Weigert, 1985). Thus, one attends to the reputation of the actor or 
organization with whom one is interacting (Good, 1988). Since trust is a 
reputational issue in this situation, it can be acquired and lost (Dasgupta, 1988; 
Gambetta, 1988) through such devices as ethnic or cultural characteristics, 
brand advertising, self aggrandizing speech, policies of standing behind goods 
and services, advertising such policies, corporate responsibility ideologies, etc. 
In addition to examining the reputation of the actor to be trusted, one can also 
assess the opportunity for the other to cheat. For example, one can assess 
whether or not to trust the other by focusing on the other's motivational structure 
(Luhmann, 1979). Or again, one can explore whether or not the other's 
interests coincide with one's interest (Gamson, 1968). Regardless of how one 
assesses reputation or opportunity to cheat, there is no relation of friendship on 
which one can rely. One is left with the problem of tolerating risk. 
There are at least three approaches to managing trust in this first type of 
secondary relationship which do so by injecting elements of primary 
relationships into the secondary relationship. First, Shea (1984) recognizes 
that people in the work place live in a system of hierarchy in which the 
supervisor assigns work, provides information, appraises performance, rewards 
and punishes behavior, and controls opportunities for advancement. Given this 
relationship, Shea (1984) proposes seven guidelines to build trust between the 
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supervisor and the subordinate. The first three guidelines -- analyze the work to 
assign work which is challenging, train subordinates in one acceptable method 
but give them freedom to innovate, and focus on what gets done rather than on 
how it gets done -- create the potential for risks by giving workers a realm for 
acting in ways that either exhibit incompetence or opportunism. At the same 
time, these guidelines are an act of extending trust on the part of management. 
Yet, they do so in a way that limits risk: a manager trains workers in at least one 
acceptable method of working and audits what gets done. The next guideline --
avoid using coercive power -- substitutes self controlling methods for command 
through delegating authority, through using T' messages in communications, 
and through using Rogerian listening. As Knight and Willmott (1988) observe, 
making individuals more directly and intensely responsible as persons for their 
own actions is a very effective means of self control. The next two guidelines --
concentrate on solving the problem and skip the search for who is guilty --
replaces punishment and degradation leading toward ending the work 
relationship with techniques for dealing with the work itself. By doing so, a 
manager does not threaten the relationship they have or the worker's security. 
In other words, the manager acts out a valuing of the worker and refuses to act 
opportunistically toward the worker. The final guideline -- support.your 
subordinates and help them to come out winners -- are acts confirming the trust 
put in workers by supervisors and the relationship between them. 
Second, Levering (1988) recognizes that work is a commodity exchange 
of work for pay. If taken to its logical conclusion as a commodity exchange, both 
employers and employees give up as little as possible while trying to maximize 
their own position. Yet, Levering (1988) acknowledges that work places can be 
more like a family or a partnership than merely a job. The key for building trust 
for Levering (1988) is to recognize that work can be a gift like exchange as well 
as a commodity like exchange. Often, people do more in work than is narrowly 
required. In doing do, they are being creative and are giving a part of 
themselves -- a gift --to the company. There are two things that a company can 
do to build trust through such exchanges. First, a company can acknowledge 
work as a gift by acknowledging and supporting suggestions from workers by 
giving them the equipment and resources to carry out their suggestions and by 
extending appreciation for the gift offered. Second, the company can respond 
by giving away some of its power to workers. As with Shea (1984), Levering 
( 1988) suggests limiting the company's risk by trusting workers only after they 
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have exhibited technical competence in doing a job. 
A third approach for managing trust in the secondary relationship by 
injecting elements of primary relationships is that of contractual relations. 
According to Macneil (1978), classical and -- to a large degree -- neoclassical 
contracts are composed of a number of devices which make them very discrete 
and which assume all relevant aspects of a promise and its fulfillment are fully 
represented in the contract. Thus, what is constructed as a relationship in an 
exchange is a one-time event. A look at some of the elements of a classical 
contract reveals a whole set of apparatuses that help to set up the secondary 
relationship nature of the contract. Macneil (1978) describes how lawsuits are 
set up as a bipolar situation with two sides forced into a winner-take-all contest. 
Litigation in this situation focuses on completed events and is seen as a 
self-contained event. All future relational considerations are excluded. Rights 
and remedies are explicit and interdependent and are based on the discrete 
and assumed fully defined terms of the contract at the time of its execution. 
However, "no such model will do when the relation is supposed to continue in 
spite of the dispute, and where a main goal must always be its successful 
carrying on after the dispute is resolved ... " (Macneil, 1978: 891). As an 
alternative to the classical or neoclassical contract, Macneil (1978) proposes 
the contractual relation which is designed to preserve a relation and which 
develops devices for harmonizing conflictwithin the internal matrix of the 
relationship. As noted earlier, the intrinsic valuing of a relationship is a key 
element in the construction of trust in the primary relationship. In the contractual 
relation, the scope of a dispute is shaped by both parties and the resolver of a 
conflict rather than exogenously given by a contract. Party structure is not 
bipolar but is amorphous. The dispute mechanism attends more to negotiating 
a viable future rather than imposing judgments on past events. 
A second type of secondary relationship in which trust has been identified as a 
relevant issue is the agency relationship. Agency relationships are those in which 
individuals or organizations -- the agent -- act on behalf of a principal. 'Trust is 
used here ... as a social relationship in which principals ... invest resources, 
authority, or responsibility in another to act on their behalf for some uncertain 
future return" (Shapiro, 1987: 626). Perrow (1990) distinguishes agency from 
hierarchy because hierarchy puts the agent in a command relation rather than a 
contractual relation with the principal. Shapiro (1987) differentiates the agency 
relationship from a simple market relationship by noting the specialization 
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which requires agents to be entrusted. The idea of specialization could be seen 
as similar to asset specificity or to small-number bargaining (Perrow, 1990). 
Small-number bargaining gives a supplier or customer more experience with 
each other. But, it does not mean that the supplier is acting on behalf of the 
customer in a setting for which the customer has no ability. Asset specificity 
gives specific skill advantages to a supplier. Again, this does not mean that the 
supplier is acting on behalf of the customer in a way that the customer could not 
act on behalf of herself. What really constitutes agency relationships as a 
separate class with respect to trust is not specialization or acting on behalf of 
others in and of themselves. Hierarchy involves acting on behalf of others. 
Specialization is another device for differentiating products and drawing 
boundaries of social distance across which one must trade. What really 
constitutes an agency relationship as a separate class is specialization and 
professionalization. Agents are created both by specialized knowledge and by 
a set of devices to certify competence and disinterested concern for the client's 
welfare. This second aspect of the creation of the agent both sets up the 
possibility of the agency relationship and facilitates it by defining the agency as 
a trustworthy person. But, as attested to by the increasing rate litigation and the 
rising cost of malpractice insurance, a principal still has the problem of 
assessing reputation and the risk of opportunism with respect to the agent. 
Distrust: A Technique for Managing Relationships Which is More than the 
Absence of Trust 
Conceptualizations of trust tend to treat distrust as the absence of trust. 
From the perspective of social learning theory, distrust is simply a particular 
level of subjective probability or expectancy about the actions of other people 
with respect to their trustworthiness. Various perspectives of organizational 
climate make trust and distrust part of a continuous variable in a scaling 
technique. Luhmann (1979) relates a willingness to trust to inner security. 
Here, distrust would be an absence of inner security. Bradach and Eccles 
(1989) treat trust as one of three mechanisms for governing economic 
transactions between actors: trust, price, and authority. If trust is not utilized, 
price, authority, or a combination is utilized. Distrust as a mechanism is 
missing. Similarly, Maculay (1963) observes that the trust of friendship is an 
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important factor that governs economic transactions. Again, he also attends to 
market and authority as methods which interfere with and destroy trust. But, he 
does not explicitly deal with distrust. For Garfinkel (1963), distrust is a rupture in 
the taken-for-granted assumptions of the natural attitude of actors which cannot 
be easily normalized; While such ruptures have consequences for continuing 
interaction, Garfinkel is interested in the necessity of trust to sustain interaction. 
Finally, trust as a social practice is related to tolerating uncertainty by devising 
various schemes of assessing the trustworthiness of the other. But, is distrust 
simply a matter of deciding that you cannot tolerate the uncertainty given the 
assessment of the other? Or, is distrust a practice that posits with certainty that 
the other or a situation cannot be trusted? 
To get at the practice of distrust, consider Fox's (1974) analysis of 
distrust. From Fox's (1974) perspective, managers begin by distrusting workers. 
For example, Taylor (1939) argues for scientific management by noting that the 
initiative and incentive system of management does not work because workers 
believe that it is against their interests to give their employers their best 
initiative. Thus, managers impose work roles and rules, methods of policing, 
and methods of pacing. In response to the application of techniques of 
discipline, workers perceive that managers believe that they cannot be trusted 
to deliver the work. In response, workers who feel they are not trusted respond 
with distrust. In response to the distrust of workers, managers utilize more 
techniques of discipline. The spiral of distrust continues. Here, the opportunity 
for both workers and managers to act in a way that can be interpreted by one or 
the other party as opportunistic is set up by the purchase of labor power which 
must be converted into labor (Edwards, 1984). The problem of tolerating 
uncertainty is created when both workers and managers are embedded in their 
own back regions and front regions such that the back regions cannot be easily 
monitored. 
Fox ( 197 4) implies that the application of techniques of discipline alone 
evoke distrust. But, techniques of discipline and the application of 
"untrustworthy" to a person or situation may not be one and the same thing. For 
example, the ultimate application of techniques of discipline in the work place 
for Edwards (1984) is bureaucratic control. In Edwards' assessment of the 
Lordstown Vega plant, distrust was not so much a problem as boredom and 
anger over a lack of control. In Weber's (1978) analysis of legal-rational 
authority and bureaucracy, techniques of discipline would actually be 
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necessary to create the appearance of legitimation used as the vocabulary of 
motives accompanying a command. From Weber's (1978) perspective, the 
problem with a command and techniques of discipline occurs when a command 
is issued which does not fit what is considered legitimate as constructed by the 
technique of discipline. Thus, it seems that distrust is constructed more by the 
application of a label of untrustworthy to a person or to a situation as part of the 
dividing practice of separating persons or situations into the trustworthy or 
untrustworthy. So, in situations which are deemed trustworthy, a worker would 
accept technologies of discipline. In situations which are deemed 
untrustworthy, any technique of relating will be deemed untrustworthy and will 
be treated as such with certainty. 
The importance of seeing trust and distrust as distinct techniques which 
emerge from a common dividing practice and as techniques which are separate 
from but can be combined with other techniques of relating can be seen in the 
differential treatment of participative management schemes by Whyte (1989, 
1991) and by Banks and Metzgar (1989). On the one hand, Whyte (1989, 1991) 
discusses how the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union and 
Xerox worked together in a jointly controlled participative management program 
to reorganize work to become more productive in the face of global competition. 
Whyte ( 1991) observed that both the union and Xerox trusted each other before 
the process began. This trust made it possible for both the union and the 
company to expose themselves to more opportunistic behavior by the types of 
information they shared and by sharing control of decisions. As a result, the 
joint union-Xerox management teams developed strategies for increasing 
productivity and for saving jobs that were scheduled to go to Mexico. On the 
other hand, Banks and Metzgar (1989) begin with an analysis of how 
companies have used participative management programs to get workers to 
expose special knowledge about work processes to improve productivity in 
order to reduce labor. Here, participative management programs are simply 
devices used by management to act opportunistically toward labor. Thus, 
management and company controlled participatory programs are placed 
among the untrustworthy. On the basis of this placement, Banks and Metzgar 
(1989) develop a strategy for how unions can develop their own participative 
program by identifying strategies for increasing productivity and by then using 
contract negotiations to place a value on the strategies for increasing 
productivity and to construct work rules to keep managers from using the new 
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strategies to eliminate jobs. The difference between Whyte's (1989, 1991) 
analysis and Banks and Metzgar's (1989) analysis is the starting point of trust or 
distrust. Once the starting point is established, one then acts on that starting 
point. If it is trust, one accepts commands. One is open. If it is distrust, one 
questions commands. One masks one's line of action and tactics and 
strategies. Both trust and distrust have their effects. 
Other Technologies of Controlling Relationships 
The current emphasis on techniques of managing relations in economic 
life had its beginning with Coase (1937) and its rebirth with Williamson (1975). 
Since their initial emphasis on market and hierarchy as the two techniques 
used to manage economic relations, trust as a technique rather than just a 
problem to be managed has emerged as a third technique for managing 
economic relations. For example, Coleman (1984) observes that the benefits of 
a hierarchy without its disadvantages has been achieved by the Japanese 
through a high level of trustworthiness. Or again, Powell (1990) and Zukin and 
DiMaggio (1990) argue that a third ideal type of organization or decisional 
structure to parallel markets or hierarchies is needed to capture informal social 
relations of trust and mutual dependency. Or yet again, Walton and McKersie 
(1965) identified how integrative bargaining and attitudinal structuring tactics 
are used in labor negotiations to build relations along with the long recognized 
distributive and intraorganizational bargaining tactics used to struggle over 
wages in a bipolar, zero-sum fashion. 
As one attempts to explore the problem of trust in labor relations, one 
must immediately attend to the relationship between different techniques for 
creating and managing relations and explore their effects on trust. On the one 
hand, Bradach and Eccles (1989) note that conventional approaches see 
various techniques of relating as being mutually exclusive of each other. For 
example, Walton and McKersie (1965) argue that distributive and 
intraorganizational bargaining tactics threaten the continuation of the 
relationship between two parties while integrative bargaining and attitudinal 
structuring tactics draw two parties into a relationship and integrate their lines of 
behavior such that hard distributive bargaining becomes problematic. On the 
other hand, Bradach and Eccles (1989) argue that price, authority, and trust are 
independent and can be combined in a variety of ways. For example, Gibb 
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(1978) notes that a level of trust and hierarchy -- or authority -- are combined in 
the paternalistic organization. To initially explore this question, consider the 
academic literature on trust and its relationship to techniques of sovereignty, 
discipline, dividing practices, market, and confession. 
Technologies of Sovereignty 
Technologies of sovereignty are "the conception of power as an original right 
that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty, and the contract, as a matrix 
of political power, provides its point of articulation" (Foucault, 1980, p. 91). 
While sovereignty is built on rights and duties which allow some to command 
and require others to obey, Gamson (1968) notes that it is the capacity to 
enforce a decision that makes it binding. However, in giving up the right to act 
at will, the king traded his ability to do what force would permit for a reign within 
the limits 
of rights arid duties (Foucault, 1980). Once one completely replaces the king's 
rights and duties with a set of rules and procedures in a hierarchical command 
structure, one has Weber's (1978) ideal-type of bureaucracy created and 
supported by the fictional person, the corporation (Coleman, 1982). What is the 
relationship of technologies of sovereignty and trust? 
Authority and partisans. One relation between technologies of 
sovereignty and trust is drawn out by Gamson (1968) in his analysis of trust in 
the context of government. For Gamson, trust is the perception or belief that the 
governmental authority's decisions are in one's best interest. Looked at in 
another way, "the trust dimension refers to their perception of the necessity for 
influence" (Gamson, 1968, p. 42). Such trlJst is important because it helps 
members of a society to tolerate decisions to which they are opposed. 
However, if people come to see that the decisions of authorities affect them 
negatively in some significant way, they can become partisans. That is, they 
may try to exercise influence on authorities. 
As partisans form interest groups to influence authorities, trust in the 
government makes influence and constituency building problematic. On the 
one hand, a lack of trust in the government makes constituency building 
possible. In fact, both Gamson (1968) and Alinsky (1971) observe that the 
defeats of interest groups may be preferred to victories if they occur in ways that 
decrease trust in authorities and increase group solidarity. On the other hand, if 
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interest groups are too successful, interest groups may not be seen as needed 
and authorities may be seen as trustworthy (Gamson, 1968). Issues of trust also 
apply to interest groups. If leaders of such groups are held responsible for 
failures or if they are seen as seeking personal power, they many not be trust by 
their constituencies. Thus, Walton and McKersie (1965) argue that negotiators 
-- leaders in a negotiation -- on both the union and management sides have the 
problem of aligning the expectations of their constituencies with what is going 
on in negotiations in order to maintain their constituencies' trust in them. 
Gamson (1968) identifies three possible places for the placement of the 
issue of trust in the context of government: authorities, the regime, and the 
political community. In the context of labor relations, the question of trust 
probably gets asked by workers in terms of the trustworthiness of particular 
managers or in terms of the company as a whole. Likewise, managers probably 
raise the trust issue in terms of particular union leaders, a particular union, or 
unions in general. Thus, efforts on the part of both interest groups and 
authorities to make their offending decisions or actions "the exception to the 
rule" or the fault of a particular person who can be removed are important tactics 
in the management of reputation of persons and organizations with respect to 
the attributions process regarding trustworthiness. 
From the perspective of authorities, Gamson (1968) argues that the basic 
problem is one of preventing parties injured or neglected by decisions from 
trying to change the decision, the authorities, or the system. To do this, 
authorities limit the resources of interest groups and their ability to bring 
resources to bear on them, make rewards or punishments dependent on 
attempts at influence, and try to alter attitudes toward them. In the work place, 
Kumar and Ghadially (1989) describe similar tactics. One can increase the 
chances of the failure of a partisan group by removing leaders of partisan 
groups through cooptation. Threats result in fear, the loss of security, and the 
withdrawal of social and emotional support. Troublesome people can be 
transferred to a place which lessens their influence. Such tactics have a 
negative effect on interpersonal trust (Kumar and Ghadially, 1989). 
Thus, from Gamson's analysis of sovereignty in the arena of government, 
distrust is inherent because authorities make decisions which help some, are 
neutral to some, and hurt some. The distributive decisions made by authorities 
may be legitimate from the allocation of rights and duties but are harmful and 
thus are seen as opportunistic to some. Distrust is multiplied as interest groups 
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try to influence authorities and is multiplied again as authorities try to neutralize 
interest groups. 
, One could question whether or not Gamson's analysis of trust and 
government is applicable to the work place. To explore this, consider Freeman 
and Medoff's (1984) analysis of a union as a collective voice mechanism. 
Building on Hirshman (1970), Freeman and Medoff (1984) note that the market 
provides the worker with the possibility of exit to deal with problems and issues 
at work. In Gamson's model, there is no exit as an option for an unhappy 
citizen. A second way for a worker to deal with a problem in the work place is 
voice. "'Voice' refers to the use of direct communication to bring actual and 
desired conditions closer together" (Freeman and Medoff, 1984:8). Voice as 
direct communication also does not fit Gamson's model of government. 
However, the National Labor Relations Act creates the possibility for a union to 
collectively represent workers' voices. Unions are political institutions with 
elected leaders (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The union acts as an interest 
group for workers. Thus, Gamson's model probably can be applied to the 
unionized work place. 
If the unionized work place fits Gamson's model of government, is distrust 
inherent in the unionized work place? On the one hand, unions can organize 
by galvanizing workers discontent in order to make a strong case in 
negotiations and in order to gain membership. Because of this, Freeman and 
Medoff ( 1984) observe that unionized workers are paradoxically often unwilling 
to leave their jobs even though they are more dissatisfied with their work 
conditions and relations with supervisors than nonunionized workers. While the 
political nature of the union can be seen as encouraging the fanning of the 
flames of distrust, the union is based on the winner-take-all form of election. As 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) note, this tends to moderate union positions by 
making the positions of the "median" member more important in elections than 
those to either extreme. 
One might be tempted to think that the tactic of encouraging distrust of the 
other side is only of value to unions. However, Walton and McKersie (1976) 
point out that intraorganizational bargaining -- that is, organizing the troops 
behind a position -- is a problem for management as well as for the union. In an 
hierarchical command structure, this might be puzzling at first glance. But, 
consider the fact that most first line supervisors are often former union members. 
While they have to execute commands that can create some of the distrust on 
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the part of employees, they have relations with people who have been fellow 
workers·and union members. So, they have the potential to have divided 
loyalties. Fainstein and Fainstein (1974) demonstrate the danger of divided 
loyalties for a command structure in case studies of social action in which an 
important tactic for partisans is to find allies in the command structure. Thus, 
anything that management can do to create distrust of unionized employees by 
first line supervisors would help to create solidarity among managers and first 
line supervisors. 
While the inevitability of distrust described by Gamson (1968) in the 
governmental arena would seem to apply to the unionized work place, Walton 
and McKersie (1965) note several ways in which trust can be encouraged. 
First, to the extent that workers and managers or the union and management 
work to solve a problem together, they employ the tactics of integrative 
bargaining which encourage communication and openness as well as develop 
a common line of behavior. Second, if the union and company negotiators 
have a good relationship and trust each other, they can tolerate and properly 
read the posturing each other must do for his or her own constituency. 
However, the real key to whether or not the authority-interest group mechanism 
of the unionized company results in distrust or trust depends on how each 
values their relationship. "Clearly to the extent that Party's interests center on 
the relationship and the importance of improving it, he (or she) is willing to 
invest himself (or herself) in the process of building trust and assume whatever 
risks are associated with this process" (Walton and McKersie, 1965:357). 
The contract. Another technology of sovereignty which seems to have an 
affect on trust in the work place is the contract. First, Brown (1987) outlines how 
labor law basically incorporates the industrial, mass production model of shop 
floor control. This model includes management rights to make decisions as to 
how the company will be run, grading jobs around component tasks, and the 
use of formal rules in a stepwise grievance procedure. The point of Brown's 
study is that the inclusion of the industrial, mass production model of shop floor 
control in labor law makes any other model of labor relations very problematic. 
She observes that the craft based, potentially collegial situation of the university 
faculty is forced into the industrial model by the elements involved in labor law. 
For example, when one looks at the grievance process, the legal contract and 
processes protract and subvert the real resolution of issues. If the grievance 
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procedure makes it difficult to substantially resolve issues after they have been 
procedurally resolved, Gamson's (1968) analysis of trust in the political process 
would cause one to expect a continual partisan response to authority or 
attempts at exercising authority over partisans regarding issues that were 
procedurally but not substantially resolved. Furthermore, if labor law makes it 
difficult to develop the relationship aspects that seem to make trust possible -- a 
issue not explored by Brown ( 1987) -- then the labor contract itself can have a 
negative effect on the development of trust. 
Second, it is worth noting once more Macneil's (1978) discussion on the 
classical contract. Again, the contract is built on a bipolar model with a 
fixed-sum established by promises. All rules, rights, benefits, and burdens are 
established by the promise. The time commitment and involvement is punctiliar. 
There is a short time between agreement and performance and a short time of 
performance. A contract is sharply entered into by clear agreement and sharply 
completed by clear performance. If a contract is held to be breached by one of 
the parties, the resulting litigation is a bipolar organized zero-sum game 
following a strict set of rules regarding issues and their development 
established by the contract. Once the litigation has been adjudicated, the 
contract is resolved. While Brown (1987) locates the problematic nature of 
labor relations in labor law, Macneil's argument would place the problem more 
precisely in the nature of the classical contract itself. Management rights are the 
rights of the contract whether on the shop floor or in the market. The formal 
rules and stepwise procedure are borrowed directly from the litigation process. 
The labor contract stipulates that management acts and, if the contract or labor 
law -- which is assumed to be an explicit part of the contract -- is felt to be 
violated by such action, workers grieve. Here, the shop floor defines some of 
the content of rights and duties in labor law, but the contract itself is the set of 
rules which has asymmetries with respect to power effects and with respect to 
trust. The contract itself constructs secondary relationships. It makes 
opportunism possible by the way it structures parties, promises, and remedies. 
The strong external system of sanctions provided by the contract destroys the 
basis for voluntary cooperation (Yamasihi, 1988). Thus, the technique of the 
contract might make trust in the work place problematic. 
Punishment and degradation. A third technology of sovereignty is 
alluded to but not developed in practical works on trust in the work place. For 
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example, Shea (1984) notes that one mustfocus on problem solving rather than 
on evaluation and assigning blame to foster trust in the work place. Deming 
(1986) notes that management needs to drive out fear, eliminate slogans and 
targets, and eliminate work standards to develop teamwork and productivity. In 
each of these examples, the replacement of traditional techniques of control 
such as evaluation, rewarding, and punishing directed at the person rather than 
the problem is urged. 
The roots of punishment and degradation can be clearly seen in the way 
the king acts directly on his subjects' bodies in punishment. For example, 
Foucault (1979) describes how a person who killed a member of the royal 
family was punished. It begins with a public confession of his crime at the 
cathedral. . It moves to a ritual torture and execution at the town square. His 
crimes are read again. During parts of the torture, he repeats his guilt and 
sorrow. Tongs are used to tear away flesh. Boiling oil and lead are poured into 
the wounds. He is then drawn and quartered. Since the horses cannot get him 
torn apart, cleavers are used to finish hacking his limbs from his body. 
If one replaces fists with words (Burke, 1954), one gets Garfinkel's (1956) 
degradation ceremony in which the identity of the person being denounced is 
ritually destroyed. To be successful, Garfinkel found that such rituals must 
remove the event and the perpetrator from the arena of their everyday character 
and place them within a scheme of preferences such that the event and the 
perpetrator are seen as essentially opposed in their character to the proper 
order of things. The denouncer must be identified as a publicly known person 
and not merely a private person. The denunciation must be in the name of the 
collective and rhetorically based on the values of the collective. The 
denunciation must separate the person being denounced from the denouncer, 
the collective, and the proper order of the collective. Excommunication is such 
a ritual. 
Personnel policies and procedures are essentially based on such rituals 
of degradation. Here, the person who is the worker is having his or her self --
both the personal and collective definition of the person -- worked on in 
performance evaluation by a public person, the supervisor. Rules and 
performance goals are stated and related to the work effort to make the ritual 
marking of the worker a "disinterested" and "objective" act. The worker is given 
a chance to improve. If he or she does not, the worker has in effect made a 
confession of guilt. Once the worker has been appropriately marked and 
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denounced through several "get well" plans, he or she can be ritually 
separated, that is, fired, fined, reduced in rank, reduced in pay, etc. It should be 
noted that such procedures, if focused on marking a person's behavior rather 
than self or nature, can be a part of what Foucault (1979) calls discipline. Here, 
the marking is part of a set of devices, including training, to bring behavior back 
to a norm. · However, since both behavior and the person are marked with the 
potential of punishment, such policies and procedures present a threat to the 
employment relationship or to the potential for promotion as well as to a 
worker's identity. Therefore, they have significant potential for evoking distrust. 
Technigues of discipline 
A second class of techniques for controlling relations in the work place are based on 
discipline. In Foucault's (1979) analysis of discipline, discipline constructs the 
individual as an object through enclosure, partitioning, the functional coding of 
sites, and the ranking of individuals. Ranking individualizes bodies, distributes 
them, and circulates them in a network of relations. Activity is controlled through 
the use of time tables, the temporal elaboration of acts, the correlation of the 
body and gesture, the articulation of the relationship between the body and 
objects, the exhaustive use of the body and acts, and a system for signaling 
commands. Once the relationship between various aspects of the individual, 
acts, space, objects, and time are marked out, discipline proceeds by training, 
which utilizes hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the 
examination. Normalizing judgment is not aimed at expiation or repression as 
in sovereignty. It relates individual acts to a field of comparison in terms of 
minimal thresholds or in terms of an optimum toward which one must move. As 
individuals are ranked in a filed of comparison, they are marked with respect to 
a hierarchy of qualities and skills and are rewarded and punished by the 
ranking itself. The examination combines the observing hierarchy and 
normalizing judgment to make individuals visible in a way to differentiate and 
judge them. 
The same set of technologies of discipline borrowed from the army and 
the church and applied to penal reform in nineteenth century France (Foucault, 
1979) were applied to the work place by Taylor (1939). The first principle of 
scientific management for Taylor was to develop a science of each person's 
work to replace the worker's rule-of-thumb method of working. Taylor's method 
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of going about this fits very much into Foucault's analysis of discipline. In his 
analysis of handling pig iron, Taylor describes how different weights of pig iron 
were used with different techniques of carrying and with different schedules of 
work and rest. Using this technique, he simultaneously identified the maximum 
possible output and developed a method for elaborating work behavior so it 
could be more easily observed and evaluated. 
The potential for these techniques to evoke distrust by exposing actions 
to surveillance is identified by Foucault as he observes that Bentham's 
Panoptican -- a circular prison in which the behavior of each person is visible to 
one guard in the middle -- is an apparatus of "total and circulating mistrust" 
(Foucault, 1979:158). The way in which technologies of discipline and trust 
interact is outlined by Fox (1974) and confirmed by Roche (1987/1990). 
Managers begin by distrusting workers. For example, Taylor (1939) argues for 
scientific management by noting that the initiative and incentive system of 
management does not work because workers believe that it is against their 
interests to give their employers their best initiative. Thus, managers impose 
work roles and rules, methods of policing, and methods of pacing. In response 
to the application of techniques of discipline, workers perceive that managers 
believe that they cannot be trusted to deliver the work. In response, workers 
who feel they are not trusted respond with distrust. In response to the distrust of 
workers, managers utilize more techniques of discipline. The spiral of distrust 
continues. 
Dividing practices 
A third class of techniques for controlling relations in the work place with 
implications for trust can be found in the background practices not directly 
explored in the literature on discipline and trust: the dividing practice. As noted 
earlier, the dividing practice involves linguistic, ritual, and physical practices of 
dichotomously separating groups into in-groups and out-groups. Once the 
mad, the ill, the criminal, the racially or ethnically different, the other gender, the 
differently educated, etc. have been separated and confined, discipline can be 
applied to control and to create discourses with their own power effects. If one 
looks at Taylor (1939), one notes in his description of his discussion with 
Schmidt -- who is obviously a recent immigrant from his accent and is noted as 
such by Taylor's use of his accent in the text-- that Taylor recommends rough 
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talk and the application of scientific management on "mentally sluggish" types 
such as Schmidt. However, one would not treat "an educated mechanic" or "an 
intelligent" laborer in such a fashion. In a similar vein, Bauman (1982) observes 
that the first factories in England were continuations of poor-houses populated 
by a large, destitute population who had been uprooted from the country side. 
This population included large numbers of women and children. Discipline and 
reinforcing machine technology was used to force work from these populations 
into closely watched, repetitive routines. Discipline and machines were not 
initially applied to craft situations. Thus, before the distrust of applying 
discipline fo the trustworthy craftsperson, there was the distrust of the "other" 
who was the target of discipline. Here, trust and distrust are a part of the 
dividing practice of in-group and out-group. 
Another dividing practice Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984, 1990) identifies is 
that of distinguishing the true from the false. As noted in the Introduction, truth is 
not an objective or subjective transcendental or transcendent reality. Rather, 
truth is produced by a series of devices and rules used to divide the true from 
the false. There is evidence that the worker has a system of dividing the true 
from the false different from that of the manager. For example, Taylor (1939) 
distinguishes the "rule of thumb" knowledge of the worker from the knowledge 
of the manager gained by applying the principles of scientific management. 
The use of the two different systems of dividing the true form the false can make 
trust in the work place problematic in at least three ways. First, it is a part of 
dividing the in-group from the out-group. For example, one sometimes will hear 
a manager complain that another manager who came out of the ranks of 
unionized workers still "has the union in him or her." That is, he or she still uses 
the workers' rules of thumb rather than the rules of managers. Second, 
Garfinkel ( 1963) notes that violations of the taken-for-granted nature of the 
natural attitude raise the issue of trust in interaction. So, if two different groups 
are trying to interact and to build a line of action with different rules of dividing 
the true from the false, it is easy for distrust to emerge as actions are confronted 
which are not divided into the true and the false in the same way. Finally, the 
dividing of the true from the false takes place along side of and within 
techniques of sovereignty and market. If managers want to set up a series of 
studies to distinguish the true from the false that makes the true grounds for the 
elimination of jobs, the true and the false coincide with exit and opportunism on 
the part of management with respect to workers. 
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Technigues of market 
Exit.and options. A fourth mechanism for controlling relations in the workplace 
is market While exchange is the purpose of market, it is controlled through exit 
(Hirshman, 1970; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). To increase the value of an 
exchange, sellers try to restrict the number of parties that buyers have. That is, 
they try to control the buyer's options to exit. This is essentially what a union 
does when it organizes workers or what a company does by paying executives 
more money than they could get if they were to look for a new job. Buyers try to 
increase the number of sellers in order to play them off against each other. That 
is, buyers try to increase their ability to exit. This is one of the consequences of 
the application of scientific management to the work place such that work is 
deskilled to increase the potential number of workers of any one job 
(Braverman, 1974). Since the increasing or the decreasing of opportunities for 
exit affect the distribution of value in an exchange, techniques of market are 
opportunistic on their face and, therefore, have a potentially negative affect on 
the maintenance of trust. 
Labor power and labor. When it comes to the labor market, Edwards 
( 1984) notes that one must distinguish between purchasing labor -- work 
completed -- and labor power -- the potential to do work. When one out sources 
a job or pays workers on the basis of a completed job, one is buying labor. The 
positive side of this strategy for the buyer is that any problems, delays, or 
miscalculations of how long a job will take is borne by the worker. The negative 
side of this strategy for the buyer is that a fixed cost has gone into the final 
product. With this technique, there is little room for opportunism on the part of 
the worker and some room for opportunism on the part of the buyer. The buyer 
has the opportunity to alter the unspecified aspects of the job until it meets what 
she or he wants. When one hires a worker for a wage, one is buying labor 
power. One is agreeing to pay a worker so much per unit of time for a yet to be 
produced outcome. The positive side of this strategy for the buyer is that -- if he 
or she can apply effective management technologies to the worker -- more work 
per unit of cost can be obtained than by the fixed cost method of buying labor. 
The negative side of the strategy for the buyer is that any problems, delays, or 
miscalculations of how a job is done is borne by the buyer. With this technique, 
the potential for opportunism shifts to the worker. As noted earlier, this potential 
for opportunism has serious potential for evoking mistrust of the worker by the 
manager (Taylor, 1939). 
To understand how market works in the work place, it is necessary to 
place it in the context of technologies of sovereignty and discipline. Edwards 
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( 1984) does this by arguing that technologies of sovereignty and discipline --
directing, evaluating, and rewarding and punishing through simple, 
technological, and bureaucratic control -- are required to take advantage of the 
strategy of purchasing labor power. Here, the use of the labor power market 
techniques makes possible the opportunistic behavior by workers and the 
sovereignty mechanism of authority sets up the possibility of decisions which 
evoke resistance. As a result, one finds opportunistic behavior such as workers 
cooperating together to impede production in response to decisions by 
authorities which are problematic to workers (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). Or 
again, one finds companies divesting themselves of old unionized plants and 
opening new plants in areas which have few unions, low wages, and right to 
work laws (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). These new plants employ human 
resource management strategies which replace union mechanism of voice with 
participatory management strategies and which pay higher than locally 
prevailing wages in order to further resist unionization ( Freeman and Medoff, 
1984; Kochan et al., 1986). Here, the threat to exit can now be used as an 
excellent tactic to get workers to alter work rules and to make wage and benefit 
concessions in negotiations, a technique of voice. In the case of an electric 
utility, it is all but impossible for the company to move away from its union. But, 
the utility can exercise the same strategy through out sourcing work. Here, one 
can take advantage of cost competition and of buying labor rather than labor 
power (Friedman, 1988; Case, 1989; Morgan, 1989). Once again, the threat to 
do away with workers with out sourcing is a good political tactic used by 
authorities to get their way. While such tactics may be effective in a narrowly 
framed market situation, they can lead to a spiral of distrust and resistance 
which has a long term, negative impact on productivity (Freeman and Medoff, 
1984). 
Techniques of confession 
A fifth technique for controlling relations in the work place is the creation and use 
of subjectivity through the confession and its group expression borrowed from John 
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Wesley's Methodist Society Class (Davies, 1963). Subjectivity emerged from 
the technology of the confession. The confession is analyzed by Foucault 
(1990) as a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject 
of the statement. The confession is told in the presence of an authority who 
requires, prescribes, appreciates, and intervenes in the confession to judge, 
punish, forgive, console, and reconcile. In the confession, truth is confirmed by 
the obstacles and resistance which it must overcome to be formulated. The 
process of expression independent of its external consequences produces 
intrinsic modifications in the person who tells it. It exonerates, redeems, 
purifies, unburdens, liberates, and promises salvation. John Wesley took this 
same process and put it in a group context such that the members of the Society 
Class became the confessors for each other. However, instead of the agency 
relationship between parishioner and priest, the members of the class probably 
constructed their relationship more as primary relations. In the nineteenth 
century, the sexual confession came to be constituted in scientific terms. Then, 
by combining the confession with examination and interrogation, the procedure 
of confession was placed in the field of scientific observation. The postulation of 
a general and diffuse causal power of sex justified having to tell everything. 
The principle of latency made the ways of sex obscure and elusive. In the one 
who spoke, truth was incomplete and blind to itself. Therefore, truth could only 
reach completion in the one who assimilated and recorded it. The revelation of 
the speaker required the interpretation of the hearer for truth to be complete. 
The purpose of confession through medicalization was health instead of 
redemption. As also noted, the small group experience is simply a collective, 
primary relationship extension of the confession. 
Knights and Willmott (1989) suggest that technologies of discipline 
create subjectivity at the work place. By separating people, marking and 
elaborating their behavior, and marking them as individuals under the gaze of a 
supervisor, individuals must make their own behavior problematic for 
themselves. While there is no doubt that technologies of discipline can make 
one's actions more problematic for one's self, they are not really the same thing 
as subjectivity as constructed by confession. Consider again Foucault's (1979) 
analysis of the panoptican. Here, the prisoner is always exposed as an 
individual to the gaze of the guard who is hidden from the prisoner's view. 
Thus, the prisoner makes his or her own behavior problematic for him or her 
self. But, the self as a substance is not the focus of the prisoner's concern. As 
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Foucault notes (1979), the panoptican is simply organized malevolence. 
This is similar to Weber's (1958) analysis of the Protestant ethic. The 
position of the person is very similar to the prisoner in the panoptican. The 
hidden God always has one in His/Her gaze. One makes one's own behavior 
problematic because of being exposed to the gaze. But, there is an additional 
critical element here: the identity of the self. Am I among the elect or the 
damned? In Weber's understanding of Calvin, the decision had been made 
and was hidden. So, the Protestant ethic is still sort of a religious panoptican. 
However, once one replaces the hidden issue of election with a principle of 
assurance -- the "strangely warmed heart" -- and change the issue to 
sanctification or the perfection of the self, one reaches the point of the 
technology of the confession. So, while discipline makes the individual's 
behavior problematic to the individual, a different focus is needed to make the 
perfection of the self the object of problematization. 
There are two places where the technology of confession seems to be 
applied in the work place: performance appraisal and the work team. With 
respect to performance appraisal, Bowen (1982) outlines a problem-solving 
approach to performance appraisal in a book of exercises used for training 
managers. This approach assumes that people are capable of growing in a 
climate that permits and encourages growth. In an organization, people grow 
when they can achieve their own goals by achieving the organization's goals. 
The technique involves helping people to identify areas in which they want to 
grow, how the organization's goals fit the individual's goals, and the problems 
which the individual is encountering which need to be solved in order for the 
individual and the organization to grow. Performance appraisal then becomes 
problem solving with personal growth and organizational efficiency as a goal. 
With respect to the work team, ltoh (1984) identifies a similar technology 
in the small group management techniques used in Japan. Again, it is 
assumed that people will work hard when they know that they are responsible 
for their own destinies. When a person's destiny is tied to the company's 
destiny, the person will sacrifice himself or herself for the company. In addition, 
by dividing into groups of five to ten persons, each person is asked to link his or 
her own aims to those of the group. By controlling the group's information and 
values (Simon, 1945; Whalley, 1990), the company can use a worker's efforts to 
reach his or her own goal and the work group's goals. A classic example of this 
is outlined by Whyte (1991) in his study of participative management at Xerox. 
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Here, Xerox worked with a union representing their employees to come up with 
some innovations to save the jobs of the employees. On the one hand, the 
company released control by creating a joint union-management committee 
with access to production, marketing, and accounting information. Thus, it 
appears that the company is giving up or sharing management rights with 
workers. On the other hand, the company can control the scene by framing the 
choice and the relevant information for making the choice: Come up with 
innovations within these parameters to make the company competitive or the 
company will close down the plant and open it in a country with cheap labor. 
Thus, the goals of the workers and those of the company were merged such that 
the workers efforts on their own actions and selves were loosely controlled by 
the company. 
On the one hand, it is difficult to see how techniques which enable me to 
work on myself to become what I want to be and to feel good about myself can 
evoke distrust. There appears to be concern for the worker and a lack of 
opportunity for management to act opportunistically. But, if one recognizes that 
these techniques are techniques of labor control in the context of technologies 
of sovereignty and market, one can see how something that appears to evoke 
trust can evoke distrust. For example, Freeman and Medoff (1984), ltoh (1984), 
Banks and Metzgar (1989) all document how technologies of confession are 
used in human resource management strategies to resist unions. In ltoch's 
(1984) analysis of the development of management through small groups in 
Japan, he traces the steps through which groups created and controlled by the 
union are supplanted by those created by the company. First, the company 
selects group leaders and sends them through a training on small group 
process. Then, on company time, group activities begin with uncontroversial 
issues such as studying regulations, procedures, and manuals. The direct 
presence of management is absent. But, management controls the training of 
the group leaders and -- through the training -- the agenda. Eventually, issues 
of efficiency, of competing with other groups, and of the competitive position of 
the company begin to emerge. Since management rights allow this process to 
proceed on company time without involvement from the union, it is relatively 
easy to begin to replace union involvement and loyalty with company 
involvement and loyalty. In addition to the issue of union resistance, Banks and 
Metzgar (1989) point out that quality improvement groups make it easier to carry 
out the task of separating knowledge from the worker. Under scientific 
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management, it was relatively easy to hide knowledge from the industrial 
engineer. However, when one is working with fellow workers in a groups which 
"appears" to be autonomous, one is likely to reveal knowledge. Thus, quality 
improvement groups can get at knowledge which will eventually lead to 
improvements which could eliminate jobs or increase profit margins without 
increasing wages. Banks and Metzgar's (1989) solution is for the union to 
create its own quality improvement groups to identify improvements which then 
could be negotiated over with respect to improved salaries and job security for 
workers. Thus, putting confession into the context of other technologies of 
managing relations expose how confession can be seen as opportunistic with 
respect to the worker, the union, and management. 
The Labor Relations Arena: More than 
Negotiations and Arbitrations 
Labor relations studies that focus on trust are traditionally conducted 
exclusively around one setting. Many are conducted around practices 
connected with how a company and a union relate through the official 
machinery established by labor law. A number of such studies have been built 
on Walton and McKersie's (1965) behavioral of theory of labor relations. For 
example, Davis(1982/1983) identifies four phases in the labor negotiations 
process in addition to Walton and McKersie's typology of bargaining tactics: 
presentation of demands, deliberation, hard bargaining, and coming to 
agreement. Caldarelli ( 1984/1985) traces deteriorating relations in negotiations 
as negotiations moved from integrative bargaining to distributive bargaining. 
Turner (1988/1989) focuses on the role of the negotiator as a representative of 
constituents and on intraorganizational bargaining. In a different vein, Glasser 
(1989), Struck (1990/1991), and Hardin (1991) look at alternatives to the 
traditional positional approach to bargaining such as the use of collaborative 
bargaining, Goldaber's Win/Win technique, and a variety of home grown 
devices. In addition to the negotiation process, the issue of trust has been 
studied in the grievance procedure (Briggs, 1981) and in the relationship 
between collective bargaining and factors such as strikes (Dufalla, 1990), 
attitudes of supervisors and workers (White, 1990/1991 ), salaries (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984; Kochan et al., 1986; White, 1990/1991), and organizational 
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environmental factors (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Kochan et al., 1986). 
Trust has also been studied at the level of the work group and at the 
strategic level of a company. At the level of the work group, Gabarro (1978) 
finds that trust has a different meaning for a supervisor than for a subordinate. 
The integrity, competence, and consistency of the subordinate are most 
important to the supervisor. The integrity, loyalty, and openness of the 
supervisor are most important to the subordinate. Anton (1990) finds that the 
perception of a worker's right to respect and voice, to feedback on performance 
and prospects, and to meaningful work affected the worker's satisfaction, trust in 
management, conflict, and intention to turn over. At the strategic level, both 
Watson (1989/1990) and Trunfio (1990) find that trust and confidence in others 
appear to run from top down in an organization. 
Kochan et al. ( 1986, 1991) argue that the strategic, industrial relations, 
and work group levels must all be considered to understand labor relations in a 
company. Therefore, a study of trust in labor relations must also attend to all three levels 
rather than to just one level as is the rule in most studies of trust and labor relations. For 
example, it has been noted earlier that strategies of participative management 
are often aimed at the level of the work group to engender trust and 
cooperation. However, Mohrman (1979) finds that participation involving 
recurring organizational decisions or decisions already framed by others has 
little impact on trust. Instead, workers need a system of political access to the 
strategic level of the company to raise issues for the organization in a collective 
fashion. With political access to the strategic level of the organization, Mohrman 
notes a strong relationship between participation in political access and the 
level of trust and organizational effectiveness. In a similar fashion, Kochan et al. 
(1986) and Gilbert (1989) find that the success of quality of work life programs 
depends on the ability of an organization to reinforce trust. But, the 
maintenance of trust depends on the degree to which the strategic levels of the 
company and the union adopt lines of action linked to the development and 
reinforcement of trust. Kochan et al. ( 1986) note that it is ironic that 
management continues to closely guard issues which they traditionally have 
controlled through management rights while trying to implement quality of work 
life programs. Thus, any study which focuses only on trust at the level of the 
work group would totally miss the importance of the strategic level. 
There are several practices which both discourage and at the same time 
make imperative the inclusion of all three levels in an analysis of trust and labor 
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relations. For example, labor law -- and therefore the labor contract --
recognizes and reinforces management's right to run a business and workers' 
right to negotiate or grieve over the consequences of those decisions 
(Thompson, 1974; Bowles and Gintis, 1982; Gold, 1989). Thus, labor law itself 
discourages linking industrial relations and the strategic level of a company. At 
the same time, the strategic level of companies has both grown in distance from 
the work group and the union scene and has increased its arsenal of strategic 
options. Both of these developments can have dire consequences for workers 
and can therefore be problematic with respect to trust. 
With respect to the growing distance between workers and the strategic 
level of the company, Chandler (1988) notes that the traditional business 
enterprise was composed of a single unit with a single or few owners. Here, 
Edwards (1984) observes that the owner was often a worker as well as owner 
and could directly control work. The three levels -- work place, industrial 
relations, and strategic -- were tied together and were undifferentiated. Then, 
the adoption of a number of practices began to define and pull the three levels 
apart. Through the introduction of scientific management (Taylor, 1939), 
technical control (Edwards, 1984 ), and accounting and inventory control 
techniques (Nelson, 1988), the supervisor and the worker were separated, the 
worker became a replaceable part and the object of technical manipulation, and 
the supervisor became the supervisor/engineer who devised more productive 
ways of combining and controlling labor and machines. Through vertical and 
horizontal integration and conglomeration, a hierarchy of middle and top 
salaried managers was set apart to supervise units. Units were treated now as 
profit centers to be bought, sold, or maximized. Ownership was disassociated 
from control through the creation of the corporation and stock ownership 
(Coleman, 1982; Chandler, 1988). With the ability to exit associated with stock 
rather than actual ownership, stock holders look to maximize short term gain as 
rentiers rather than interested owners. 
This disassociation of levels not only leads to the organizational and 
spatial separation of people in each level, it creates at least four discourses. At 
the level of the shop floor, workers create a discourse around their own ways of 
working and of relating to each other and managers. Supervisors create 
discourses around their relations with workers and managers in the context of 
managing work. The struggle between workers and managers was 
institutionalized in labor law. As Brown (1987) notes, this creates another set of 
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discourses around the labor contract, the rights defined in labor law, and the 
procedures for administering the contract. Finally, the strategic level of the 
company -- unable to have a direct feel for the work group level, subject to 
pressure for short term gains from stock holders, and unfettered by direct 
constraint from the other two levels -- creates yet a fourth discourse around 
markets, strategies, and profits and losses (Hayes and Abernathy, 1988). As 
noted earlier, trust requires an ability to hear and understand each other, an 
ability to build a common line of behavior, and an ability to reinforce and value a 
relationship for itself. The organizational and spatial separation of the three 
levels and four discourses make understanding, common efforts, and 
relationship very difficult. 
While the adoption of organizational, financial, and engineering 
technologies has helped to create the three levels of a company, the internal 
labor market of a company can accentuate or depress the effects of this 
differentiation on trust. The internal labor market consists of the ways of 
matching people to jobs after people are in an organization (Kalleberg and 
Berg, 1987). For example, the president ofTrumpf, a machine tool company in 
Germany, began as a machine apprentice and worked his way through the 
company. This company moves people up career ladders such that they have a 
hands-on feel for all levels and have networks of relations at all levels. On the 
other hand, a company might hire people with an MBA and no experience or 
extensive relations at different levels. in the company to manage the strategic 
level, people with an engineering degree but no actual shop floor experience to 
manage production, and specialist from human relations schools to manage 
labor relations. This strategy would obviously accentuate the distance and 
differences in discourse among the three levels. This would make trust more 
difficult to establish and maintain. 
If one looks at the arsenal of strategic options available to the strategic 
level, one finds that almost all of them are problematic for both workers and 
union organizations. Bluestone and Harrison (1982) note how improved 
transportation and communication technologies make it easy to manufacture 
anywhere. Thus, companies can play cities, states, and nations against each 
other to get the least cost deal. If a company cannot move, it can look at out 
sourcing products and services to again set up a competition to drive down 
prices. A company can decide to reposition itself in a market by shedding some 
services or products and by adding others. A separation of management rights 
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from workers' voice prevents workers from influencing decisions that really 
make a difference to their security and future. Yet, they clearly have an impact 
on workers and on the ability of a union to negotiate or to grieve. Thus, the 
separation of the strategic from the industrial relations levels makes for potential 
distrust. 
Human resource management systems in academic literature 
discourage one from looking at all three levels by framing all issues at the work 
place level. Lewis (1991) notes that the employee involvement and 
participation programs used in human resource management focus on team 
building as a way to build a goal congruence between workers and work 
organizations. This team building and participation takes place at the work 
place level. It is virtually always nonfinancial participation. The human 
resource management system also incorporates voice procedures through 
complaint and appeal procedures and ombudsmen programs. Lewis (1991) 
points out that unions as participatory mechanisms are totally ignored by human 
resource management system literature even though unions are participatory 
mechanisms. Despite Michels' (1964) "iron law of oligarchy," unions elect their 
leaders and committees. They vote on issues to grieve and on terms of 
contracts. In the employee involvement and participation programs in human 
resource management literature, management controls the team building, the 
construction and approval of goals and procedures, and the outcome of all 
grievance like procedures. Since workers through the union have legal 
standing, management cannot as easily control the worker's agenda. While 
most labor contracts block unions from direct access to influencing strategic 
decisions, human resource management systems would eliminate all of the 
devices used by the union to create alternative definitions of workers' rights and 
value. Thus, the definition of which level one must examine to study trust in the 
work place takes place in a struggle between defining participation in human 
resource management terms or in union representation terms. This struggle 
itself engenders distrust. 
Conclusion 
One might ask why an examination of academic literature should be 
relevant to this study. After all, Foucault encourages the researcher to examine 
social practices at their actual point of application. But, Foucault also 
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recognizes that techniques circulate and become a common set of practices for 
a range of settings. Otherwise, an academic discourse about them could not be 
established. From Foucault's perspective, academic literature could be 
considered one way that techniques of relating are developed as a discourse. 
For example, Nelson (1988) explores how technologies of scientific 
management, engineering, accounting, and inventory control become used 
and, as a consequence, affect industrial organization. Or, Hayes and Abernathy 
(1988) describe how portfolio management as a technique is taught in business 
schools and then is used to contribute to the short-term perspective at the 
strategic level of management. Or again, Lewis (1991 ), Banks and Metzgar 
(1989), and Kochan et al. (1986) all attend to the development and spread of 
human resource management strategies in efforts to suppress unions. Once 
social practices are established, knowledge can be built on them and can 
become a part of the practice itself. 
From the discussion in this chapter, what can be observed about social 
practices in the work place? 
First, the practices used to construct primary relations make trust intrinsic 
to them. Rituals such as tutoiement are are used to mark off and establish a 
friendship. Such a relationship is reinforced by listening to and valuing the view 
of the other, empathizing with feelings shared by the other, and accepting the 
other in a nonjudgmental manner. The relationship is further reinforced by 
exposing one's own self and feelings to the other. Nothing is kept from each 
other. Lines of behavior are continually being integrated. When challenged, 
the relationship is valued and maintained rather than sacrificed. Rituals such as 
repentance and reconciliation make the maintenance of the relationship 
possible in the face of breaches of trust. 
Secondary relationships have their birth in the dividing practice between 
the in-group and the out-group in which distrust is an intrinsic element. While 
technologies of relating such as sovereignty, discipline, and market were 
devised as ways of relating across boundaries, the examination of these 
technologies reveals that the techniques themselves set up the divisions and 
the distrust implicit in the scene of their birth. Thus, the question of trust --and 
distrust -- only genuinely emerges with the application of techniques of relating 
which establish and reinforce secondary relations. 
In the context of secondary relationships, trust is fundamentally a dividing 
practice: trustworthy or untrustworthy. Reputation and motives of persons, 
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organizations, or other identities are constructed and read as an integral part of 
the dividing practice. But, regardless of how one assesses the reputation of the 
other or the other's opportunity or motivation to cheat, the techniques used to 
relate leave no room for friendship on which one can rely. One is left tolerating 
risk in trust or positing distrust with certainty. When trust is broken, there are no 
rituals of restoration. Instead, there are techniques for punishing, exiting, 
objectifying, subjectifying, and stigmatizing. 
Are practices of trust and other practices of managing relations 
compatible and reinforcing of each other or are they problematic for each other? 
This review of literature on technologies of sovereignty, discipline, market, 
dividing practices, and confession suggests that the capacity for opportunism is 
intrinsic to those very technologies. Furthermore, the differentiation of the work 
place into the work group, the labor relations level, and the strategic level is 
created by theses technologies and enhances the problem of opportunism by 
establishing different discourses about what constitutes opportunism and by 
decreasing the ability to assess whether or not people are acting 
opportunistically in a level or setting different from one's own level. While 
opportunism is set up by these technologies, the discussion on trust and distrust 
suggests that trust and distrust as practices in and of themselves are separate 
from those technologies but have an effect on what lines of action can be set up 
by those technologies. 
Finally, some have argued that one can incorporate elements of primary 
relationships into secondary relationships to manage trust. For example, 
managers can listen to and value workers. One can eliminate the judgmental 
and blame finding aspects of appraisal. One can give workers freedom to act. 
However, in the context of secondary relations, these acts are constructed as 
instrumental acts. No friendship or intrinsic valuing of the relationship is 
involved. No rituals of restoration are involved. Thus, one is left thrown back on 
issues of reputation and intention which are a part of the technologies of trust 
and distrust. 
CHAPTER Ill 
METHOD AS RUSE 
Introduction 
Since most social science is built on either the realist or the idealist 
model of epistemology (Smith, 1983; Smith and Heshusius, 1986), these 
perspectives will be first outlined and criticized from the perspective of Foucault. 
Then, Foucault's method of study will be outlined. Finally, the specific 
procedures used to conduct this study will be described. 
A Critique of the Realist and Idealist Epistemologies 
The aim of the realist model is to match one's descriptions of the world to 
the actual conditions of the world. Here, there is an independent source of 
reality against which one's models can be judged. In order for a knower to 
successfully carry the role of observer of an independently existing reality, the 
knower must be neutral. That is, the knower must eliminate all bias and 
preconceptions, must not be emotionally involved in the knowing process, and 
must use value-free, neutral language. Devices used to insure and measure 
reliability, internal validity, and external validity are procedures used to 
eliminate bias and preconceptions. If contradictory statements arise, the 
existence of an independent reality provides a point of comparison and 
arbitration against which contradictory statements about the reality can be 
adjudicated. By using the appropriate procedures, one should be able to 
develop and refine laws of association and causal laws which are isomorphic 
with reality. 
While the realist view of social science posits a distance between the 
knower and the known, Foucault's (1979) analysis of the application of 
discipline in the prison reveals immediately that the neutral, objective relation 
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between the knower and the known assumed by the realist model rests on 
devices such as hierarchical observation, the panoptican, and the examination. 
The neutrality and objectivity assumed is created by these asymmetric devices. 
Thus, they are not neutral. Similarly, Emerson (1988) exposes this use of 
power relations to create objectivity in his analysis of the emergence of 
self-consciousness in field work. Colonial regimes in which much early field 
work was conducted were built on the power relation between the colonial 
rulers and the native population. The power of the ruler guaranteed access to 
and cooperation from the natives. Thus, conditions could be manipulated to 
test hypotheses. The power and cultural differences between the colonial 
researcher and the natives provided the exterior, detached subjects necessary 
for the construction of the appearance of neutrality and objectivity. Yet, this 
again is hardly a neutral situation. In a different vein, Duncan (1984) notes that 
most methods of measure in the realist model of social science have their social 
· roots in methods of voting, levying taxes, valuing goods, labeling social ranks, 
bestowing honors, and drawing lots. Again, all of these are rooted in 
nonneutral, asymmetric relations. With respect to the issues raised in this study, 
these methods of measure outlined by Duncan (1984) are also rooted in 
devices which create and are used in relating across boundaries. That is, the 
realist model presupposes and creates secondary relationships. 
A second line of criticism against the realist model which can be drawn 
from Foucault focuses on the foundationalist notion of an independent, 
knowable reality. Cooke (1993) observes that, while Foucault avoids solipsism 
by the minimal realism of recognizing sources of recalcitrance and asymmetries 
set up by other practices, Foucault is unwilling to privilege any model of reality 
as true because there is no way to separate knowledge from the asymmetries of 
the practices used to find truth. For example, Alwin and Krosnick (1985) 
observe that the ranking of values is altered by the use of a rating or a ranking. 
methodology. Is the difference they found rooted in the method, did they 
discover two different aspects of a reality, neither, or both? Is the invariant 
aspect located in the tool constructed to produce a measure or in some reality 
independent of the tool? Similar questions can be raised about Smith's ( 1987) 
finding that attitudes toward a public policy change when survey respondents 
are asked questions using the word "poor" instead of "welfare." One can 
describe the apparatuses and resistance involved in social action and the 
consequences associated with those apparatuses and resistance. But, can one 
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claim a truth transcendent of this codetermined situation? 
A third line of criticism against the realist model is suggested by 
Foucault's (1980) criticism of global, totalitarian theories. The realist model 
assumes that there is one, universal reality which one can discover and reduce 
to laws of association or causation. While these global theories have provided 
useful tools for local research, the very not~on of global theories forces all local, 
non-centralized practices either into a common mold or discounts them as the 
accidental and therefore inadequate. · If reality is codetermined by social 
practices and if social practices and resistance are local in their application, 
then global theories blind one to what is going on. Furthermore, global theories 
are enfeebling (Cooke, 1993). Global theories broadly conceive of overall 
strategies for change. But, such strategies usually do not offer practical means 
for their realization in the local scene, which is the only scene in which any of us 
live. In addition, such schemes often commit one to a particular idea of 
emancipatory practice based on a global theory such as human rights in spite of 
how the actual practice of the emancipatory practice is carried out. For 
example, Shapiro (1990) contends that a democratic ethos -- a global theory --
is desirable independent of whether the ideas of representation or participation 
can be realized in local practice. At the same time, Shapiro (1990) ironically 
notes that the very practices recommended by a global theory get subverted in 
local practices as voting procedures are manipulated, influenced by the order of 
voting, influenced by the control of agenda, and influenced by interest groups. 
A fourth line of criticism against the realist model is suggested by 
Foucault's (1980, 1984) analysis of truth. As noted earlier, the realist model is 
built on the correspondence theory of truth. Here, there is a source of reality 
against which contradictory models can be judged and which can be known by 
using methods which guarantee objectivity and neutrality. However, Foucault 
claims that truth is " ... a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulaticm, and operation of statements· (Foucault, 
1980: 74). Truth is what is produced by a set of rules and procedures. That is, 
the rules for producing truth have a power effect by governing which statements 
are acceptable or unacceptable (Foucault, 1984). Also, truth has a power effect 
by virtue of its rhetorical effect (Cooke, 1993) and by virtue of the location and 
status of the intellectual in society (Shiner, 1982). 
To see how the assumptions of the realist position have an effect on 
governing the acceptability of statements, consider Smith and Heshusius' 
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(1986) analysis of how attempts to adopt realist concerns to idealist methods 
subvert the aim of the idealist epistemology. Since the idealist model of 
knowing recognizes that the mind with its attending emotions and intentions is 
involved in the construction of reality in investigation, inquiry can only be a 
never ending process of interpretation. "All that can be done is to match 
descriptions to other descriptions, choosing to honor some as valid because 
they 'make sense,' given one's interests and purposes" (Smith and Heshusius, 
1986, p. 9). If one applies the aims of the realist model to idealist methods --
which are methods designed to get at the meaning of things as the other sees it 
-- one subverts the indeterminism of the idealist epistemology with the 
determinism of realism. The realist requirements of isomorphism between data 
and an independent reality is imposed on the idealist model such that the 
codetermination of interpretation is broken apart into subject and object. Now, 
interpretations can be judged by an isomorphism between the researcher's 
interpretation and the subject's interpretation. For example, Agar (1988) and 
Denzin (1983, 1989a, 1989b) propose that the validity of interpretations can be 
determined by submitting the interpretations to review by those being studied or 
by using the interpretations as a rule book to anticipate interaction with the 
subjects being studied. Another strategy for breaking apart the codetermination 
of the interpretation with realist assumptions is analytic induction (Agar, 1986; 
Denzin, 1989b). Here, one creates an interpretation, checks it against further 
examples of the behavior under study, modifies the interpretation, checks it 
against more examples of behavior, and continues until the interpretation can 
account for all behavior and until no further examples can be found which 
would counter the interpretation. As Smith and Heshusius (1986) argue, the 
application of a realist set of rules for determining truth to a set of procedures 
which do not assume an independent reality force the creation of an 
independent reality and force the separation of the true from the false on the 
basis of that independent reality rather than by "honoring" some interpretations 
and not others as "making sense." 
Unlike the realist, the idealist epistemology does not posit a strict 
separation of the knower from the known. It does not posit an independent 
reality which can be know by a neutral observer. Instead, the idealist 
epistemology recognizes that the object of study is not known apart from the 
knowing subject. What is known is a product of mind with its attendant emotions 
and values. There is no independent reality available as an arbitrator of 
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interpretations. The process of understanding involves a constant movement 
with no beginning or ending. Since the viewpoint of the other in social context 
is the object of study, one attempts to understand the meaning that others give 
to their situations. Here, truth can only be understood as a socially and 
historically conditioned agreement. With no external reference, two 
contradictory interpretations are simply different ways of constituting reality. 
Agreement is reached through a process of justification that is inescapably 
bound up with values and interests. All one can do is match interpretations to 
other interpretations and choose to honor some as valid because they make 
sense given one's interests and purposes. There are no rules or procedures to 
produce truth. 
Before moving to criticize the idealist epistemology from Foucault's 
perspective, it is important to note that Foucault and the idealist epistemology 
both see phenomena as constituted in a codetermined fashion with the act of 
knowing. Thus, both are unwilling to engage in claims of procedures which 
offer to produce truth independent of the practices of knowing. In this way, they 
both break the social and rhetorical power of truth claims rooted in the realist 
epistemology. 
Having recognized these affinities between Foucault and the idealist 
epistemology, there are significant and critical differences. First, the subject or 
mind exists for the idealist as a real, transcendental reality that acts to give 
meaning. As such, it is an unmoved mover which can be an object of study 
(Cooke, 1993). Thus, Denzin (1990) notes that underneath the textual orders 
created by social scientist, journalist, novelist, etc. , there is the subject -- the 
man, woman, or child -- who has her or his words and stories to tell. Here, the 
researcher aims to see the organizational world as a member would see it, to 
learn the meaning of actions from the viewpoints of members, and to portray 
these as accurately as possible (Smircich, 1983). As noted earlier, the main 
congruence set up by this scheme is between the interpretations of those 
studied and the interpretations of the researcher (Jones, 1983). Against the 
transcendental subject, Foucault (1990) argues that the subject is constructed 
by techniques used to elicit hidden truth drawn from the confessional and, as 
noted earlier, the class meeting. As Denzin (1990) observes, the meaning of 
experience is in its telling. Such meaning itself eludes the teller and listener. 
But, as Foucault (1990) notes, the telling is elicited by specific techniques and in 
specific relations of power. The telling itself elicits further interpretation and 
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emotions by the listener and by the teller after the fact. The transcendental 
fiction called subject is an artifact posited by techniques or rituals of relating and 
by the myths about the situation. Thus, Foucault encourages one to examine 
the relations, rules, and techniques for interacting rather than subjects 
themselves to understand what people do and how they do it. 
In addition to the subject as the transcendental author of meaning, the 
idealist epistemology contains a concept of the subject as a transcendental 
ethical subject. For example, Denzin (1990) posits the right of the subject to 
interpret his or her own story, and Habermas (1984) posits an equal right 
among story tellers. Yet, Foucault (1980, 1984) argues that such rights are a 
part of technologies of sovereignty. While the king gives up certain rights with 
the concept of natural rights, natural rights ensnare actors in asymmetric 
devices such as contracts, bureaucracies, and different methods of voting. At 
the same time, Foucault (1980, 1984) objects to concepts of power grounded in 
sovereignty because they entirely miss technologies of power derived from 
techniques of discipline, confession, etc. For example, I as a researcher might 
give someone who was a subject a right to review my interpretation to see if in 
fact I understood her or him. Yet, if one were to actually examine the interaction 
during the review, one would see all sorts of accounts, postures, gestures, etc. 
on the part of both of us as we struggled over an acceptable interpretation. 
Furthermore, life in an organization is replete with the asymmetries of hierarchy 
and dividing practices. I might give both a worker and a manager a chance to 
review interpretations. Both will work to eliminate interpretations which make 
them look bad or which reveal strategies which they are trying to keep hidden. 
The worker has much less ability to keep her or his interpretations from 
managers -- who most often engage in studies -- than the manager has to keep 
her or his interpretations from workers. Thus, asymmetries of power which are 
totally missed by the concept of rights have an effect on the construction of 
interpretations. All of these techniques for relating do serious damage to the 
idea of a transcendental subject so critical to membership validation and to 
validation through recognition and honoring. 
Method as Ruse 
A ruse is a gimmick or device used as a strategy or instrument. For 
Foucault, method can best be understood as a ruse rather than as a method 
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which promises truth. In fact, truth from Foucault's viewpoint is produced by 
rules and relations for separating or dividing statements into the true or the 
false. The rules and relations of the idealist and of the realist epistemologies 
are disciplines and as such tame and normalize as surely as does discipline 
applied to prisoners. Truth itself is a ruse in the game of power/knowledge. By 
recognizing truth in this way, Foucault (1984:46) is able to raise his principle 
question: "How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the 
intensification of power relations?" Because of his attempt to explore the 
capabilities in social practices without resorting to the power effects of truth 
about those capabilities, Foucault's method has been called an anti-method 
(Shiner, 1982). As Keeley (1990) notes, Foucault is not interested in theorizing 
or in hypotheses. Instead, Foucault encourages a researcher to adopt an 
attitude of contestability, to apply analytic devices, and to explore possibilities. 
In addition to bracketing the issue of truth with the use of ruse as method, 
Foucault adopts other strategies which are designed to unhinge the realist and 
idealist frameworks of truth. First, Foucault (1984) concentrates on specific 
instances with historical investigations in order to separate out from the 
contingencies that which makes us what we are and what we are no longer 
capable of being. By focusing on the historical and the specific, Foucault 
intends to reject the search for formal structures with universal value. Second, 
Foucault (1980) encourages one to concentrate on practices, that is, to 
concentrate on how things work at the on-going point of application. By 
focusing on practices, Foucault intends to reject inquiry at the level of conscious 
intentions or decisions. Third, Foucault (1980) encourages one to begin the 
analysis of power at the local level in the application of various practices to 
things, to the actions of others, and to actions on one's self. Only then can one 
conduct an ascending analysis by exploring how local practices are invested, 
colonized, and utilized by other practices. By focusing on the infinitesimal 
applications of techniques of relation, Foucault intends to reject an exclusive 
focus on large, centralized mechanisms as an explanation for phenomena. 
While Foucault (1980) encourages one to begin with the infinitesimal and then 
explore their colonization in an ascending analysis of power, Donnelly (1982) 
observes that Foucault fails to follow his own advice by showing how 
technologies such as discipline in the prison are analogous to the industrial 
setting without actually tracing the process of diffusion. Finally, Foucault (1980) 
claims that one cannot achieve a perspective for fully knowing our historical 
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limits. Theoretical and practical experience is always limited and determined. 
With no independent reality or transcendental subject which can be used as a 
measure, one is always in the position of beginning again. While each new 
study with realism and idealism represents a new approximation, each new 
study with method seen as ruse represents a new perspective. By recognizing 
method as perspective, Foucault intends to reject the foundational assumptions 
of idealism and realism. 
Even though Foucault rejects foundational assumptions, he (Foucault, 
1984:47) claims that his approach to method does not mean that " ... no work 
can be done except in disorder and contingency." His method has its 
homogeneity, its systematicity, and its generality. By homogeneity, Foucault 
(1984) means that one studies what people do and how they do it. In order to 
do this, Foucault examines practices as if they were techniques or devices. For 
example, one could look at a practice as if it were an apparatus (Foucault, 
1980). That is, one could look at a practice as being an ensemble consisting of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, law, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, moral propositions, etc. Then, 
one could try to identify the nature of the connections that can exist between the 
elements. Finally, and to the point, one could explore how these elements and 
their relation to each other set up or discourage certain lines of behavior. 
Foucault deals with this last point by claiming that an apparatus has a strategic 
function (Foucault, 1980) or is conditioned by strategy just as the apparatus also 
conditions strategy (Foucault, 1990). For this reason, Donnelly (1982) has 
criticized Foucault for engaging in functional arguments or in denying but 
requiring a transcendental subject to give meaning. However, as Cooke (1993) 
demonstrates, if one stays on Foucault's horse and attends to the asymmetries 
in the apparatuses involved in practices, one can explore differential outcomes 
set up by practices without resorting to functions or needs or without needing a 
transcendental actor with a purpose. Another way Foucault explores practices 
is to focus on discourse with the idea of the episteme (Foucault, 1972, 1980). 
The episteme is the apparatus which makes possible the separation of what 
may be taken to be true from that which may not be characterized as true. 
Again, one is interested in exploring what discursive and non-discursive 
elements are related in what way to separate statements taken to be true from 
those not taken to be true. 
By systematicity, Foucault (1984) identifies three broad areas of practical 
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systems: relations of control over things, relations of actions upon others, and 
relations with oneself. For example, with respect to constituting ourselves as 
moral agents of our own actions, Foucault (1984, 1988a, 1990) begins by 
looking at what part of the self or action is conceived as ethical substance. He 
then moves to explore modes of subjection by which people are invited or 
incited to recognize moral obligations and means by which people can change 
themselves in order to become ethical subjects. Foucault -- while recognizing 
relations as apparatuses -- does not recognize relations as a fictional substance 
which can be constructed, objectified, and acted on just as can be things, 
others, and the self. Thus, Foucault does not attend to rituals of relationships 
except as they affect others or the self. One can also explore relations 
themselves as the fictional substance which are constituted by practices and on 
which practices work. 
Finally, by generality, Foucault (1984:49) means that his investigations 
are specific and" ... bear upon a material, an epoch, a body of determined 
practices and discourses." Here, Foucault (1990) is not only interested in 
identifying and analyzing strategic unities, he is interested in examining critical 
changes which reflect a reversal of relationships of forces. Since such a 
reversal is a complex restructuring of apparatuses, it must be described 
comparatively. Thus, Lewert and Gillan (1982) observe that Foucault structures 
his text with a "then" and a "now." First, Lewert and Gillan (1982) note that 
Foucault begins every text and most sections with the description of an 
exceptional case which anchors what follows. For example, in Discipline and 
Punish, Foucault begins the book with the description of a torture and execution 
as a case to analyze the technology of punishment used by the king. Foucault 
(Lewert and Gillan, 1982) then employs an oppositive structure -- e.g., then ... 
now -- to organize a comparison of the two different apparatuses that mark the 
reversal of relationship of forces. This comparison aids in the exploration of the 
apparatuses and how they evoke or inhibit different lines of action. Again, in 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault's analysis of the use of punishment on the body of 
the condemned then is compared with the emergence and application of 
techniques of discipline borrowed from the military, the school, and the church 
and applied to the prison now. He finally explores how social science could 
emerge from the application of discipline to a confined population but could not 
emerge with the use of punishment on the body of the condemned by the king. 
Thus, Foucault's analytic is applied to analyze how one set of apparatuses are 
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displaced by another. 
An Application of Method as Ruse 
Studies in labor relations which utilize Foucault's perspective do not 
provide one with much assistance with the task of operationalizing a research 
method. Hollway's ( 1986) study of the mediation between the contradictory 
requirements of workers and peasants in Zimbabwe and of foreign and 
multinational interests doing business in Zimbabwe draws on Foucault's (1979) 
analysis of discipline and punishment as a framework for interpretation. But, 
Hollway does not utilize Foucault to develop a method of study. In a similar 
fashion McDonnell (1987) draws on Foucault's idea of the archaeology of 
knowledge (Foucault, 1972) and strategies of power (Foucault, 1980) to 
interpret the patterning of the transportation industry in New South Wales and 
laws associated with it. Again, Foucault's approach is not central to the method 
of the study. Knights and Willmott (1989) draw on Foucault's (1990) exploration 
of how.·subjectivityis brought forthlrom the confession··to· explore how deskilling 
(Braverman, 1974) makes an individual's behavior problematic to the individual 
and thus develops the individual's subjectivity. Again, Foucault provides a 
framework for interpretation but is not used to construct method. 
Only Brown (1987) clearly attends to methodology. However, she uses 
Foucault's concept of archaeology (1972) to interpret how the shop floor -- with 
its emphasis on management rights, grading jobs according to component 
tasks, and grievance procedures which focus on the formal interpretation of 
rules -- is incorporated into labor law. Since Foucault claims that the law as 
practical manual can construct a scene, Brown (1987) then hypothesizes that 
the application of labor law in a situation that should be collegial -- the 
university faculty -- should force the provost into the non-participatory 
management style of industry. She then utilizes ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis to explore her hypothesis. Here, Foucault is used to 
make a historical interpretation and as a theory. But he is then dropped when it 
comes to method. Brown's (1987) use of Foucault as theory to generate a 
hypothesis to test is clearly antithetical to Foucault's approach. 
Since Foucault's analysis leads one to set aside method as an 
establisher of truth in any foundationalist sense, what is the point of any 
description of method at all? First, to look at a set of practices using Foucault's 
approach is to apply a systematic research device. So, a description of method 
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can be rendered. However, the method makes no claims to truth. Second, 
even though Foucault continues his effort to unhinge the truth claiming business 
of method by avoiding extensive documentation of his research (Lewert and 
Gillan, 1982), documentation is an important technology for constituting trust in 
the secondary relationship of agency between the researcher and the reader. 
While a description of gathering and disseminating information does not 
generate truth in any foundational sense, Shapiro (1987) notes that they do 
provide the reader with the conventions by which the study was done so the 
reader can evaluate the work done by the researcher. In other words, a 
description of method is a disclosure. 
On another level, research method is a ruse. It is an apparatus which 
regulates what is discovered and the discourse about what is discovered. If one 
adopted the traditional realist strategy of reviewing literature, deducing 
hypotheses, and creating and implementing a research design to answer a 
series of yes or no questions, one would have to know the apparatuses used in 
an organizational setting and the distribution of those apparatuses. One would 
also have to use a series of devices to reduce actors to subjects and to control 
the scene in particular ways. It is highly unlikely that such power and control 
would be available to a researcher in an organizational setting. Since Foucault 
recognizes that the realist perspective sets up potential conclusions and limits 
all other views before.one. ever begins a study, he encourages one to explore 
social practices at the point at which they are made problematic. This does not 
mean that one is engaged in a method which avoids regulating discovery and . 
discourse.· It simply means that one cannot know what practices exist and how 
they are being made problematic before the fact of exploring the practices. 
This approach is similar to both the grounded theory approach to 
qualitative research (Strauss, 1987; Charmaz, 1988) and the participatory 
action research approach to the study of organizations (Whyte, 1991). With 
grounded theory, one begins with the data and looks for what can be defined 
and discovered in the data rather than deduced from theory and then tested 
with .data. Since one does not k11ow in advance exactly what needs to be 
sampled, one explores, analyzes through developing theoretical categories and 
the relationships between those categories, and then uses theoretical gaps to 
decide what needs to be sampled next to extend and fill in theory development. 
In a similar fashion, Foucault encourages one to begin by exploring where and 
how things are made problematic. However, he has a framework for exploring 
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the problematic. What practices are involved in making things problematic? 
What substance do they create and work on? The actions of others? The self? 
Things? Relationships? How do they work on them? What lines of behavior 
are encouraged or discouraged? While theory development drives sampling in 
grounded theory and can drive sampling in exploring practices, Foucault would 
also recognize that a researcher in an organizational setting is working in a set 
of practices. In other words, practices implicit in the organization drives 
sampling. Different groups are on the receiving end or applying end of 
practices. They experience them as problematic from these different angles. 
The practices themselves close or open access to viewpoints and settings. 
With the participatory action research approach, one actively works with 
members of an organization throughout the research process. Like Foucault, 
one begins by discovering the problems existing in the organization. The 
viewpoints of actors are not avoided but used to construct the picture of what is 
occurring. Unlike Foucault, one tests perceptions with members of 
organizations to clarify perceptions. For Foucault, such testing involves 
organizational practices that must be explored rather than transcendental actors 
that can be relied on for verification. In participatory action research, one 
develops with members of an organization a strategy to address the 
problematic through such a process. In other words, the research strategy itself 
can help to set up a new line of cooperative behavior. Foucault himself was 
very much interested in exploring practices with an eye to new ways of acting. 
However, unlike participatory action research, the articulation of a set of values 
or social policy -- such as cooperation -- probably inhibits effective political and 
ethical action from Foucault's (Gandal, 1986) viewpoint. Since all practices are 
built on asymmetric apparatuses, all practices are dangerous. While Whyte's 
( 1991 ) analyses of several case studies of participatory action research focused 
on two potentially conflicting groups coming together in cooperation, such 
approaches, while setting up new lines of cooperation, represent potential 
danger to the union or to management. There are no utopian solutions. 
Defining the Research Question 
To use Foucault's approach, one must discover how things are made 
problematic by members of an organization and use that to define the research 
question. I was hired as a labor relations consultant by the human resources 
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department of an investor-owned, midwestern electric utility company because 
management perceived that the relationship between management and the 
union had become strained. After initial interviews with several managers at the 
strategic level of the company (vice presidents and higher and members of the 
central business planning group), at the human resources level of the company 
(the specialized department dealing with personnel issues, individual and 
organizational capacity development, remuneration, benefits, and labor 
relations), and at the work group level of the company and after interviews with 
several leaders of the union, they all seemed to agree that the relationship 
between the company and the union was once fairly good but had been 
growing increasingly problematic and conflictual over the last two years. Thus, 
the principal research question is: What had changed in the relationship between the union 
and the company to cause the relationship between them to deteriorate? 
If one now applies Foucault's framework to begin to elaborate -- and 
regulate -- the discourse, one must ask: What practices were used by the union 
and management to construct a relationship which both took to be good? What 
practices were adopted by one or both parties to begin to make the relationship 
problematic? The chief way that managers and union members seemed to 
make their relationship problematic was around the practice of trust. This 
caused me to elaborate the research question by focusing on trust: Did a 
practice or practices of trust exist among the practices used to construct a good 
relationship? If so, what did it look like and how did it work? What other 
practices were employed by the union and the company to construct a 
relationship perceived as good? How did they work? What practices were 
adopted which seemed to contribute to the deterioration of the relationship? 
How did they work? How did these practices affect the practice or practices of 
trust? What practices regulated the consideration of these practices by those 
who eventually adopted them? 
Constructing a Sample by Following the Problematic 
In order to answer these questions, one has to construct a sample, a 
method for objectifying what one will take as data, and a method of analyzing. 
How does one select settings to explore? From a traditional realist point 
of view, one begins with the assumption that one can discover where practices 
are made problematic by devising a sampling procedure which uses the device 
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of randomness. This a procedure for constructing the unbiased claim of the 
detached observer of realism. It is also a device for economizing when there 
are large numbers of settings while claiming to accurately represent the totality 
of the settings. The company studied had about 2,000 employees. Over 600 
employees were covered by the union contract in settings which were 
separated by many hours of driving. Additionally, different practices probably 
got acted out at different times, during various events, and on different shifts. 
Whether one used the realist model or not, some sort of economizing sample 
had to be made. 
The traditional sampling approach also assumes that a set of practices 
would be distributed in a normal fashion. There are statistical tests for testing 
this assumption. Basically, these tests are devised by constructing a normally 
distributed population, by drawing a random series of samples of a specific 
sample size, and by developing a distribution of a specific parameter such as 
standard deviation. These tests assume a condition and use it to construct a 
conditional statement: If the population is normally constructed, then any 
sample of a given size should fall within·a given parameter with a given 
probability. Even though every student of logic and scientific method knows that 
this scheme guarantees nothing because the converse of a conditional 
statement is not necessarily true, the practical use of the test is to rely on the 
truth of the converse. Unless one can survey 100 percent of practices over all 
time under consideration, one is left with the assumption of the nature of the 
distribution of practices. Thus, even with sampling, explanation precedes 
discovery and establishes -- i.e., governs -- the discourse about it. 
A second assumption of traditional sampling is that one has the 
apparatus available to obtain a random sample. That is, it assumes that one 
has the power to gain access to get a sample which is representative of the 
population as theorized. However, if one is studying an organization, one will 
be embedded in numerous practices which direct, block, and reorganize that to 
which one can gain access. For example, the company in this study employed 
a management consulting firm to survey all of the employees of the 
organization. To get the surveys completed, the company had to require as well 
as to encourage employees to take the survey. In response to this, several 
employees were found who cooperated to answer the same or answer neutrally 
to either "send a message" or to "hide" in fear of the consequences if they 
revealed their feelings. So, the tactics adopted by the respondents rendered 
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the total population survey problematic by introducing totally unknown 
characteristics into the population from those theorized. Here, no a priori 
construction of the population could have included the practices actually used 
by workers because the workers devised the practices in response to the 
survey. 
The sampling procedure adopted for this study in some ways contains 
elements of theoretical sampling from the grounded theory approach of 
qualitative research (Strauss, 1987; Charmaz, 1988) and elements of 
_participatory action research (Whyte, 1991). Since practices are identified only 
by going out and exploring situations, one does not know in advance exactly 
what will be sampled. How managers and union leaders defined what was 
problematic in their situation certainly contained a distribution even though 
neither exact practices nor their distribution could be stipulated a priori. While 
theoretical' sampling decides what needs to be sampled next through the 
process of theoretical development and the need to sample more date to 
elaborate a category, I entered the scene and was governed by sets of practices 
that made things problematic. So, it was practices themselves rather than the 
transcendent theorization of the researcher which largely governed my 
sampling. 
The sample for this study was governed by three practices: management 
practices, union practices, and academic practices. Thus, the study employed 
triangulation by using data constructed bymanagers,·union ,leaders and 
members, and academic concerns to bear on the analysis of the various 
practices by which managers and union members relate. While Marshal and 
Rossman (1989) note that multiple sources of data can be used to corroborate, 
elaborate, or illuminate situations, Fielding and Fielding (1986) point out that 
such a strategy does not necessarily lead to stronger claims from a realist point 
of view. Foucault does not directly address triangulation. He does note that 
different m-ethods and data sources are apparatuses and parts of different 
apparatuses. The data from different sources are a part of different practices. 
One cannot just treat different sources as reflective of a common phenomenon. 
One must analyze· the mechanisms which generate the data itself as .part of the 
practices which construct the relationship between management and the union. 
The sample obtained was conditioned by attempting to follow the trail of where 
different members suggested that I could find the problematic. First, it was defined by the 
practices of human resource management practiced in the company. I was hired by the 
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human resources level of the company to explore what might be done to 
improve the relationship between the union and the company. This purpose 
conditioned what scenes I was directed to explore. I was also embedded in a 
consultant employee-employer relationship. The person who hired me laid out 
a series of concerns: ( 1) There had been a change in human resources 
personnel which may have resulted in the company dealing with the union in a 
different way; (2) there had been a change in union leadership to leaders who 
appeared to utilize conflict with the company to enhance union solidarity, to 
increase the appeal of the union to nonunion employees, to discredit the 
company and its management in the eyes of the community and the parent 
company as a negotiation tactic, and to enhance their personal position in the 
union; (3) the new participatory culture which was implemented company wide 
may not be practiced company wide by managers at the work place level; (4) 
the U.S. Department of Transportation was requiring a new universal 
Commercial Drivers License which required testing and physical examinations, 
and this had become an issue between the company and the union; and (5) 
most problems between the union and the company seemed to happen in the 
operations area where the company and the union both had headquarters and 
in a nearby power plant. Again, operations involves the construction, 
maintenance, and repair of the electricity distribution system. The company had 
four main operations divisions and six operational power plants across the 
state. Also, my employer met with me to develop a list of persons whom I 
should interview. These included managers at the strategic level (again, vice 
presidents and above and the strategic planning staff of the company), 
managers in human resources (including labor relations), managers of 
operational areas and power plants, labor lawyers employed by the company, 
first line supervisors of work groups, the business agents of the union, and 
members of the union's executive committee. It is interesting to note that my 
employer's sense of the problematic included the exact three levels of 
organization which Kochan et al. (1986, 1991) identified as critical to the study 
of labor relations. 
As I observed and interviewed in the human resources department, 
various practices defined the problematic for the staff in that department which, 
in turn, directed my sample. Several staff people were in charge of dealing with 
various types of employee complaints. Some were in charge of dealing with the 
union contract and with grievances and negotiations. A committee of company 
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managers was established to address problems with interpretations of the labor 
contract. Forms soliciting issues for this group were routinely circulated at all 
levels of management. Union communications were monitored. Others were 
responsible for organizational development and training. Training sessions 
provided places for making things problematic. Still others dealt with testing 
and with pay and benefits. These areas also contained problematic practices. 
The department conducted employee surveys which were designed to identify 
the problematic. 
Second, the sample was defined by practices of the union's leadership. In the 
process of trying to identify the location and nature of various new management 
practices and policies in order to grieve the practices or to negotiate over the 
practices, the union had developed a seri.es of materials and lists of places and 
persons where things were problematic for them. They gave me the use of 
materials and lists of settings and encouraged me to interview people 
associated with these problematic settings. As I observed and interviewed the 
union leadership, various practices defined the problematic for them and, in 
turn, directed my sample. Trips were made by union leaders to the various work 
places on a systematic basis to talk with union stewards and members. Union 
stewards called the union office for clarification of work rules when union 
members had questions about management actions. Union members called 
the union hall with concerns. The union leadership would analyze grievances 
called in from various areas and consult stewards to see if the.new problematic 
management practices existed in other areas. 
Finally, two academic concerns contributed to my selection of sites to investigate. 
First, Kochan et al. ( 1986, 1991) identified the study of the strategic, labor 
relations, and work place levels of a company as critical to the study of labor 
relations. As already noted, these three levels were included in the study as a 
result of the direction of my supervisor. Second, as early as Weber (1958, 
1978), academic sociology has used the ruse of comparison to try to identify 
differential effects set up by various conditions. Knowing the settings that 
management made problematic and those that the union made problematic, 
some work groups which were not identified by either group as problematic 
were selected to interview and observe. The purpose for doing so was to see if 
the practices defined as problematic extended beyond either the union's or 
management's sense of the problematic and to try to find alternative practices 
for purposes of comparison. The specific sites investigated were chosen by not 
being on the list of sites either managers or union leaders urged me to 
investigate, by the availability of personnel, and by the convenience of travel. 
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By convenience of travel, I mean that I tried to string a series of visits together on 
my line of travel. Of the sites enumerated below, seven operations sites and 
two power plants were not on either management's or the union's list of 
important sites for me to visit. 
To summarize the actual sampling activity, all areas· of the company 
made problematic by management and the union were covered as well as other 
areas not mentioned by either as a source of comparison. On the management 
side, five interviews were conducted with persons at the executive or strategic 
planning level, fourteen interviews were conducted with human resources and 
labor relations personnel, thirty-six interviews were conducted with managers in 
operations over the four areas in which the company is divided, and 
twenty-eight interviews were conducted with managers involved with power 
generation in six sites. To get another view of the strategic level, a person who 
was a member of the state's utility board for several years in the 1970s and 
1980s was also interviewed. On the union side, the business managers, the 
union executive committee, one work group in power generation, one work. 
group in operations, twenty-five union members in operations over three areas 
of the four areas into which the company was divided, and twenty-one union 
members in power generation in six sites were interviewed. The interviewing 
was done on a daily basis over a four month period. 
In addition to the interviews, a variety of meetings were observed. At the 
human resources and labor relations level, one arbitration session, one 
negotiation session, one strategic planning session, one labor relations 
protocol m·eeting, one meeting reviewing a promotion decision, and ten other 
brief meetings between various persons were observed. At the operations and 
power generation level, a central safety committee. meeting,· an operations 
safety meeting, a power generation safety meeting, three daily meetings, a 
strategic meeting to plan for the negotiation of work rules, and a meeting to 
negotiate work rules were observed. 
Finally, two flip charts used for training managers, fifty-three letters or 
memos, twenty-one newsletters or newspaper clippings, twenty-eight 
grievances, eleven training or procedure manuals, and seven studies or 
evaluations regarding labor relations which had been conducted by the 
company were examined for content. Additionally, following the suggestion of 
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Marshall and Rossman (1989) to use multiple sources of data to corroborate, 
elaborate, or illuminate situations, the company annual reports from 1976 to 
1990, local news articles on the company going back to the 1950s which were 
found in historical files in the local library, and information from the U.S. 
Census and the local state employment commission from the 1970s and 1980s 
were analyzed. 
Final/)'; ndte carefully how this sampling procedure affects the picture constructed 
of this situation As noted earlier, the sample obtained for this study was 
conditioned by attempting to follow the trail of where different members 
suggested that one could find the problematic. Second, the method of 
constructing data outlined below was designed to elicit the problematic. Thus, it 
will create an impression of the problematic. If one adopted a method which 
had as its intention to develop an impression of the average or the 
representational, a less problematic picture of the scene would probably 
emerge. 
Constructing Data by Eliciting the Problematic 
Now that sampling has been discussed, what approach does one use to 
objectify practices? First, Foucault (1980, 1984) observed that manuals and 
other written sources for directing practices play a key role in regulating social 
practices. Thus, manuals and other written sources for directing practices such as labor 
contracts, labor Jaw, union policy and procedures, and company policy and procedures 
must be and were considered in this study both as a tool for constructing practices as well 
as an objectified practice. 
A limitation of exclusively relying on manuals and other such devices is 
that one is not able to know how the manuals are actually used in practices or to 
know actual practices which are not included in the manuals. Foucault 
probably ignored or overlooked this because his studies are historical studies 
and because he emphasized the importance of manuals as the crystallization of 
power and knowledge. Therefore, in addition to examining manuals and written 
sources for defining and directing practices, other devices must be deployed to 
objectify practices as they seemed to occur in the organization. 
Loftland and Loftland (1984) have noted that data actually used in an 
analysis is always some sort of record which is constructed by some practice. 
What sort bf device would be appropriate given that one does not know the 
scene a prion? The use of tightly framed devices such as questionnaires and 
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structured interviews are problematic on at least two levels. First, since this 
study does not presume to know the nature of practices used to make the 
relationship between management and the union problematic, it is not really 
possible to adequately frame such regiments. Second, a survey constructs a 
practice based on certain a priori assumptions about actual practices in the 
work place which may force an interpretation of those practices which are not 
warranted. As noted above, it was learned that the company hired a 
management firm periodically to assess employee attitudes by work group for 
the whole company. The assumptions of the survey treat the constructed 
attitude measurement of individual respondents as an independent measure of 
some aspect of the individual. Some people responded to the survey as 
individuals as constructed by the survey and by the instructions for 
administering the survey. But, others responded in some collective way. 
Management interpreted the survey results using the assumptions of the 
measurement device. There was a great disparity between how managers 
interpreted the survey based on a priori assumptions and how those trying to 
collectively "send" a message intended their response to be interpreted. 
In order to try to understand how various actors made things problematic, a very 
open ended interview process was used to allow them to use their own devices and 
practices. I would share with the interviewee that I had been hired by the 
company to conduct a labor relations study and that this study would be the 
basis for my dissertation as well as input for trying to improve the relationship 
between management and the union. Then, I would share with them that I 
would keep their identity confidential by not revealing their names and by 
focusing on practices in my analysis. If the person indicated that they did not 
want to talk with me, the session ended, and I thanked them for their time. 
Otherwise, I would tell them that management and union officials perceived that 
labor relations in the company had become strained over the past few years. 
Could they help me understand why this perception might exist and how the 
current situation came to be? While I would occasionally ask questions for 
clarification or elaboration, I reasked the question until the respondent could no 
longer think of a response which they would share. I recorded the responses as 
close to verbatim as I could by taking notes. The interviews ranged from twenty 
minutes to three hours. The average interview lasted forty-five minutes to 
one-hour fifteen minutes. 
While my purpose in using an unstructured interview was to allow the 
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respondents to describe practices and consequences as they experienced 
them and made them problematic, one should not conclude that my research 
strategy was itself a practice without discourse governing effects. For example, 
Hall et al. ( 1982) suggest that one can enable minority viewpoints to emerge in 
a group decision making process by setting aside the first solution a group 
identifies and by requiring the group to identify additional solutions. Similarly, 
by continuing to repeat the question until a respondent could no longer come 
up with a response, a responses beyond the first reaction was evoked. 
Respondents also engaged in strategies to govern discourse. For 
example, respondents offered accounts to instruct me as to how I should read a 
situation. I would sometimes get a description of various events and practices 
which were connected to deteriorating relationships between the union and the 
company. The respondent would then say, "But, we really have good relations." 
Then, the respondent would continue with practices contributing to the 
deteriorating relationship. I also noted occasions on which respondents omitted 
items which latter came out. Finally, some persons openly lobbied me on how 
to take accounts offered by other persons. 
Second, data was constructed through the obseivation of meetings and through 
taking notes as close to verbatim as possible on what transpired at the meetings. In all 
meetings observed, I identified myself as a consultant hired by the company to 
study labor relations. In these meetings, I tried to play the role of observer more 
than participant. I did this by not sitting where the interaction was taking place 
or -- if it were necessary to sit where the interaction was taking place -- by sitting 
away from where the interaction was focused by the architecture of the table or 
room. Even though I tried to minimize the effect of my presence in meetings 
observed, there are no guarantees that I was effective in doing so. In one of the 
first meetings I observed, I wore blue jeans and a work shirt because I was 
planning on making my initial contact with union members at that meeting. 
Because of my dress and because most managers did not know my role during 
the first part of the meeting, I was taken to be an unknown union observer. 
Managers were cautious of me at that meeting until I was introduced to them by 
a human resources staff person. They then laughed, said that they took me for 
a union member, and began discussing elements of the meeting. In other 
settings, I was not taken into the circle of the in-group as easily. One day I had 
the opportunity to travel with a line crew all day. I was held at arms length by 
many crew members. The supervisor of the crew was careful and guarded his 
l 
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speech as compared to how I had seen him from afar just days earlier. Toward 
the end of the day, several crew members had begun to share more openly with 
me. Then, a couple of men came in from another crew and began to accuse me 
of being a spy and a hired gun to help destroy the union. Rather than assume 
that I was a factor in some settings and not in others, I treated all situations in 
which I acted as a consultant for the company as an observer. That is, I 
recorded the practices used on me and by me and their consequences for my 
actions and for the actions of those around me. 
Finally, practices were objectified by unintentionally breaching various practices. 
While Garfinkel (1963) developed specific breaching experiments to test 
various hypotheses about the natural attitude and the·taken-for-granted nature 
of social reality as theorized by Schutz (1962, 1967), such breaching events 
happen in an unplanned course of events. One need not adopt Schutz's 
phenomenological viewpoint to usefully employ breaches. Rather, one can 
adopt Berndtson's (1970) and Foucault's (1980, 1984) notion that power only 
becomes apparent in resistance and recast a "break" in the taken-for-granted as 
a practice which is met by another practice which sets up an alternative line of 
action. 
Such breaches occurred on at least two occasions. First, at a meeting in 
which high level managers met to review my findings, most of them felt that my 
findings were pro-union because I had focused on how the use of management 
rights had created a series of events which affected the union worker's trust in 
the company's strategic level and human resource level of management. There 
was a general agreement among the managers that the company could not 
give up any more rights to the union. Thus, even though there was a lot of talk 
about the new company culture of openness and participation, control through 
the practice of management rights and hierarchy was what was being practiced. 
Second, after this meeting and after clarifying that the company's 
management seemed to want me to address a way to improve relations with 
union members without working through the union organization, I wrote a 
second analysis in which I analyzed practices by which the union used 
discontent created at the work group level by management decisions taken at 
all levels of management. In particular, I noted how the resistance by 
management to substantially resolving grievances from the perspective of 
workers in order to not give up any more management rights in fact resulted in 
increased discontent and made it easier for the union to organize and to press 
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for demands in negotiations. At the meeting in which my first findings were 
reviewed by management, it came out that the number of persons in unionized 
units of the company who were members of the union had increased from sixty 
percent to eighty percent over the two years in which grievances were 
continually not substantially resolved from the viewpoint of the union but were 
procedurally pushed to arbitration. Since I was told by the human resources 
department that training had been given to first line managers on the contract so 
they could make decisions with respect to grievances in the· new participatory 
culture, I recommended that first line supervisors be encouraged to resolve 
issues rather than resist them and force them to arbitration. Record numbers of 
grievances made it to the human resources level in the year that I began this 
study. In a meeting to review this second study, I was shown a note from a 
person in human resources which indicated that the training was to ensure that 
work group supervisors followed management's interpretation of the contract. 
The person who wrote the note indicated that she had hated being told what to 
do when she was a work group supervisor by labor relations specialist in the 
human resources department. So, she was using training. If it did not work, 
then the training at least provided the background for work group supervisors to 
understand her orders. In other words, she substituted training for command as 
a way to work on work group supervisor's behavior. This was a significant 
revelation. Before, it looked like first line supervisors had some latitude 
because of the emphasis on participation in the new corporate culture. Thus, I, 
as a participant in the scene, made things problematic in an unintended way but 
in a way which clarified practices. 
Constructing an analysis of the problematic 
Now that the method of sampling and the method of objectifying practices 
into data have been disclosed, what method does one use to analyze practices 
from Foucault's perspective? First, Foucault (1984) encourages one to focus on 
what people do and how they do it. In order to examine practices, Foucault 
(1980) views them as if they were techniques or devices. Second, Foucault 
( 1984) encourages one to explore what substances the practices posit and 
work on as a practical system. Specifically, Foucault contends that practices 
posit and work on things, the actions of others, and relations with oneself. 
Additionally, I observed earlier that relations themselves are objectified and 
worked on by social practices for constructing relationships. Third, Foucault 
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(1991a, 1991b) encourages one to break down practices into the elements 
which constitute them. The number of such elements is not given in advance 
but can be taken to be finite. Thus, "one has to proceed by progressive, 
necessarily incomplete saturation" (Foucault, 1991b:77). Fourth, Foucault 
(1991a, 1991b) encourages one to identify the nature of the connections that 
can exist among the elements and the lines of activity they set up or inhibit. For 
Foucault (1991b), practices have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to 
be done and codifying effects regarding what is to be known. Fifth, Foucault 
(1984, 1991a, 1991b) encourages one to examine critical changes in practices 
which constitute a reversal of relationships of force. Since such a reversal is a 
complex restructuring of apparatuses, it must be described comparatively. 
Thus, Lemert and Gillan (1982) observe that Foucault structures his text with a 
"then" and a "now." Finally, Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984) encourages one to 
examine how practices circulate and are colonized by other practices. 
Before moving to describe how Foucault's methodological points will be 
operationalized, Foucault's anti-essentialist, "polymorphous" approach to 
correlation will be constrasted with the essentialist, exclusive partitioning 
approach to causality. First, the normal way of doing social science relies 
heavily on _the requirements from logic that reality be partitioned into mutually 
exclusive categories based on an essential aspect of the phenomena under 
consideration. This might be done through such devices as ideal types (Weber, 
1958, 1978), categories (Strauss, 1987; Charmaz, 1988), or definitions (Best, 
1981; Babbie, 1986). Foucault (1991b) criticizes such a partitioning and 
reducing because such categories are created by the researcher in order to 
reduce potentially important differences into commonalities. Such reductions 
further become a priori judgments which restrict the field of consideration of the 
researcher. While it is never possible to know if one has enumerated all 
elements of a practice, normal social science presupposes such a possibility. 
Furthermore, the categories are probably not present in the thought of the 
individuals whose concrete behavior.is to be understood on their basis. Finally, 
definitions, categories, and rationalities are all parts of practices whose power 
effects can only be understood by relating them to other elements of practices. 
In the place of essential reduction, Foucault (1991 a, 1991 b) encourages 
one to break down practices into their elements. While one attempts to 
"saturate" the break down and while the elements can be taken as finite, one 
can never presume to know that the break down is complete. Furthermore, the 
breakdown is a construction of the researcher. Thus, one cannot claim to 
exhaustively or essentially categorize some reality. 
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Second, ideas of causality in naturally occurring settings rely on the 
conditional statement and on some accounting of covariation. As noted earlier, 
conditional statements only give one the ability to reject some theorized 
necessary condition. They cannot be used to affirm necessary conditions 
without relying on the practice of affirming the converse of the conditional, which 
is a fallacy within the discourse of conditional statements. When it is applied to 
an accounting of covariation, the slope becomes even slicker. Whether one 
uses cross classification, correlation, regression, factor analysis, or some other 
measure of covariation, the procedure forces a reduction of phenomena to the 
variables under consideration and constructions an accounting of variation in 
the dependent variable in terms of the currency of the independent variables. 
To demonstrate the indeterminacy of conjecturing relations between 
variables and then using covariation to demonstrate the relation, consider 
Cooke's { 1992) examination of the relationship between relative cohort size of 
persons in an internal labor market and the rate of survival of members of a 
cohort in an organization from one time period to another. Cooke used Reed's 
(1978) findings that an individual's chances for promotion are greatly affected 
· by relative cohort size in a system in which all promotions are made from within 
and in which few leave for other employment to predict that, as the ratio of 
younger to older clergy rises, the number of younger clergy remaining in the 
ministry in the next period will decrease. When Cooke examined this 
relationship for all members of the Oklahoma annual conference of the 
Methodist Church who were in the ministry from 1940 to 1980, he.found the 
predicted linear relationship between relative cohort size and survival in the 
ministry which accounted for forty-four percent of the variation in the proportion 
of clergy surviving to the next period. However, when he considered only clergy 
who were actually in the internal labor market of the annual conference, the 
predicted linear relationship only accounted for one percent of variation in the 
proportion of clergy surviving to the next period. So, by changing definitions --
which were all mutually exclusive within their scheme -- one came up with 
different results. While the discourse of causality would cause one to begin to 
look for other variables, one is always left in the position of not knowing if one 
has enumerated all elements or if one has appropriately related the elements 
as one forces the accounting of variation into the enumeration one has created 
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with a discourse about causation which claims more than it can ever deliver. 
In the place of allocating causality on the basis of classification and 
variation accounting, Foucault (1991a, 1991b) relies on exploring the interplay 
and relation of elements of practices and how they work on things, actions of 
others and relations with oneself. He is interested in exploring how some 
elements displace others and the effects of such displacements. By doing so, 
Foucault does not claim a better argument for causality. Instead, he intends to 
explore how things work while suspending the privilege of arguing cause. 
To operationalize Foucault's method, the six principles of analysis 
outlined above were applied to the data constructed as outlined above to 
answer the research questions outlined above. First, a "before" and "after" 
picture of labor relations was created by identifying practices used in a period 
when respondents of both management and the union judged that relations 
between them were comparatively good and in a period when they judged that 
relations between them were comparatively troubled. Then, practices that 
union members and managers used to judge their relationship as "good" or 
#problematic" were explored. Since practices for judging the "good" and the 
"problematic" seemed to be part of practices that could be categorized as family 
like practices, practices for structuring the internal labor market, management 
practices, and labor relations practices, practices used by union members and 
managers to judge their relations were related to these four complexes of 
practices. This first step of.analyzing the deterioration of the relationship 
between ttie union and management is contained in chapter four, "From Family 
to Enmity." 
Second, a more complete analysis of practices was developed. After 
classifying observed practices as family like practices, practices for structuring 
the internal labor market, management practices, and labor relations practices, 
practices in each of these four categories were further classified using the 
general description of practices of trust as part of primary relations, trust as part 
of secondary relations, distrust, sovereignty (including the political process, 
contract, punishment, and command), discipline, dividing practices, market, and 
confession (including small group practices) from the review of literature. These 
practices were further broken down into the different practices which were used 
in trust in primary relations, trust as part of secondary relations, etc. Then, these 
practices were broken down into the elements which seemed to constitute them. 
This was done by identifying an element, what substance the element seemed 
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to posit and work on (such as the other, things, oneself, and relationship), how it 
posited and worked on the substance, how it was related to other elements, and 
how elements and their relations to other elements either set up or discouraged 
a line of action. The results of this analysis is reported in chapters five through 
eight. 
Finally, practices that replaced others and, in doing so, made possible 
the adoption of practices that made relations between the union and 
management problematic for both were identified and analyzed. Additionally, 
practices by which practices circulate or are colonized by other practices and 
how these contributed to changing the situation from a n goodn one to a 
nproblematicn one were identified. The results of this analysis is reported in 
chapter nine. 
To conclude this section on method as ruse, ethical considerations with 
respect to this study will be briefly explored. According to Marshall and 
Rossman (1989), the basic question of ethics with respect to a study in a natural 
setting is whether or not people are putting themselves at risk by participating in 
the study?- As noted elsewhere (Cooke, 1993), the idea of rights -- the basis of 
most ethical thinking about social science research -- are rooted in the practice 
of sovereignty. So, any ethical argument is constructed and replete with 
asymmetries. The concepts of individuals and natural rights are themselves 
methods for controlling behavior. They have the same limitations of any 
foundationalist approach. So, if one developed an ethic based on membership 
validation -- a concept of rights -- as a basis for including observations in a 
study, both the union and management would surely want to eliminate or recast 
observation to give a different account of their practices. Surely both will find 
other accounts to discount the accounts of those included. Since both sides in 
this study have concepts of rights which attack the other side's view of rights 
while establishing their own, where is there any transcendent place to stand to 
sort out rights? By using membership validation, both sides would be engaging 
in a practice which would modify the study in some particular way. By not using 
such a membership validation scheme, the study will be modified in some other 
way. Neither scheme can guarantee or define in a transcendental way the 
protection of rights or the people involved. They just result in different 
interpretations. 
When I was interviewed before being hired to do this study, I told a 
company manager that I would only do the study if I could use the data gained 
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for my dissertation and if the company was interested in improving relations with 
the union. My proposal -- including the stipulation of using the information for 
my dissertation as well as my vita -- was circulated widely among managers 
and union members. The union agreed to participate in the study. As noted 
earlier, I told persons interviewed that I would not use their names or their 
individual positions in order to try to protect their identity. There are so few 
persons in some positions that this will be difficult at points. However, people in 
these particular positions kept telling me that they would tell anyone what they 
were telling me. Nonetheless, I will try to protect their identity. Furthermore, 
there are so few women in many areas studied that gender identification would 
identify individuals. Therefore, I will use female pronouns throughout the study 
to refer to both males and females. I also wiH not use the name or the location 
of the company. However, as Vidich and Bensman (1958) found, with any 
research done with a relative small group -- even the size of a town or of a 
company of about 2,000 employees -- readers can use their own background 
knowledge to possibly figure out who some of the actors are. This is true even 
with survey research. As noted earlier, this company hires a management firm 
every three years to conduct an employee attitude survey. While workers were 
assured and researchers believed that identities were protected, enough 
demographic data was included on the survey to be able to identify problematic 
work groups in order to take measures to improve the groups. On at least three 
occasions, I found strong evidence that managers could use their knowledge of 
the scene with the survey information to identify who had brought the attention 
of upper management on them. 
Finally, whether or not respondents put themselves at risk in this study 
rests with what the readers decide to do with the information. On the one hand, 
I could see managers and union members reading this study, beginning an 
open and frank discussion on how to improve their relationship, and deciding 
together on strategies for improving their relationship. On the other hand, I 
could also see managers and union members reading this study, caucusing 
among their own groups, and trying to figure out how to use the information 
against each other. .. On -hind sight, I .would only have agreed to do this study if 
both the company and the union jointly funded and controlled. the study and the 
development of recommendations for action. This apparatus would certainly 
have enhanced the first possibility and inhibited the second. 
CHAPTER IV 
FROM FAMILY TO ENMITY 
Introduction 
This chapter begins the analysis of practices with an analysis of accounts 
given in interviews and documents that contain explicit, comparative references 
to practices used in two periods. First, in a period before 1970, respondents of 
both management and the union felt relations between them were 
comparatively good. Second, in a period after 1990, they felt that relations 
between them grew problematic. The relation between unionized workers and 
the company in the first period can be described as family like. The 
relationship between unionized workers and the company in the second period 
reflects enmity. It will be seen that judgments about "good" and "problematic" 
relations are a part of the practices used by union workers and by managers. 
Family 
Before 1970, the company under study was run like a family. According 
to interviewees, districts tended to be self-contained entities. There were 
monthly family dinners at which the manager talked on a personal level with 
employees and their family members. If anyone in the community needed 
tables and chairs for an event, the company was only too pleased to oblige. At 
Christmas time, there were separate parties for children and for adults. Each 
child had a gift with his or her name on it. At work, a manager would take time 
to talk with workers about their families and their work. A worker was valued as 
a person. On a hot day, a manager might come by the work site, pick up the 
crew, and go for a soda. 
The company took care of workers. Workers had a secure job, half-rate 
electricity, all benefits paid, and a retirement plan with an extension of the 
benefits and half-rate electricity into retirement. There were enough workers 
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such that excessive overtime was not required. Workers could count on a 
stable schedule and could plan for a social life outside of work. If positions 
were reduced in an area or if a worker had an injury, other work would be found 
for the worker. There was room for promotions. Since promotions were based 
on seniority, a worker could anticipate a career path. A worker in a demanding 
job such as line work or shift work in power plant operations could look forward 
to some point in her career when she could fill a less demanding position. 
There were no higher education requirements for promotions. Jobs were 
learned on the job. A line worker could conceivably become the president of 
the company. 
During this period, just as different practices of relating are used in 
different families, four different practices could be identified between managers 
and workers. First, some managers practiced favoritism. Since supervisors 
came out of the ranks of workers, they had established relationships with 
workers. A boss' friend might get easy assignments and fast promotions. If a 
worker fell out with the boss, she would get the dirty jobs. Some managers 
would hold a grudge. Favoritism left bitterness and resentment with some 
workers. Second, some supervisors were authoritarian. As the most 
experienced worker, supervisors would direct work by "show" and "close 
supervision." Workers were not encouraged to speak their minds. Orders were 
given with little justification beyond the quip, "Because I said so." Third, there 
was a laissez faire attitude of supervision toward workers. One did not have to 
direct work because workers were craftspersons who already knew the job and 
performed adequately. In fact, direction to a person who already knows a job is 
often experienced as an affront. A supervisor would not want to offend a friend. 
Also, one did not critically evaluate workers because they were one's friends. 
Finally, since supervisors' workers were coworkers and friends, some 
supervisors practiced a participatory management. Problems would be 
discussed before decisions were made. Solutions which emerged in 
discussions would be adopted as decisions. Communication was frequent. 
Since the company was divided into semi-autonomous districts, the 
coordination of work between work groups was directly between manager and 
manager and manager and worker. Each department could prioritize work and 
coordinate how work would be done directly with other departments. If a worker 
saw something that needed attention, she could give it immediate attention 
without an elaborate prioritizing and planning system. 
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From 1928 to 1973, the utility company continued to increase its 
customer base and lower electricity rates. Even though the company was 
owned by another company, the holding company maintained a "hands off" 
approach to the management of the company. The focus of business was on 
the retail level of electricity sales rather than on the wholesale level. With an 
emphasis on the retail level and on customer satisfaction, line personnel . 
worked everything "hot" -- with active electric current -- in order to avoid service 
interruptions. During this period, company crews used five person crews and 
and A-frame truck technology to engage in outside construction as well as 
maintenance and emergency service. Power plant maintenance -- including 
major maintenance -- was also done by company crews. With the emphasis on 
the development and maintenance otan expanding retail service base, the line 
worker had a high status within the company. 
Labor relations as defined by the National Labor Relations Act -- passed 
by congress in 1935 -- began between the company and the union with their 
first agreement or contract in late 1940s. From these early days, the contract 
contained a no strike clause and the corresponding grievance and arbitration 
procedures to deal with differences over administering the contract. Before 
1970, the practices used to negotiate and administer the contract were informal. 
Rather than having formal contract negotiations, the business agent of the union 
and an executive from the company would meet for a few days, discuss the 
contract, and shake hands. Even though the company executive might tell the 
union "how poor they were" in these discussions, these were basically growth 
times for the utility. So, there was no reason for the company or the union to 
push or pull. There was plenty for all. There was no specialized labor relations 
department. Though personnel practices were specialized before 1970, there 
was no human resources department with an emphasis on increasing labor 
productivity. Whereas the contract was worked out in the meeting between the 
union business agent and a company executive, the day-to-day administration 
and application of the contract was informally conducted through verbal 
agreements between supervisors and union officials. Verbal agreements were 
based on a number of practices. Most supervisors came out of the unionized 
work force and related more to the work force than to management over them. 
As noted earlier, this did not necessarily mean that managers were not 
authoritarian in their supervisory practices. But it did mean that one could talk 
out issues and come to an agreement that both parties would remember and 
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honor even though the discussion was accompanied by anger and "hard 
headedness." Stewards, business agents, and supervisors had confidence that 
each party would listen to and hear each other's viewpoint and that each party 
would be open and honest in communicating about the problem at hand. The 
issue was discussed and explored to the extent that, if a grievance moving 
toward binding arbitration had to be filed by the union, every avenue had been 
exhausted and a real impasse had been reached. One manager summarized 
labor relations before 1970 as paternalistic. Workers and the union expected 
the company to take care of them and to do right by them. 
Enmity 
Every three years, the company conducted a work force attitude survey. 
By 1991, the attitudes among unionized workers had become steadily worse for 
ten years. Since the late 1970s, there had been two major work force 
reductions which cut into the ranks of unionized workers. Issues of trust are 
raised by union members around perceived promises of no layoffs followed by 
layoffs which occurred during contract negotiations. Christmas parties for all 
employees and their spouses and for the children of employees are no longer 
held. Christmas festivities now seemed to be a part of the "front office" only. 
Company facilities are now surrounded with fencing and security systems. 
Half-rate electricity for employees and retirees is a thing of the past. An 
announcement was about to be made that retirees would have to now pay for a 
significant portion of their insurance if they retired after 1992. For the first time in 
the history of the company, the union had utilized an information picket, a media 
campaign against the company, and flyers with polarizing language in the work 
place during negotiations. During negotiations, an executive level manager is 
overheard by union officials telling another manager during a break, "F __ _ 
what the union wants." Record number of grievances are heading toward 
binding arbitration. Managers rarely associate with workers. Workers are 
instructed by union leadership to not participate in voluntary company activities. 
Practices similar to those used to construct family had been replaced with 
enmity. 
Having experienced two major force reductions and a significant 
increase in the use of outside contractors to do power plant maintenance and 
outside construction, workers feel insecure about job security. Company 
executives claim that there is more job security since they are working at 
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minimum work force. But, first line supervisors continually threaten workers with 
bidding out their work if they do not improve their productivity. Periodically, 
such work is out sourced to a contractor. There are few light duty jobs to take 
care of persons who are injured. The size of a line crew has been reduced from 
five to three through the use of the newer bucket truck technology. Districts 
have been staffed with service persons, and line crews are consolidated in 
central locations serving large areas. The company is looking for ways to split 
up the three person line crews and to eliminate craft distinctions in power plants 
in order to recombine workers in different ways. 
Required overtime has mounted as the company has tried to do more work with 
fewer people. The company has changed scheduling procedures to work more 
flexibly with the parent company's new control of the dispatching of electrical 
production. With the disruptions of off work time inherent in the new scheduling 
procedures, it has become more difficult to plan for family life. The divorce 
among shift workers has increased. The company's response to this change in 
working conditions which sets up role conflict at home is counseling. 
Seniority as a method for advancement has been replaced with testing 
and educational requirements. It is no longer possible for union workers to 
move into supervisory positions without a college education. While the 
company pays for its workers to attend college, required overtime and changing 
shift schedules do not provide the consistency required to schedule college 
work. Even though there is a larger number of non-line work positions in the 
company, testing and educational requirements have placed a barrier in the 
way of worker mobility. Additionally, with layoffs by seniority which eliminated 
new workers and with early retirement plans which encouraged the early 
retirement of older workers, most workers and managers from the top to the 
bottom of the company are of a similar age cohort. 
To compound matters, the region in which this company does business 
experienced a significant loss of industrial and construction jobs which would 
have provided alternative employment for line workers and power plant 
mechanics and operators. To explore changes in the labor market in the 
principal Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) served by the company in this 
study that would affect altermatives for line workers and power plant workers, 
employment information from the state employment commission by industrial 
category from 1975 through 1990 was used to estimate an average job creation 
rate by industrial category for the 1970s and the 1980s. This information is 
Table I 
Average Levels of Employment, Wages, and Hours 
in the 1970s and 1980s for the Principal MSA 
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contained in Table I. Information from 1970 through 1974 was not available 
from this source. Wage and hour information for the MSA was available only for 
manufacturing. Additional wage and hour information for the state was 
available for mining, construction, wholesale trade, and retail trade and was 
used to estimate the wage and hour information for the MSA for these industrial 
categories. The average wage rate by industrial category was adjusted by the 
Consumer Price Index to get a comparable wage rate over time. The Consumer 
Price Index establishes a baseline for the cost of goods and services in 
1982-1984. Then, all wages were expressed in terms of 1990 dollars. This 
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information is also contained in Table I. Finally, a different report from the state 
employment commission contained weekly wage information by industrial 
category for 1991 in the MSA principally served by the company in this study. 
Throughout the 1970s, all industrial categories were adding employment 
in the MSA. Employment grew during this period by an average of over 15,000 
jobs per year. But, in the 1980s, employment grew by only an average of over 
1,000 jobs per year. During this period, mining, manufacturing, construction, 
and wholesale trade were losing employment while the other industrial sectors 
were adding employment at a rate slower than in the 1970s. The jobs which 
were being lost in the 1980s tended to be the jobs which paid.higher wages in 
the 1970s: manufacturing, mining, and construction. The only sector which 
paid higher wages and continued to marginally add jobs was transportation and 
public utilities. Since the only electric utility in this area for whom workers could 
work was the company in this study and since employment in the alternative 
industrial areas in which their skills could apply were shrinking, workers had no 
place to exit. It would be difficult to find a less demanding position after a 
worker gets too old to easily do line work. 
With the consolidation of work into larger areas and with the increased 
control of the company by the parent company, management decisions are 
taken in places and with considerations far away from the work group. The 
manager no longer has the ability to engage in directly identifying and 
addressing production and service problems or the problems of employees. 
Problems have to be referred up the line of command for decisions. Command 
is still used to direct work. But, instead of coming from the authority of the work 
group supervisor -- "Because I said so" -- it comes from the authority of upper 
management. Now, the work group supervisor "just delivers the news." 
Furthermore, with the requirement of college education for supervisory positions 
and with the recent policy by the parent company to move upper managers 
around its various electric utility companies, the history of involvement with the 
work group is broken. 
Human resources techniques are applied to workers as substitutes for 
"Because I said so," "show, .. and "close supervision, .. which would often offend 
workers who were as experienced as the supervisor and who were "adults and 
not children." Training is now used to set expectations, which requires less 
"show" as a personal act between the supervisor and the worker. Extensive 
rationalizations accompany commands to replace "because I said so... By using 
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such techniques as problem solving, accountability is more focused toward the 
expectations elaborated in training than toward personal degradation. Problem 
solving gets the worker to monitor and critique her own behavior rather than 
having the supervisor be in the role of monitoring and critiquing the worker's 
behavior. While many supervisors use the new techniques of supervision, 
many still use the old techniques. Even with the new techniques, reward and 
punishment are still employed. 
The company had also experimented with versions of participatory 
management. Initially, some managers felt that worker participation in 
management would be helpful because employees are closer to the actual 
outcomes and situations being addressed and because these managers 
believed that ownership in work is better if workers are a part of the decision 
making. This was met by a cry from most managers that the actual decision is 
management's responsibility. Thus, strategies were worked out to give workers 
"voice" but not "vote." For example, the company's central safety committee 
includes a few union workers chosen by management. Workers are 
encouraged to say what they think and feel. Task forces are used to gather 
information. Managers are trained in active listening. 
When the first participatory training sessions were held, workers got the 
impression that they would have a say as well as a voice .• A company-wide task 
force on half-rate electricity recommended that the company retain the half-rate. 
When the issue of retaining half-rate electricity for employees and retirees came 
before the state utility board and failed, many workers felt that management 
either ignored the recommendation or did not fight hard enough for it. Other 
task forces were created, came up with recommendations, and had 
recommendations ignored, reversed, or alternatives decided by management. 
Some times, it appeared to workers that managers used task forces to sell 
decisions already made. Other times, it appeared to workers that managers 
used task forces to find out information from workers to use it to increase 
productivity in ways that threatened job security. Yet other times, managers 
would use the fact of the inclusion of a few union members on committees as a 
basis of legitimating unpopular decisions with workers. 
After attending workshops conducted by a local state university on the 
use of participatory management as a union busting tactic, the union instructed 
workers not to participate in participatory or voluntary activities unless ordered 
and paid to do so. They also trained their workers in a list of "signs" to look for 
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in the participatory activity if it was being used adversely against the union. As 
a counter tactic, the union developed its own safety committee to analyze safety 
problems and safety procedures. It shared its findings with the company. The 
recommendations were said to be too costly by management and were not 
adopted. Additionally, the union included a proposal for a joint 
union-management safety committee with half of the members appointed by the 
union, with half of the members appointed by management, and with decision 
making power with respect to safety issues as an alternative model of 
participation. The meaning of participation had become an issue of contention. 
With the centralization of operations and decision making, face-to-face 
interaction as a method for coordinating work has been replaced with a variety 
of technologies. Communication is much more likely now to take place through 
a log book, a folder, bulletin boards, or electronic mail that by face-to-face 
encounter. As a consequence -- as one supervisor noted -- it is hard to develop 
a relationship when you only see a worker a few hours out of every month. With 
more levels of authority in the company and with less authority at the work 
group level, there is more HcheckingH that has to be done. In an attempt to 
control inventory, to maximize the life of equipment, and to order work to deal 
with the most critical issues first, more work is controlled through computerized 
work analysis systems and a central planner. As both workers and supervisors 
put it, Hyou use to be able to see something broken and fix it. H Now, it must be 
reported, analyzed, prioritized, split apart into its component parts, assigned out, 
and checked. 
Strategically, the company went through drastic shifts. With the oil crisis 
and resulting. regulations and legislation in the 1970s, the company found itself 
in the position of having 100 percent of its generation capacity fired by natural 
gas and, at the same time, being required to be totally off of natural gas by 
1990. At the same time, the region was going through an economic boom. In 
order to cope with this untenable situation, the company adopted two strategies. 
First, it built coal fired capacity. But, uncontracted coal which was low in sulfur 
content was difficult to find. They eventually entered into an expensive, multiple 
year, take-or-pay contract for coal. With this contract, the coal would have to be 
taken or paid for if not taken. Thus, the plant would have to be base loaded. 
Second, the company decided to build a large nuclear power station. What 
looked .like a relative inexpensive option in the early. 1970s looked very 
expensive ·by the late 1970s. What looked like a politically fea.sible option in the 
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early 1970s looked politically impossible after the Three Mile Island nuclear 
power plant accident in 1979. 
By the early 1980s, several conditions totally reversed themselves. First, 
the rising cost of nuclear power coupled with serious political problems with the 
licensing process lead to a decision to not build the plant. But, the company 
had already spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the project. With the 
collapse of oil prices in 1982 and again in 1986, the mandatory requirements to 
replace all gas fired capacity by 1990 were rescinded. As a result, the company 
had an excess of capacity and newly capitalized plants. At the same time, the 
region suffered one economic down turn in the early 1980s and another in the 
mid-1980s. Legislation was passed which allowed industrial concerns to 
engage in the cogeneration of electricity. With an excess of generation capacity 
set up by events in the 1970s, municipalities began to consider taking the 
electricity franchise away from tradition electrical utilities and to provide 
electrical service themselves by buying electricity rather than generating it. 
Industrial concerns could begin to directly contract for electricity from any 
company. Thus, rural electric coops and generation authorities began to 
compete against traditional electric utilities for industrial customers. Again, the 
company was in an untenable situation. From the company's annual reports, 
one can calculate percent changes in total kilowatt-hours sold, the number of 
residential customers, the number of commercial customers, and the number of 
industrial customers to see how the company's market had changed. Such 
calculations for changes that took place between 1976 and 1980, 1980 and 
1985, and 1985 and 1990 are presented in Table II. 
Table II 
Percent Changes in Kilowatt-hours Sold, Residential 
Customers, Commercial Customers, 
and Industrial Customers 
Residential Commercial Industrial 
Year Kilowatt-hours ·Customers Customers Customers 
'76-'80 14.7 12.2 15.7 15.2 
'80-'85 -20.9 8.7 12.6 14.0 
'85-'90 1.8 0.5 2.3 9.9 
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Even though the number of customers increased during the period 
(1980- 1985) just prior to the layoff, the company experienced a significant 
decrease in the number of kilowatt-hours of electricity sold. Thus revenue 
decreased over the period. To address this situation, the company attempted to 
reposition itself by trying to capture part of the heating market and by engaging 
in conservation programs. Here, the company was trying to increase the 
average use of the system while decreasing the peak use of the system. 
Additionally, the company committed itself to no new rate increases for ten 
years. lnt~rnally, the company laid off workers in the late 1970s as the nuclear 
project costs increased, and it laid off workers in the mid 1980s to cut increasing 
operations costs against a loss of revenues. It also engaged in outsourcing 
work which was periodic enough to require excess work capacity if it were 
internalized. The company turned to examining how work was put together to 
see if it could be more effectively organized. This meant examining issues such 
as how shifts were organized, how crews were organized, how work was 
prioritized, etc. 
The parent company also began to become more involved in directly 
managing the company. Strategically, the parent company took over 
dispatching power generation for the companies it owned. This means that 
power plants that the parent company owns are treated as costs and revenue 
centers such that it is possible to load plants to maximize profits. However, this 
positioning of dispatching required that some plants be shut down and that 
others be placed on economic shut down. Plants that were shut down no 
longer needed crews. Plants on economic shut down did not need as large of a 
crew on a full time basis. The parent company also operates all of the benefit 
programs. This means that the parent company has greater buying power for. 
insurance and other benefits than the company in this study alone would have. 
It also means that staff at the parent company level decided to handle the new 
federal regulations (FAS 106) requiring benefits to retirees to be accounted for 
as they are obligated rather than when they are collected by requiring retirees 
to pay for such benefits. The company paid for them before. The parent 
company is attempting to standardize procedures in all companies it owns. 
These procedures may or may not fit the company in this study well. Finally, the 
parent company is cross pollinating leadership in the different companies it 
owns by taking potential leadership from one company and promoting it to 
leac:f ership in another company .. This obviously brings new perspeytives to the 
strategic level of a company. It also brings in persons with no long term 
relations with the work force or the community. 
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In 1990, a senior executive noted that labor relations had "gone to hell in 
a hand basket all of a sudden." From the viewpoint of management, the 
company had the best union one could ask for until two years ago. Then, the 
union started pushing with the election of a new group of radical leaders. The 
union began to try to turn informal agreements worked out between workers 
and supervisors or between the old union leadership and management into the 
binding forms of formal side agreements or the contract. Instead of accepting 
management's findings of "no violation of the contract" with respect to 
management decisions which were challenged by workers as violating the 
labor contract, the union began to push grievances from verbal discussions 
between a worker and supervisor with a steward present to a written grievance 
to be addressed by the supervisor in writing, to an appeal to the supervisor's 
manager, to an appeal to the manager of labor relations, and finally to binding 
arbitration. 
The union engaged in a campaign of noncooperation with respect to 
volunteering to be involved with company activities after hours and with respect 
to actively engaging in quality of work life and quality improvement programs. 
Organizing campaigns were undertaken with new categories of workers. 
Membership campaigns resulted in an increase from about sixty percent 
membership among workers in organized units to about eighty percent 
membership. Before 1990, contract negotiations required only five or six 
proposals to get an agreement. In 1990, it took over fifteen proposals to reach 
agreement. The negotiations were conflictual to the point that a federal 
mediator was called in to assist with negotiations with little effect. In 1991, it 
took twenty or more proposals to reach an agreement. During negotiations, the 
union engaged in information pickets, information media campaigns, and 
bulletin board and newsletter campaigns for the first time in the company's 
history. It was widely felt by management that the union could no longer be 
trusted. They would take advantage of you if they could. 
From the union's perspective, a group of older senior managers and new 
senior mar:iagers brought into the company by the parent company from 
nonunion companies had installed new labor relations personnel to engage in 
a war on the union. The new labor relations personnel took office during 
negotiations in 1990. New labor relations training was instituted which was 
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designed to keep first line supervisors from working out agreements with 
workers which could not be supported by a narrow interpretation of the contract. 
The training also instructed supervisors how to avoid defining a practice as a 
past practice which could be a basis for the union to win an arbitration, 
encouraged supervisors to identify with and close ranks in solidarity with 
management to protect management's right to decide and act unilaterally, and 
encouraged a definition of the motive of the worker and the union as more pay 
for less work. Over one-hundred agreements which had been worked out 
between workers and supervisors and which could be unilaterally canceled by 
management were canceled by management. Letters were discovered in 
which upper managers encouraged lower managers to find ambiguous areas of 
the contract which could be contested through management decisions. 
Electronic mail messages were discovered in which newly appointed managers 
pledged to "get" the group of workers over whom they had been appointed. 
Grievances are no longer discussed and solutions sought. Instead, grievances 
are met at every level with the standard "no violation of the contract found." A 
supervisor who had been a union business agent said that he would be afraid if 
the company had done this when he was a union business agent. He would 
think that the company was trying to break the union. Managers deny that they 
want to break the union even though they would like to be rid of the union. 
Union members widely voice that they no longer trust management. 
Practices for Making Things "Problematic" 
The interviews with managers and union members regarding how 
relations between them deteriorated contain distinct but often related 
assessments of the "good" and "problematic." These assessments involve the 
use of different practices of assessment by union members and managers to 
assess reversals in practices. Reversals of practices are instances in which one 
practice is replaced by another practice. In this section, reversals in practices 
structuring the internal labor market, management practices, and labor relations 
practices and their relation to the practices for making them "problematic" will be 
explored. 
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The "Problematic# and the Internal Labor Market 
First, one finds a complex of practices for assessing the Hgoodn and the 
Hproblematicn built around restructuring the internal labor market. These 
practices and their relation to reversals of practices instituted by the company or 
the union are contained in Table Ill. 
Table Ill 
Reversals of Practices Structuring the Internal Labor 
Market and Practices Used by Workers and 
Management to Make Them 
"Problematic" 




Layoffs and Reduction 
of Benefits 
Practices for Making Things Problematic 
Worker/Union Management 
No options in the job 
market 
Perceived promises of 
no layoffs 
Maintaining Profitability of 
Company 
--- ·-------------------------------·---------------------------------------------------
All work done by company Outsourcing work 
work force historically done by 
company work force 
Plants staffed for full 
operation 
Plants staffed for 
flexible operation 




Safety and quality of 
outsourced work 
Threat to employment 
Past agreements on 
schedule changes 
Ability to plan for a life 
outside of work 
Control role conflict by 
restructuring schedule 
Work itself qualifies a 
person to enter the 
apprentice program 
Cutting costs by matching 
work force to changing 
work demands 
Matching production to 
demand 
Control role conflict by 
giving workers skills to 
better cope with it 
Testing predicts who 
will do y.,ell in the job 
Work itself qualifies for Education qualifies 
one for promotion one for promotion 
Supervisors should know Supervisors supervise 
the work and are people more than work 
dangerous if they do not 
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From a union member's perspective, the company's management and 
union members began to grow apart around 1970 when the five person crew 
and associated A-frame truck technology of line work was replaced by the three 
person crew and the growing use of bucket truck technology. Later in the early 
1970s, the company did away with doing outside construction with company 
crews. Instead, large jobs of constructing the electrical transmission and 
distribution system are done by contracting with other companies. In the late 
1970s, the company was preparing to construct a nuclear power station while 
having the licensing process indefinitely delayed in the wake of the Three Mile 
Island nuclear power station accident. The company dealt with this by laying off 
mainly unionized workers in the line department. Between this layoff and the 
layoff in the mid-1980s, several district offices were closed and reorganized into 
centralized locations. This entailed workers moving or commuting and the 
creation of new crews and new seniority rankings with respect to layoffs. In the 
early 1980s, the company began to contract out more line work beyond the 
large construction jobs. In the mid-1980s after instituting an early retirement 
program to encourage a work force reduction of over seven percent, the 
company laid off an additional seven to eight percent of its work force, including 
the elimination of the work force of one whole power station and other 
reductions in power plant workers and line workers. The entire line apprentice 
program was terminated. 
Several practices intensified the "problematic" nature of these force 
reductions for union members. By using seniority to effect layoffs and by using 
early retirement programs to entice older workers to leave, the oldest and the 
youngest workers were all but eliminated. Thus, any further reductions in the 
work force would begin to affect persons who were thirty-five to fifty-five years of 
age with significant years of seniority. Furthermore, the economy of this area 
had significantly worsenedfor persons trained as outside electricians, 
mechanics, millwrights, and machine operators. Between 1980 and 1990, the 
proportion of construction jobs making up the work force decreased by thirty-
four percent, and the proportion of manufacturing jobs decreased twelve 
percent. The over all loss of jobs for persons who were thirty-five to forty-four 
years of age in 1990 was so severe that the major metropolitan area in this 
region lost over four percent of this age cohort in net migration between 1980 
and 1990. More than one percent of the age cohort who was forty-five to 
fifty-four years of age in 1990 were lost in net migration during this period. 
Union members perceived that their ability to exit to another job which would 
support the financial and family obligations of a person earning union wages 
with high seniority had significantly decreased. Any potential layoff now was 
much more "problematic# than in periods when seniority was an effective 
protection against a layoff or when one could easily find a job outside of the 
company. 
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Another strategy adopted by management which affected the internal 
labor market and made things problematic for unionized workers out sourcing a 
variety of jobs. From accounts by executives, the strategy was designed to 
reduce the permanent work force to that necessary to cover work that had to be 
done all of the time. In other words, outside contractors were employed to cover 
the periodic maintenance and construction jobs. This would also allow the 
company to build cost flexibility into the system to cover revenue shocks due to 
centralized dispatching, fluxuations in temperature from year to year, and 
economic conditions. The executives claim that the union should not worry 
about this practice since remaining jobs are now more secure. With the use of 
outside contractors, the company can now look at nonunionized companies and 
put downward pressure on wages by threatening to outsource more work if the 
union members cannot do a job as cheaply as outside contractors. On a daily 
basis, one hears some manager say, "If you cannot get this work done more 
productively, we will have to look at letting it out to a contractor. u All of this is 
problematic to job security, income potential, and benefit retention to unionized 
workers. 
The- internal labor market was also "problematic# for the company's 
management. In the late 1970s, the company had incurred hundreds of millions 
of dollars of obligations on the unlicensed nuclear power plant. An executive 
announced to lesser executives that the company would reduce the work force 
a certain amount across the board. Some executives had hired the unused 
nuclear work force and felt obligated to protect their jobs. So, they turned to the 
unionized work force to effect work force reductions to cut costs. 
If one turns to the layoffs in the mid-1980s, one finds on the one hand a 
letter from the executive level to the work force in which it was observed that 
operations and maintenance expenses had been increasing over sixteen 
percent per year. The executive writing the letter claimed that force reductions 
were the only way to deal with the problem. On the other hand, the parent 
company had just taken over dispatching and, in the process, pooled and 
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controlled a larger number of power plants. These power plants are now 
treated as cost and revenue centers. With excess capacity, older plants which 
are paid for and which are not encumbered with take-or-pay fuel contracts can 
be closed or placed on economic shut down. The nature of fuel contracts and 
the depreciation schedules of new versus old plants seems more relevant to 
determining a judgment about Hproductivityff than any real sense of productivity 
of the work force. 
The economic shut down of a plant is made problematic for managers 
because it requires the remaining work force at plants on economic shut down 
to adopt new work rules to continue to operate the plants with more varied shift 
and maintenance requirements than when the plants were fully operational. 
Many studies in the company now focus on how job boundaries, crew size, job 
classifications, work rules regarding call outs and overtime, work rules 
regarding meals, and work rules regarding shift work made it difficult to take 
actions to reduce costs or to increase productivity. Attempts on the part of 
management to change job boundaries, crew size, job classifications, and 
various work rules begin. About one year later, one finds a labor relations 
document in which the company decides to be more Hbusiness liken and less 
paternalistic with respect to the union. Specifically, a concerted effort will be 
made to reassert management's rights to unilaterally make decisions and to talk 
up cost and productivity issues. A few years later, one finds managers making 
things problematic for workers: Hit you can't increase your productivity, we will 
have to look at contracting out this work. ff One finds managers unilaterally 
changing work rules: HHere's my decision. If you don't like it, do what you need 
to do.ff 
One of the issues which had come to the front of negotiations and 
grievances involved changes in how shifts were managed in power plants 
which were on economic shut down and, thus, were operating and not 
operating much more frequently than base loaded plants. At hand was a 
practice giving workers a five day notice before.changing a work schedule 
before being required to pay overtime. The company wanted to be able to 
change the master shift schedule by giving workers a five day notice before the 
event. Such changes had become more frequent because of the practice of 
economic shut down as well as because of changes in human resources 
practices such as giving workers extra days off for good attendance and 
requiring more days to be spent in training. The union wanted the company to 
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continue to observe what they claimed was a past practice of·giving five days 
notice before the work week in which the schedule change was to be made. 
The union claimed that such changes made it difficult to schedule their lives 
outside of work. This group of workers had experienced a higher divorce rate 
since the practice of economic shut down. 
Here, two different practices emerge for dealing with work practices 
which interfere.with a workers life outside of work. Management believes that, if 
workers had better problem solving skills, they could manage.the role conflict 
created by changing shifts every two weeks and by changing these scheduled 
shifts with little notice. So, they cast about for more training programs to help 
workers cope with role conflicts set up by the structuring of work. Workers want 
to manage the role conflict by stabilizing the work schedule. They feel the only 
way to get the company to listen is to make schedule changes costly. The 
company feels that the union only wants more overtime for its workers. 
In general, the human resources department works out of the counseling 
models which assume that individuals are responsible for their fates. When 
management takes decisions that complicate the life of a worker, it is the 
worker's problem to cope with their situations. It is the responsibility of the 
human resources department to create programs to empower workers to take 
responsibility for their lives. The union works out of a model which focuses on 
work practices. It recognizes that the practices established by management 
sets up their situation at work. Therefore, they use the grievance mechanism 
and contract negotiations to empower workers. This is problematic for. human 
resources because they work from the assumption of management rights to set 
conditions and worker's responsibility to cope with the conditions. Human 
resources sees the union system as a Hcrutchff for poor workers who will not take 
responsibility for their work actions. Such workers would rather rely on "third 
partyff intervention than take responsibility for their own lives. 
Prior to the mid-1980s, promotions across the company had been made 
by seniority and within certain lines of promotion. There were no educational 
requirements. In the mid-1980s with the strategic changes of centralized 
dispatching of power generation, with strategic commitments to shift to 
marketing and conservation while holding the number of employees and the 
price of electricity constant, and with the resulting layoffs, the·humanresources 
department begins to cast around for practices to increase productivity among 
workers to do'more with fewer. The company decided to participate in a study 
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with the national electric utility trade organization to identify qualifications to do 
various jobs if those jobs were reorganized around increasing productivity 
through self learning and improvement. A trade test and an attitude test were 
developed to quality for craft positions. 
Workers participated in the tests to standardize testing and qualifications. 
But, the exact nature of how the tests were to be used was not clearly 
communicated to the rank and file workers. So, workers who had constructed 
an expectation based on the past practices of seniority and lines of progression 
were met with a new series of standards that made promotion "problematic. ff 
The company had begun a new apprentice program for the first time since the 
layoffs in the mid-1980s. Over twenty persons went through the preapprentice 
school. During this time, they were involved with hands-on training experiences 
involving actual tasks that had to be performed in doing line work. At the end of 
the preapprentice school, a committee of union journeymen and company 
supervisors and managers judged a handful to be good enough to enter the 
training program. Then, the human resources department administered the 
battery of standardized test and failed one of the workers who had been passed 
by the committee. She was not allowed to progress until she passed the test. 
This situation became "problematic" for all involved. The worker had 
passed the actual work tests that the journeymen and supervisors conducted. 
This raised serious questions for workers about the validity of the company's 
other tests. It was problematic for the human resources department because it 
stood in the way of the practice of selection which they were trying to establish. 
None of the workers or the union had been a part of deciding the criteria for the 
human resources testing program or how the testing program would be used. 
Union journeymen and many supervisors could not see how a worker who had 
demonstrated skill in the actual performance of work was not qualified for the 
work just because of responses on a pencil and paper test. 
The union and the human resources department.both quickly moved to 
try to establish the practice they took to be valid. The union filed grievances to 
establish the past practice of demonstrating skill through actual work as part of 
the contract. Managers denied the grievance and began to make changes to 
diffuse the crisis and to prevent further questioning of the practice. To diffuse 
the crisis, managers tried to work with the worker who had filed the grievance to 
enable her to pass the test when it was given again. The union encouraged the 
worker to stay with the grievance and to refuse to take the test in order to 
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establish the demonstration of skill in work as the criteria for entrance into the 
apprentice program. To reduce the chance of future crises, managers decided 
to administer the test before workers were admitted to the preapprentice school. 
This would prevent workers from experiencing a confirming judgment from the 
committee of journeymen and supervisors and then risking rejection by the test. 
From the side of the traditional practice of testing by working, validity was 
in the outcome of work. Judgment about the work was by workers and 
supervisors who had demonstrated skill. From the side of the human resources 
department, validity was in the work studies used to select relevant criteria and 
in the validating of test to predict success on those relevant criteria. Judgment 
about a worker was established by a set of methods which placed workers in 
comparative fields and by human resources staff. 
In addition to the establishment of pencil and paper testing as the first 
screen for allowing workers into craft progressions, college education standards 
were established for supervisory positions. From the point of view of human 
resources practices, the problems set up by needing to do more work with fewer 
people in the craft areas, the problems which had arisen from the application of 
authoritarian management practices by first line supervisors, and the problems 
set up by challenges to management decisions by the union could be solved by 
requiring college for supervisory positions. It was felt that college graduates 
would bring different problem solving and human relations practices to the 
supervisory position. 
This move was problematic for union workers from two perspectives. 
First, it obviously made advance much more problematic than before. Second, 
it introduced supervisors who had no demonstrated skill or job knowledge from 
the union worker's perspctive. This led to situations of having managers order 
workers to execute jobs which -- from the perspective of workers --were unsafe. 
For example, one worker related an incident in which a manager who was not 
on the work site and who had no experience with line work ordered a foreman 
to energize a line during a rain storm. When the execution of the order was 
attempted, there was severe arcing of electricity down the insulated pole used 
to close the switch. The foreman backed off. The supervisor pushed her to 
close the switch. The foreman refused. The manager began to complain about 
insubordination. Or again, a supervisor who did not have work experience 
ordered a worker to use a crane to lift a piece of equipment which was near the 
maximum rated weight for the crane. The worker knew that she did not know 
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to do it. She went to another worker who did. The worker confronted the 
ervisor about how only certain well trained persons should be allowed to 
, , ,ake such lifts. The discussion degenerated into a fight over job classifications 
and featherbedding. In addition to safety issues, the lack of having the most 
knowledgeable worker as a supervisor often left workers without a resource 
person to do infrequently done or particularly complicated jobs. 
The "Problematic" and Management Practices 
Second, one finds a complex of practices for assessing the Hgood" and 
the HproblematicH built around management practices. These practices and 
their relation to reversals of practices instituted by the company are contained in 
Table IV. 
Table IV 
Reversals of Management Practices and 
Practices Used by Workers and 
Management to Make Them 
ff Problematic ff 
Reversal of Practices Practices for Making Things Problematic 
Worker/Union Management Before After - . 
Work Group Leaders plan Centralized planner and 
and coordinate work computer plan and 
coordinate work 
Priorities are derived from Priorities are derived from 
work experience operations research 
Management discretion 
at work group level 
Management discretion Supervisors are just the Upper management wants 
supervisors to be the front 
line of the management 
team 
Workers do work and 
control quality 
at middle and upper level "finger of management" 
Contractors do work and Quality and safety of 
quality by management outsourced work 
inspection 
Outsourcing is a means 
of cost control. Union 
complaints are "sour 
grapes" over jobs lost 




"Voice not vote" Participation is just a Management must have 
ploy to sell management final say because they 
decisions are responsible 
Union training indicates Participation is a union 
participatory management avoidance tool 
is ploy to weaken union 
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As the company centralized decisions and the deployment of resources, 
the use of face-to-face communication in the work group to coordinate activity 
gave way to other practices which made communication and the coordination of 
work problematic. In response to measures required by the Internal Revenue 
Service to improve inventory control, the company adopted a centralized, 
computer driven inventory and planning system. This becomes problematic to 
workers and supervisors because work which they could identify, prioritize, and 
coordinate with other required crafts to do a job now are prioritized and 
coordinated by the planner and computer. It is problematic because the sense 
of priority is different between the workers and supervisors and the planner and 
the computer. The planner is now effectively made the director and evaluator of 
all work. The planner is disassociated from the actual work. The sequence of 
doing a job often conflicts with the ways that the supervisors use to work out the 
sequence of doing a job. As some workers, supervisors, and lower level 
managers put it, "It's like a Chinese fire drill. " 
The centralization of decisions has changed the role of supervisor from 
that of director and planner of work and arbiter of work rules to the deliverer of 
news from managers higher up the ladder. This creates problems for work 
group supervisors because they must now do a lot of checking up the ladder 
that they did not have to do. They cannot directly deal with things. They also 
have to carry out orders which they may not understand or with which they may 
not agree. It makes it possible for work group supervisors to role distance 
themselves from their own decisions as well as from their manager's decisions 
by claiming that all decisions are their manager's decisions. This is problematic 
for upper managers because they become the nameless, faceless "they" that 
are disliked by workers. They deal with this by trying to get supervisors to "own" 
decisions by claiming to workers that the decisions are their own. This also lets 
upper managers role distance themselves from decisions which are 
problematic to workers by claiming that decisions were taken by supervisors. 
This creates problems again for supervisors. For example, a supervisor who 
was a former union member was told by a manager who was an engineer and 
had never been a union member to take down flyers attacking management's 
position during negotiations. The supervisor did not think she should since she 
remembered that such communications were protected by labor law. But, 
wanting to be a good team player and wanting to "own" the decision, she 
ordered the flyers down as her decision. A few days latter, management 
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decided that they made a mistake and reversed the decision. Now, it was the 
supervisor who had angered the union members with her actions which were 
owned by her as her actions who was stuck with the relationship problem with 
her workers. 
The removal of the design of work from lower levels and the contracting 
out of such work also set up safety problems for workers. Engineers and 
managers would design jobs, create job specifications, and let out work to 
contractors. Union members would claim that this work was poorly done by 
contractors. As a result, they claimed that they would often use plans from the 
engineering department to go out to work a job and find a "mess" that was 
dangerous and did not resemble the work specifications. Managers would 
dismiss such claims on the basis that the union was just angry about having 
work given to outside contractors instead of to them. This would anger union 
members. Union members accused managers of not caring about safety. This 
would anger managers. One management study was found in which it was 
claimed that the managers studied often failed to use the quality of work clause 
in the contract with an outside contractor to inspect work and to hold contractors 
accountable for their work. 
The introduction of attempts to use participatory management also set up 
practices which were problematic for both union workers and managers. Early 
participatory practices were drawn from training at ivy league business schools 
to which various executives were sent by the company and from the human 
resources and organizational development vendors that would walk through the 
door of the human resources department from time to time looking for contract 
work. One of the early participatory experiments was the development of a 
company wide task force to make a recommendation about keeping half-rate 
electricity as one of the employee benefits. The half-rate benefit had been a 
long standing practice of the company. The half-rate was eventually rejected by 
the state utility board. This was problematic for workers because they felt that 
the company did not really fight for the benefit. Their anger was problematic for 
managers. But, what was more problematic was the expectation set up by the 
practice that participation meant that workers might have a say in setting 
company wide policies. One then finds evidence of managers attempting to 
modify the practice by distinguishing between having a say as having a voice 
but not a vote. Slogans to this effect could be found in the offices of several 
managers. One could often hear the litany, "Workers have a voice but not a 
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vote." Thus, workers were encouraged to be open and to say what they feel on 
issues. But, such encouragement became problematic for managers when 
what workers said hurt the feelings of managers and -- at times -- degraded 
managers. As one manager said, "It makes you want to get even." 
As the company shifted the development of participatory management 
practices from the quality of work life to productivity issues, union leaders 
attended training provided by the union and a local state university on how 
participatory programs oriented toward productivity could be used to destroy 
unions. The union began to instruct workers to not volunteer for training or 
programs on such participatory practices. They were only to attend if ordered 
and paid to do so. Even then, they were armed with sets of questions to 
evaluate whether or not the training might be an attempt to undermine the 
union. This angered managers because it blocked the effectiveness of the 
productivity improvement training. At the same time, the union included 
proposals in negotiations to create a joint safety committee with decision 
making power. Half of the committee would be appointed by the union. Half of 
the committee would be appointed by management. They were attempting to 
join voice and vote. This was problematic for the company because the 
company had the legal liability for safety decisions and because it infringed on 
management's right to take unilateral action. 
The "Problematic" and Labor Relations Practices 
With respect to labor relations practices, one finds distinct but related 
assessments of the "good" and "problematic" with respect to identifying 
practices which contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between 
management and the union. These practices and their relation to reversals of 
practices instituted by the company or the union are contained in Table V. 
Essentially, there are two practices of rights embedded in labor law 
(Gold, 1989). On the one hand, one finds the reserve rights doctrine: All rights 
not explicitly given up by management in the contract are reserved by 
management. The reserve rights doctrine in reiterated in the specific labor 
contract between the union and the company and in the training manuals used 
by the company with supervisors. In fact, the training manual specifically states 
that managements' rights -- the right rooted in the reserve doctrine -- is the 
cornerstone practice of management: The right of management to take 
unilateral action. To the extent that management stipulates explicitly or 
Table V 
Reversals of Labor Relations Practices and 
Practices Used by Workers. and 
Management to Make Them 
"Problematic" 
Reversal of Practices 
Before After 
Encourage supervisors Encourage superviosrs 
to avoid grievances to carry out management 
policies regardless of 
grievances 
Practices for Making Things Problematic 
WorkerAJnion Management 
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Resist all grievances 
not explicitly in the 
contract 




Past practices· extend Reserve management 
the contract rights limit the contract 
Look out for the company's 
financial interest 
implicitly with the union with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, management has limited its ability to take unilateral 
actions. Thus, practices which limit management's ability to take unilateral 
actions tend to be seen as "problematic." 
On the other hand, labor law defines collective bargaining as the duty to 
meet and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment. As Gold (1989, p. 38) notes with respect to good 
faith: "It is not enough that they meet and say no to each other; they must 
genuinely try to reach agreement." From the union's perspective, this means 
that management should confer when decisions are taken which would alter 
wages, hours, and other terms of employment. In fact, as Gold (1989) notes, it is 
a refusal to bargain if one party changes the terms of employment without 
bargaining with the other party. In this study, the union considered all 
conditions established by past practices as terms of employment. As noted in 
the management labor relations training manual, management considered only 
those things explicitly given to the union as constituting the terms of 
employment: "If it's not explicitly in the book (the contract), it is a part of 
management's right to take unilateral action." The definition of good or 
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problematic relations for management and for the union come out of their own 
practice of rights defined in labor law. And, these rights are semi-exclusive and 
semi-oppossed. That is, the exercise of one sets up to some degree the 
negation of the other. 
During most of the 1980s, the company had one labor relations 
management team, and the union had one business agent. Labor relations 
tended to be deemed good by both parties during this period. If a grievance 
was filed against a supervisor, it was considered poor supervision by labor 
relations management. The number of grievances filed against a supervisor 
was included in job performance evaluations of supervisors. Thus, supervisors 
were encouraged to accommodate various requests by workers or to become 
very good at negotiating differences. The labor relations personnel during this 
period worked at creating a good relationship with the business agent of the 
union. They would travel to trouble spots together. They would discuss issues 
over drinks. They could share viewpoints with each other and could see each 
others viewpoints. Grievances that were filed were first worked out by the labor 
relations management and the business agent. Then, labor relations 
management would get the necessary legal backing for the solution to sell it to 
higher management. If a solution could not be found such that the labor 
relations personnel had to find that management's decision had not violated the 
contract, the labor relations personnel would continue to discuss the problem 
until an informal solution could be found. This practice protected 
management's rights by averting an official , legally binding decision about a 
condition of employment. At the same time, good relations were maintained by 
informally and unofficially finding a solution acceptable to the union business 
agent. 
Following the strategic decisions taken in the mid-1980s and the 
resulting layoffs and attempts to reorganize work, both management and union 
members began to find this set of labor relations practices problematic. From 
the side of management, it is difficult to reorganize work if supervisors are 
encouraged to avoid grievances. It is difficult to reorganize work if grievances 
are denied in order to go protect a new work practice unilaterally established by 
management and then informally negotiated in order to modify the new work 
practice in a way not acceptable to management. One begins to find the term 
"distrust" applied to labor relations personnel by management for practices that 
encouraged the relationship deemed as good by management. One begins to 
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find managers wondering whose side the labor relations personnel are on 
when they wear union symbols and when they seem to be too friendly with 
union leaders. From the union side, grievances began to be dropped by the 
business agent because they were not acted on in a timely fashion . The 
business agent began to neglect meeting with units of the union in outlying 
plants and districts. Union workers felt that the business agent was not acting 
on their concerns. Again, one begins to find the term distrust applied to the 
business agent by union workers. 
In the late 1980s, the union elected new leadership and the company 
changed labor relations management personnel within a period of less than two 
years. Having recently experienced layoffs, the increased use of outside 
contractors, and significant efforts to reorganize work in ways that were 
problematic to union members, the union elected persons who brought a new 
set of practices to labor relations. Since the former business agent had 
engaged in a series of informal arrangements to establish practices that were 
now being attacked by attempts by management to reorganize work, the new 
business agents began to file grievances to try to make the informally 
established practices part of the recognized contract or official side agreements. 
By doing so, the business agents were acting to limit management's right to 
take unilateral action. Thus, the business agents are seen by management as 
"pushing" and as "radical." Distrust is now a term that managers applied to 
union officials instead of labor relations management personnel. Since the 
business agents are acting on the concerns of union members, they are now 
trusted by union members. The new labor relations management personnel are 
hired to end paternalistic labor relations practices and to become more 
business like. Supervisors are now told to act as they wish to manage their 
areas under the direction of managers and to not worry about grievances. As 
grievances are filed by the union to resist the reorganization of work that 
violates the informally agreed to past practices, there is no legally binding 
record of the past practices. Thus, the unilateral action taken by management is 
not seen by them as a violation of the terms of employment since the past 
practices in question are not a part of the official contract or side agreements. 
Over one-hundred such past agreements are unilaterally revoked by 
management. Now, grievances are not found in violation of the contract by 
labor relations personnel and are continually forced to binding arbitration 
instead of resolved by informal agreement. It appears to union members that 
the company wants to break the union. The duty to bargain seems to be 
ignored by the company. Distrust is now a terms union members apply to 
management instead of union officials. 
Trust and the "Problematic" 
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Finally, the union and management made their relationship problematic 
with respect to trust. The issue of trust seems to be raised whenever a person 
or organization breaks with practices that the trusting party feels she could 
count on or whenever the trusted party resorts to acts which would be 
unacceptable or problematic to the trusting party. As seen above, the two 
different definitions of rights in labor law make the acts of the opposing parties 
opportunistic for each other. If the union is successful in negotiating to resolve 
the concerns of its members, managers walk away with new areas in which they 
cannot take unilateral action. If managers take unilateral action without 
consulting or negotiating, it appears that they are not willing to fulfill their duty to 
bargain. For example, one finds managers making the issue of safety 
problematic by claiming that the union cannot be trusted because they turn 
every safety issue into attempts to address work rules in ways that become part 
of the contract and limit their arena of unilateral action. One finds the union 
making the issue of safety problematic because the company unilaterally alters 
safety rules in ways the union considers unsafe. 
If one examines the ways in which the union and management made 
their relationship problematic with respect to practices used to construct the 
internal labor market, management practices, and labor relations practices, 
there are numerous incidents of changes in practices on which one party or 
another thought they could count. Union members thought they could count on 
a stable job progression and job security. The company reduced the craft work 
force several times in twenty years and altered the rules of advancement. The 
company reorganized how work was done to reduce the numbers of workers 
needed to do it. The company began an extensive use of contractors to out 
source work which had been done by union members. Workers thought that 
they could count on the paternalistic labor relations practices. The company 
moved to reclaim disputed areas of unilateral action. The company thought that 
they could count on union leadership which would hold the concerns of workers 
in check. A new group of leaders were elected which acted on the concerns 
workers. 
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The issue of trust in these reversals of practices was made even more 
problematic by circumstances accompanying them. Even though executive 
management instituted an early retirement plan to try to reduce the work force 
by attrition and held open the possibility of further layoffs, there are numerous 
accounts from managers, supervisors, and workers of good will tours and 
discussions with upper managers in which the possibilities of layoffs were 
denied right up to the day they happened. Workers in power plant operations 
and maintenance from the entire company were called to the plant which was to 
be closed for a meeting. At this meeting, all of them were terminated with no 
warning other than the vague hints of layoffs modified by numerous promises of 
no layoffs. When the layoffs occurred, the company had engaged scores of 
contract workers to do the same work of workers laid off. Almost daily, workers 
are reminded that their jobs could be done by contract workers. 
The company offered the possibility of participatory management. Then, 
it was significantly curtailed. When a few workers chosen by managers are 
included on management committees and decisions are made which go 
against past practices on which workers have counted, workers are told that 
they had a say by virtue of the small representation chosen by management on 
the committee. When workers voice their concerns, they are sometimes aimed 
at questioning the concern and integrity of managers. The chance for voice by 
workers has turned into a chance to publicly degrade managers. Techniques of 
active listening taught to managers become rituals for communicating closed 
channels of influence for workers. As one worker put it, "When you hear, 'I hear 
you, I share your concern, and let me see what can be done about it ,' you know 
you have just been ignored." 
The issue of trust raised by reversals of practices was also made more 
problematic by an increase in practices which reduced the personal relations 
that could mediate such reversals. By moving management control outside of 
the actual work group and by recombining workers in work groups, it is hard to 
build relationships. As one manager put it, "It's hard to build relationships with 
workers when you only see them once in a while." With the centralization of 
decisions, there is more distance between workers and management as the 
supervisor becomes "someone else's finger. " With the parent company more 
involved in the strategic positioning of the company, there is more distance and 
less involvement of executives at the work group and individual community 
level than when strategic positioning was closer to the work group and 
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individual community level. 
An example of the consequences of the loss of personal relations with 
workers set up by such practices can be found in an interview with an executive 
level manager. She had once been heavily involved with the training of line 
personnel. During this period, she became friends with several workers and 
knew them to be reasonable people. That is, they could see her viewpoint and 
she could see their viewpoint. So, it came as a shock to her when, years later, 
those workers with whom she used to have an active relationship now were on 
information picket lines protesting the unreasonableness of the company. It 
came as a shock to her when she would visit power plants and they would 
criticize the concern of management over safety. 
Distrust also becomes a way of making the relationship between the 
union and management problematic. It would anger managers during 
negotiations when the business agent would lean over the table and say, "We 
don't trust you any more." Distrust made it difficult to get unilateral decisions 
accepted by workers. As one worker put it, "When a manager asks you to do 
something, you're first question to yourself is, 'What is she up to?' ." Instead of 
going along with the company's new participatory program on improving the 
quality and productivity of work, the union instructs its members not to 
participate voluntarily. The union questions the motives and effects of the 
program in its newsletter. The company sees such tactics as groundless and 
simply as strategies to organize more workers. On the one hand, distrust has 
been used as an organizing tool by the union. Union membership has 
increased from about sixty percent in organized units to about eighty percent in 
organized units over three years. On the other hand, participatory management 
practices have been adopted by the company as a union avoidance devices. 
As a senior executive put it, "If workers can get what they want through 
participation, why would they want a union?" 
Distrust is also problematic for the union. Management does not want to 
engage in serious discussions over safety issues because they distrust what the 
union will do with the discussions. They are afraid that the union will use them 
to get into changing work rules in ways that they do not want them changed. 
Management might be willing to try to figure out ways to accommodate the 
concerns of workers in specific settings. But, they are afraid that they will 
become part of past practices that will limit their ability to take unilateral action. 
Management also engages in practices that encourage distrust of 
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workers. In training manuals, workers are portrayed as only interested in more 
work for less money. The union is pictured as attempting to try to take 
management's rights away from them at every turn possible. In management 
meetings, the union is talked about as being radical and irrational. Managers 
brag about baiting union officials into anger. Friendships between managers 
and workers are discouraged because they may lead managers into 
compromising management rights. Training manuals encourage supervisors to 
see themselves as part of the management team against the union. 
CHAPTERV 
PRACTICES CONSTITUTING THE COMPANY 
AS FAMILY LIKE 
Introduction 
Some company practaices encourage a family like atmosphere; other 
practices do not. As one analyzes sources of data for practices that constitute 
the company as family like, one can identify three sets of practices: (1) practices 
used to involve the employee and her famjly in the company as if the company 
were an extended family, (2) practices used to relate to employees as friends, 
and (3) practices that leave local managers unencumbered enough to respond 
to workers as friends and family. These practices are examined first. Then, the 
analysis will turn to explore practices that discourage family like practices. 
References to the replacement of family like practices with practices associated 
with enmity show an increase in distrust. Thus, the analysis will proceed by 
exploring how various practices set up distrust, how distrust is enacted by the 
application of analogies about past breaches of trust to current situations, and 
how distrust is encouraged by threats of repeating past events that broke trust. 
A key element in analogies of distrust is perceived deception. So, various 
management and union practices are classified according to their potential to 
setup the perception·of deception and --- in doing so -- encourage distrust. 
Finally, a number of dividing practices will be explored to see how they 
discourage family like practices. 
Practices Used to Constitute the Company as Family Like 
Workers and managers recall a time in company history when the 
company borrowed a number of practices found in family and friendship 
settings and construct the relationships between management and the work 




First, one can identify practices which involve the employee and her 
family in the company as if they were part of an extended family. There were 
monthly family night dinners. The act of inviting people to participate in an 
informal meal offers a relationship between managers and workers by making 
them companions in the event. · A quick glance at the term companion in a 
dictionary reveals the ritual that establishes the relationship: Companion is 
Latin for "with bread." The event was objectified as family by calling it a family 
night dinner. Families, rather than simply employees, were invited and 
participated. Managers knew family members by name and knew information 
about their concerns, family events, and community involvement. Such 
knowledge and the use of it construct the relation as personal and not simply as 
business. Managers engaged in informal conversations about the company's 
business and family member's business. In doing so, family business and 
company business mix and merge. During the winter holidays, there would be 
separate parties for adults and for children. At the children's party, each child 
would have a gift with her name on it. Again, the practice constitutes workers 
and their families as persons who are personally known and valued. Managers 
and workers would visit each other in each other's homes. This extended the 
relationship between supervisor and worker as friendship beyond the 
relationship offered through official events such as family night dinners and 
holiday parties. 
In the company as family like, parent-child type relations would be used 
to construct the supervisor-worker relationship. A supervisor would treat 
workers as a child. Adopting the practice of parent, a boss would protect 
employees from dangerous work conditions and from problematic decisions 
from other managers. Or a boss would push upper managers until the wishes 
of her workers were met. On the other hand, bosses could become the 
authoritarian father who was always right, who offered no explanation for 
orders, and who punished those who did not obey or who got on their bad side. 
Beyond the devices used to construct personal relationships between 
managers and workers as family like, workers could sometimes use the 
resources of the company in their personal lives as if company resources were 
family resources. If a worker needed to use a company facility or equipment in 
a community organization in which she was involved, she could. If equipment 
was needed for a personal project, it could often be used. The involvement of 
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workers in community activities was seen by the community and the company 
as company involvement. Workers would be recognized in family night dinners 
and in company publications for their community involvement. They would 
identify themselves as a part of the company in their community activities. 
The benefits extended to workers placed the company in the role of 
taking care of workers and of putting the employees and their families ahead of 
other considerations. The company provided reduced rates for electricity and 
paid benefits. These were extended into retirement. If a worker was injured, 
light duty would be found . If permanent injury or the reorganization of work 
threatened a worker's job, other work would be found. Workers responded to 
such loyalty with loyalty of their own. As one worker put it, "You knew the 
company cared about you ; so you stayed near the phone on weekends in case 
they needed you. " 
Friendship 
Second, employees were treated as friends. Friendship would be 
offered through acts such as giving workers extra time off for family 
emergencies without negative consequences, dealing with mistakes without 
becoming punitive, seeking forgiveness for transgressions and granting 
forgiveness for transgressions, being the first to do a dirty, unpleasant, or 
dangerous job, listening to the concerns of workers and acting to address them, 
and giving workers breaks in bad weather or working conditions. It should be 
noted that these practices sometimes set up situations that were problematic for 
some workers. Friends got better jobs and promotions than workers not in the 
circle of friends with the supervisor. 
The importance of certain acts in the construction of friendship was 
emphasized by one worker with an analogy. You get married. You tell each 
other that you love them. You believe it. Then, you begin to neglect telling them 
that you love them. You find one day that you don't love them. In the above list 
of practices associated with the manager-worker relationship as friend, many 
practices act on the other in a way that assumes and constitutes the other as 
valuable. A boss goes out on a hot day and takes the crew for a soda, asks how 
things are going, and listens. The complaints of workers become the concerns 
of a supervisor as she advocates for those concerns with her manager. A 
supervisor knows that a job will be dirty or dangerous; so she exposes herself to 
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the risk with the workers. 
Several of these techniques have been taken up in various training 
programs currently provided to supervisors by the company. For example, it 
has been noted that the company has provided supervisory training that 
includes a listening technique built around the litany: "I hear you; I share your 
concern; let me see what can be done about it." On its face, this could be a 
valuing of the worker. Yet, one will hear a worker ask: "Is it the person or is it the 
program?" When a practice is known or suspected to be a part of management 
training, it makes it possible for a worker to pose this distinction. A manager 
could use this technique simply to allow a worker both to express a concern and 
to show concern back without acting on the concern. This often seems to 
happen. Workers seem to remember whether or not something was done about 
a concern. This is especially true when a concern is persistent. Under these 
conditions, the litany is sometimes seen as a hypocrisy and evokes anger. 
The discussion above assumes that the valuing that takes place is the 
valuing of the worker by the supervisor. There were some instances of the 
valuing of supervisors by workers. These instances often included such 
practices as taking workers into the managers confidence by sharing 
frustrations, pressures, and issues that go on behind the scene with other 
managers and workers. While friendship always includes this kind of sharing, 
such sharing did not necessarily set up friendship. For example, one worker 
was assigned light duty of helping a supervisor while the worker was getting 
over an injury. During this time, the worker got to see all of the pressures and 
conflicts that the manager had to address. By talking these issues over, the 
worker was taken into the confidence of the manager. Yet, in this instance, 
neither the worker or the manager used the term friend to objectify their 
relationship. Instead, the worker could now see the manager's point of view 
and -- from the manager's point of view -- had become a better employee. In 
fact, a good employee from a manager's point of view is one who can see 
things from the manager's point of view. And a good manager from the worker's 
point of view is one who can see things from the employee's point of view. 
While such "seeing" is a part of valuing the other, it is not necessarily valuing 
the other. Only a handful of instances were found in which both a union worker 
and a manager valued each other and their relationship by objectifying it as 
friendship. 
An important ritual of friendship is forgiveness. Several workers 
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suggested that the company and the union could solve their problems if 
management would admit mistakes, apologize, and ask for help in moving 
forward together. Without exception, those that expressed this felt that the union 
would be astonished, would admit their mistakes, apologize, and also ask for 
help. As one worker put it, 'This would start the long road to trust, rededication, 
remoralization , quality, and profits." This ritual helps to salvage a friendship by 
defining that which was offending as a mistake, by expressing regret over the 
offense and pain caused to the other and thereby valuing the other, and by 
inviting the other to continue the relationship -- thereby valuing the relationship. 
However, offering an apology is problematic on several fronts. First, it 
requires one to value the relationship more than the offending line of action. If 
management rights, a particular management strategy, worker's rights, a 
particular union strategy, or whatever is more important than a continuing 
relationship, then the ritual of forgiveness is moot because it will require 
defining the offending line of action as a mistake. Second, if the party who 
opens the ritual of forgiveness is rejected, enmity will probably be deepened. 
Third, the party who opens the ritual may do so because they value the 
relationship more than the other party. If this becomes apparent to the other 
party, it may be used to squeeze more out of the party who opens the ritual. 
Fourth, an apology is an asymmetric act. If one party offers an apology and ask 
for forgiveness, the other party now must consider accepting the apology and 
offering a counter apology if the party wants the relationship to move forward. 
Otherwise, they risk deepening enmity. Fifth, the opening act of the ritual of 
forgiveness -- admitting a mistake and offering an apology -- is also the 
opening act of punishment (Foucault, 1979). For example, one worker said that 
she had "popped off" and hurt the feelings of her boss. After she cooled off, she 
admitted that she had been wrong by talking to her boss as she had and was 
sorry. The boss indicated that she had better not do it again because the 
incident was being placed in her personnel file along with a note observing that 
she had admitted to the event. Once a mistake is admitted, it becomes a 
confession verifying guilt in the practice of punishment. Sixth, and last, 
admitting a mistake and offering an apology also make it easier to engage in 
rituals of degradation (Garfinkel , 1956). If managers admit to mistakes, it is 
possible for the union to degrade them with workers as a tool to increase 
membership and to create support for negotiations. If union leaders admit to 
mistakes, it is possible for management to degrade them with workers as a tool 
116 
to decrease the support of union leadership among union workers and to 
decrease the appeal of the union to nonunion workers. Evidence of both of 
these tactics could be found in union newsletters, management memos, and 
notes of observations of interactions. While trust might be enticed from a 
completed act of confession on the part of two parties as suggested by the 
worker above, the act is so replete with potential opportunism that a certain 
Kierkegaardian leap of trust, valuing of the relationship, or having nothing else 
left to lose is required to initiate the ritual of forgiveness in the first place. 
Unencumbered Relations 
Finally, an important device which enabled friendship and family 
practices was the small, independently operated district. Everyone in the small 
district knew each other and worked with each other. Managers were once 
workers and were a part of the continuous group of employees in the district 
even though their position changed from worker to supervisor. In the small 
districts, line workers had more direct contact with the public and had to play the 
role of "the company. " The independent nature of district operations also made 
friendship possible. The boss could set her own agenda. So, she was capable 
of responding to the concerns of workers. There was no push from the top. 
Thus, there were no devices such as pushing productivity or holding people 
accountable to turn the supervisor into an evaluator and punisher or rewarder 
and to turn the worker into a work device and an object of punishment. There 
was less centralized management handing down decisions which could 
threaten relationships, job security, and work practices and which could not be 
controlled by the local manager. 
Distrust and Practices Which Discourage 
Family Like Practices 
It is striking to note that many accounts in the interviews and notes on 
observations of interactions that include references to the replacement of 
practices associated with the company as family with practices associated with 
enmity are also accounts with reference to distrust. A key element in 
establishing distrust with respect to a current situation is an analogical 
application of an incident which was defined as breaking a trust to interpret and 
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act on the current situation. For example, one worker was told that she could be 
open and frank when talking with a person studying her work group. Later, 
things she spoke about were placed in her personnel file and used against her. 
Thus, she said that one cannot trust such promises from management. Once an 
analogy of distrust is applied, it blocks or makes problematic communication, 
interaction, and relationship because the other is considered as potentially 
opportunistic. When asked to participate in this study with guarantees of 
confidentiality, the worker repeated the analogy and declined. She said that 
she could no longer trust such promises. 
Here, the term analogy rather than a term such as stereotype is used with 
respect to the practice of distrust because stereotype often implies an 
oversimplification or an inaccurate interpretation of a reality. Since Foucault's 
approach does not allow one to claim a reality apart from the device or practice, 
analogy is used. 
Probably the main event that is used in most analogies of distrust by 
workers was the layoff in the mid-1980s. A reading of interviews with workers 
and most supervisors and lower level managers reveals the following analogy: 
The company had never had a serious layoff. Even in the depression in the 
1930s, arrangements were made to keep workers at fewer hours of work and 
lower wages. One felt that one had a job that one could count on until 
retirement. This, it will be remembered, is an important element in the practice 
of the company as family like. Before the layoffs, managers kept claiming that 
there would probably be no layoffs and that things were fine. As one manager 
put it, "One day my boss was sitting in that chair telling me that there would be 
no layoffs; the next day, large numbers of people were terminated." This event 
occurred during contract negotiations and angered the union because of the 
lack of advance notice before the layoffs. At the time of the layoff, most 
interviews containing the analogy reveal that the impression of no layoffs 
followed by layoffs created an atmosphere of mistrust. After that, most workers 
felt that one has to question every decision management makes. As one worker 
said, "It makes you question the decision and probably see it the wrong way. " 
Even in locations in the company not affected by this layoff, workers and 
managers are anxious about their jobs and question the impact of new 
technologies, changes of work rules, and the use of outside contractors on job 
security. 
As this analogy is evoked and applied to question and resist 
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management decisions, managers become angered and frustrated. They claim 
that the work force is now at a minimum level and that jobs are relatively secure. 
Thus, they see that such distrust is either irrational, rooted in some kind of blue 
collar emotional insecurity, rooted in a lack of problem solving skills, or 
encouraged by union leadership. A glance at union newsletters and flyers 
reveals that such analogies of distrust are used in appealing for solidarity in 
negotiations. At the same time, one can hear managers threaten workers with 
outsourcing their work. Technologies and work rules are being adopted by 
managers that utilize fewer workers. The executive level of management had 
adopted a general policy of no new rate increases, no new plant construction, 
and no new hires. Officially, more must be done with less. Whenever a worker 
hears a manager say, "Do more with less, .. the worker often evokes an analogy 
including tne executive's policies and questions the decision. 
An element of the layoff which is denied by.most senior level 
management but which is in most accounts given by workers and managers is 
deception. By deception, it is simply meant that the appearance of one line of 
action seems to masks another line of action that eventually becomes apparent. 
Intentionality of actors is not implied. As for layoffs, managers gave the 
impression of no layoffs. They maintained this position until the actual layoffs. 
That impression,. as much as the violation of the practice of job security, is at the 
core of the distrust analogy. 
Six practices were found in various analogies of distrust around 
deception that both encouraged the perception of deception and made 
friendship and family like relationships problematic. 
First, local control of decisions, in the period when the company was like 
a family, was replaced with centralized control. After the change, the supervisor 
or local manager could not make a decision without checking with their 
superiors .. This situation sets up a number of problematic practices. Sometimes 
a supervisor can create distance from decisions and thereby maintain relations 
with.workers by claiming that she is just "delivering the news" or that "my boss 
wants you to do this unpleasant task... It is problematic to upper managers 
because they are removed from the scene and are offered as targets for anger 
and frustration. It helps to set up managers as the untrustworthy .. they." Other 
times, a supervisor will use the distance to set up a manager as the punisher or 
enforcer: "So:-and-so wants this done!" What is implied here is that the worker 
must answer to the enforcer if the act is not done. Again, this is a role distancing 
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strategy. It allows the local supervisor to use a distant manager to deliver a 
threat that the local manager might want to deliver so as either to protect the 
relation or to mask her inability to carry through with the threat on her own. 
Again, this is problematic for upper managers because they are the source of 
punishment and are therefore feared. 
As a strategy to deal with this problem when decisions are handed down, 
the first line supervisors are encouraged by managers to make the decision 
look like their own. Managers want supervisors to "own" the command as their 
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own decision. As one supervisor lamented, 'This puts me in the position of 
lying if I don't really agree with the decision." So, the strategy of having 
supervisor's "own" management decisions by representing them as their own 
creates a potential deception. When decisions are reversed, the potential for 
perceiving deception increases. It should be noted that deception may not be 
intended. Decisions are changed. In the case of the mid-1980s layoffs, 
managers may have felt that there would likely be no layoffs. But when the 
decision was reversed, it is hard to tell if the first line of action was designed to 
deceive especially both when a worker is outside of the decision making setting 
and when a worker cannot tell if a decision is not a supervisor's actual decision. 
Second, some actors are in the position of taking decisions that they 
know will be problematic to some. This requires a sell in which some aspect of 
the decision is emphasized, other aspects are diminished or recast in terms of 
other motives, and yet other aspects are masked. While deception is not 
necessarily intentional, the use of strategies to sell decisions sets up the 
perception of deception. For example, one worker related one pattern of selling 
in the area of safety that creates the potential to perceive deception. According 
to this worker, managers do not overtly force a violation of safety rules. In fact, 
they maintain a strong public face in their concern over safety. Yet, a manager 
will send an understaffed crew with respect to safety rules. The manager will 
say that she will send help when it is needed. Then, when help is required, 
none is available. If a work crew returns to the office rather than works in 
violation of safety rules, the manager will ask, "Couldn't you do this?" A worker 
knows this and wants to please her supervisor. So, she violates the safety 
rules. 
This example contains an element of a third strategy that sets up the 
possibility of perceiving an act as deception: deniability. In the example above, 
workers are defined by safety rules as being responsible for managing the risk 
120 
of their acts. In other words, if there is a problem, it is their fault unless they 
were specifically ordered to do the act which violated the safety rules. The little 
procedure reported above by a worker makes it possible for a manager to get 
work done that violates the safety rules while denying responsibility for 
commanding the unsafe practice. It invites a perception that the manager is 
deceiving the worker to get her to engage in unsafe acts. Another strategy that 
creates the possibility of deniability and sets up the perception of deception is 
the refusal to put decisions in writing. In the labor relations arena, both the 
union and managers are careful not to put things in writing that could be used 
against them in their legal proceedings or in campaigns designed to degrade 
the other side. This leaves actors in the awkward position of living with 
agreements and with conversations while denying them. 
Fourth, the practice of dividing the company into different management 
groups both who use different tools for analyzing and acting and who are 
judged by different audiences sets up the potential for perceiving deception. 
Not only does a supervisor of a work group have to check upward, but there are 
several different groups applying different devices to the same decision. The 
financial groups put decisions into the context of budgets and begin to work by 
applying various accounting practices to the decision. Operations and power 
generation engineers begin to examine the design and the cost of the design of 
the decision. Safety staff analyze risk factors and safety rules associated with 
the decision. Labor relations staff evaluate how the decision affects the labor 
contract. From a different view point, the union staff does the same things. Few 
of these devices value the worker in and of themselves. A worker is a cost, an 
element in a technical-organizational design, a score on a test, an element of 
safety risk, and a party to a labor contract. With all of the devices working on 
decisions, they are held in limbo. 
If being caught in conflicting practices from above enables limbo, so does 
a variety of supervisory practices. With an increased use of meetings as a 
technique for coordinating management decisions and commands, supervisors 
are involved in more meetings and have less time to attend to emerging 
problems. At other times, a supervisor will continue with a practice to get along 
with the work group. In both cases, a practice is allowed to develop with tacit, if 
not explicit, approval which can be reversed when it comes to the attention of 
the appropriate manager. For example, a supervisor created a special job 
classification that did not seem to be in the contract to deal what she perceived 
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was a pay and job responsibility discrepancy. This seemed to be approved by 
managerial staff in the area where this supervisor worked. But, this was 
problematic for human resources because it did not fit the contract. It set up line 
of progression problems. Steps were taken by management to try to put the 
worker back into the original job classification scheme. Nevertheless, the 
worker had done some work which could put her into a different classification 
scheme. The union leadership pushed the issue for the worker. Two elements 
here set up the potential for perceiving deception. First, a multitude of 
perspectives get applied to the scene: supervisor, managers, labor relations 
staff, and union staff. Some of them lend themselves to judging the situation 
one way and others lend themselves to judging the situation in another way. 
Second, as the issue is worked on over a period of time, several reversals of 
decisions and reworking of sells pitches for a decision are elaborated. 
A fifth set of practices which set up the possibility of perceiving deception 
were the mutual analogies of distrust applied by managers and workers to each 
other around the issue of safety. The company in this study had increased its 
focus on safety because of a growing number of more serious injuries. A 
strategy used by the more senior management was to attend the local monthly 
safety meeting. Managers perceived that workers used this fact to combine 
nonsafety issues with safety issues to get the nonsafety issues resolved. Thus, 
managers often approach safety with an analogy of distrust toward the union. 
As one manager said, "It's hard to tell if their safety concerns are legitimate or if 
they are simply a cover to keep from changing work rules or to featherbed." 
Similarly, workers apply an analogy of distrust to managers. Workers perceive 
that managers dismiss their safety concerns out of hand if they will cost 
anything. During one safety meeting, workers pushed a safety engineer to test 
some safety equipment. The engineer resisted because she said that the 
equipment was safe, and it would cost too much to test it. At the insistence of 
the senior manager present, the test was run. During a different safety meeting, 
workers raised issues about the safety of reducing the number of workers to do 
a particular task. Immediately, one of the senior executives present cut the 
workers off with a comment about featherbedding. These analogies of distrust 
make problematic open communication and the valuing of perspectives on 
safety. 
Finally, and sixth, the use of written policies and procedures about how 
things are to be done by the company contributes to the perception of deception 
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and distrust. Employees are exposed through training, meetings, and written 
communication to company policies and procedures. They become a basis for 
judging what happens at work. To the extent that actions of managers and 
official policy are identified as divergent, it becomes possible for managers to 
be perceived as deceptive. As one worker stated, "If you look at this company 
on paper, it's a great company to work for; but there is a big difference between 
what is said and what is done." 
Dividing Practices Which Discourage 
Family Like Practices 
In chapter one, dividing practices were defined as symbolic, ritual, and 
physical practices of diqhotomously separating groups into in-groups and 
out-groups. In addition to the practice of distrust which makes practices of 
friendship with distrusted parties problematic, four other dividing practices were 
found to make the valuing of others, open communication, and objectifying a 
relationship as friendship problematic. 
First, as already noted, the centralization of command has removed the 
latitude of decision making open to the local supervisor. As the union has 
engaged in resisting the attempts of management to alter work rules and the 
internal labor market, the control of union members has also become more 
centralized. Now, neither the local manager or the local union steward nor the 
worker can easily work things out without checking above., As one manager 
interviewed said, "The company and union have reached down into the work 
group and taken away the relationship between the supervisor and the worker." 
Second, techniques of team building and the use of teams have been 
applied to coordinate management. While some teams include persons from 
several levels of the company hierarchy of command, most teams are 
composed of one level of the hierarchy. Thus, the most executive level of 
managers are a team which works together to set policy and to work on all other 
levels. The managers at the operational or plant level work as a team to work 
on workers. Within a team, there seems to be relatively open communication 
and some valuing of each otherand of each other's opinions. However; what 
goes on in the team is hidden from those outside of the team. Teams develop 
policies and take decisions which become positions to be sold to others. 
Training manuals for supervisors encourage managers to be a part of the 
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management team and to identify with the objectives of managers rather than 
with unionized workers. All of this tends to set up a them-and-us analogy, 
blocks open communication between them-and-us as we try to sell our position 
to them, and blocks the valuing of them because doing so would be disloyal to 
us. 
Third, the practice of requiring a college education enhances the division 
between managers and workers. The very act of requiring higher education 
discounts the noneducated and the craft knowledge of the noneducated. It is 
not uncommon to hear managers attribute problems between workers and 
managers to a "blue collar mentality" and to a lack of education. By requiring a 
college education for managers, new lower level managers do not have the 
actual experience of the actual work being done. So, one will often hear 
workers comment on how their supervisors are "as dumb as a post" when it 
comes to the actual work. 
One place where this duality of experience and viewpoint can be seen 
with problematic consequences is in the area of safety. Consider the following 
interview with a manager who came up through the craft ranks: 
Most managers out there are new. They have an education. But, they 
have no real first hand experience on the job. We've moved away to a 
type of education that is school based rather than work based. A good 
manager can manage. But, not many people can really do this without 
work based experience. Being a line man is a high risk job .... danger is 
the issue. You can do a job safely. You have to control risks. We are 
getting managers who have never really done this work. They may have 
some demonstration experience, but very few have had to go out under 
adverse conditions when people are out of power. 
Here, managers tend to apply engineering, risk management, and accounting 
practices to problems to construct a statistical distribution of outcomes. Costs 
are assigned to outcomes so a monetary amount can be assigned to safety 
measures for various designs. The least cost combination will more than likely 
have some measurable chance for an accident that has been included in the 
cost. If there is an accident, the cost of it to the company has already been 
included in the cost of a project through estimated legal fees and insurance 
costs. On the other hand, the worker faces an actual loss of a limb or life from 
the accident which is a probability and a cost for a manager. Many line workers 
will tell you that the goal is to walk away from the job with both hands and all ten 
fingers. 
One of the continual struggles between managers and the union is over 
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safety. As managers configure tasks or change work rules in ways that appear 
to workers to increase the chance of accidents in order to cut costs, they adopt 
new rules and procedures which load the problem of risk management onto the 
worker. Workers would rather have the work and the work force configured to 
make the work less risky in the first place as they see the work. If managers 
came up from the craft ranks and had experience with actually confronting 
dangerous situations in adverse conditions such that their life and limbs were 
exposed directly to the risk, they might have a view of safety more similar to 
workers. 
During this study, workers who were injured, had been injured, or had 
just missed injury were encountered. One worker made contact with an 
energized line a few days after being interviewed and lost part of both arms. 
Another place where this duality of experience and viewpoint can be 
seen is in the area of disciplinary problems. From a manager's point of view, 
workers are like children who are always testing the limits of management. 
They seem to abuse lunch hours and breaks. They can be found loafing on the 
job. They push the sick leave policy to the maximum allowable days off of work. 
Interviews with workers and observations made in this study would tend to 
confirm that these behaviors do occur. Given this judgment about workers, 
managers devise surveillance schemes such as hiding to watch workers, 
conducting surprise inspections, listening in on radio communications, and 
claiming to workers to randomly listen to outgoing phone calls. On the other 
hand, workers see layoffs, outsourcing of work, and changes in work rules as 
attacks on job security and as attempts to drive them. They experience all of the 
surveillance strategies as harassment. As managers devise strategies to alter 
work rules or to carry out surveillance, workers devise strategies to resist 
without appearing to resist. For example, with the increased need for overtime 
with the reduced work force, managers want workers to remain near a phone on 
their time off without paying them standby wages. Workers are angry both 
about the layoffs and about the request to alter their extra work life with no 
compensation. So, workers buy answering machines to screen phone calls on 
their off hours. 
Fourth, the labor contract and associated mechanisms of arbitration and 
negotiations are replete with practices that divide. Labor law establishes two 
parties with responsibilities for representing different interests. It establishes 
two, mutually exclusive sets of rights in management rights and worker rights. 
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By focusing on rights, arbitration and negotiations become a zero sum game. 
Rights acquired by one group are rights lost by the other group. By focusing on 
costs, arbitration and negotiations are forced into a zero sum game. Every 
dollar management can cut represents one more dollar of profit against a given 
revenue. Every dollar management can cut represents one less dollar the 
union employee does not get. It was interesting to note that, while managers 
and the union seemed to know the costs of various proposals in negotiations 
and to talk about wanting a win-win situation, no one analyzed proposals in 
terms of costs and benefits to both parties which would be necessary to 
construct a win-win option rather than just a zero sum option. 
The union is a political organization in that elections determine 
leadership. Union members judge leaders based on how well they represent 
their interests. This acts on union leaders to be sensitive to and push worker 
issues. An earlier union leader in this study was defeated because workers 
perceived that she did not attend meetings of workers, did not follow up on 
grievances such that time limitations lapsed, and worked far too closely with 
labor relations personnel at their detriment. Additionally, union leaders need 
support from the membership in negotiations. Negative campaigns seem to 
elicit more support than positive campaigns. This encourages a confrontation 
with managers. 
Management is a different type of political organization. Promotions, 
salaries, team management, training, and command structures are used to 
maintain solidarity with respect to workers. Managers can "make names" for 
themselves by cutting costs and by not being afraid to hold workers 
accountable. This encourages a confrontation with workers. Training 
encourages managers to be in solidarity and consensus with the management 
team in preserving and exercising management rights. This discourages 
working differences out with workers unless it is on management's terms. It 
encourages practices such as telling workers why things are done rather than 
listening to workers' concerns about how things are done. 
These union and management practices make it dangerous for anyone 
to practice friendship across the divide. The previous labor relations personnel 
and union leadership had something of a friendship. They had an ability to 
listen to each other, to modify each other's viewpoint, and to try to get an agreed 
upon decision passed through their respective organizations. Union members 
ended up distrusting the leader because they felt she did not actively push their 
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issues. Managers ended up distrusting the labor relations personnel because 
they felt they sold out to the union. As one senior manager said, " Such-and 
-such would rather switch than fight." Union members are chastised by fellow 
members if they are too friendly with managers. If they are too friendly and 
open with union members, the loyalty of managers is questioned. 
CHAPTER VI 
PRACTICES WHICH INFLUENCE THE 
INTERNAL LABOR MARKET 
Introduction 
Marxists (Edwards, 1984), structuralists (Kalleberg and Berg, 1987), and 
institutionalists (Farkas and England, 1988) tend to agree that internal labor 
markets rather than the auction market determine the value of labor within firms. 
On the one hand, structuralists and institutionalists see the value of labor 
attached to the evaluation of positions rather than to individuals who happen to 
occupy the positions. The circulation of individuals among positions is 
influenced more by seniority, transaction costs, authority structures, politics, or 
social networks than by any real evaluation of the productivity of an individual. 
On the other hand, Marxists often focus on the devices used by managers to 
enhance the conversion of labor power -- the potential to do work -- into labor --
work actually done. Since a wage is associated with a position, the better labor 
power is converted to labor, the more value management is able to get for the 
wage spent. 
In this chapter, practices which influence the internal labor market by 
working on the strategic level of management will first be analyzed. 
Specifically, it will be seen that the threat of exit by industrial customers, the use 
of market study techniques to determine "reasonable" costs in regulatory 
hearings, the use of a past test year method of rate setting, and the adoption of 
methods for increasing conservation and the variability of costs affect the wages 
of workers and the number and distribution of positions in the company. As one 
turns to the work group to explore practices which affect the internal labor 
market and how it works, practices which work on the value of positions, the 
number and distribution of positions, converting labor power into labor, the 
externalities of family life and safety, and rules for mobility will be explored. 
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Practices Which Influence the Internal Labor Market 
by Working on the Strategic Level of Management 
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As one turns to explore practices that work on the internal labor market, 
one can find several practices which regulate the regulators and -- in doing do 
so -- work on the internal labor market by working on the strategic level of the 
company. 
The Threat of Exit 
First, since an electric utility is a monopoly, the state established a 
regulatory board to review the costs of the utility and to set rates to protect 
consumers from monopoly market power. To set the rate, a test year is used to 
capture all costs. The costs are normalized for shocks such as weather. For 
example, a wide spread ice storm could inflict a large, unexpected cost on the 
company. Then, costs are explored for their legitimacy to include in the rate 
base. For example, the utility board felt that a corporate jet for a different utility 
in the state was extravagant. So, it was not included in the rate base. 
Once the costs are defined to include in the rate base, the utility board is 
then not free to set the rate at any level above the rate base. On the one hand, 
a regulator interviewed stated that the Hope and Bluefield court case states that, 
if investors do not get a fair return because of regulation, the state has 
confiscated their property. On the other hand, regulators are required by law to 
protect the consumer. Furthermore, they must periodically face election. Thus, 
their regulatory activity is open to influence by corporate, municipal, and 
individual expressions of discontent. 
A regulator interviewed stated that the most problematic threat was not 
the ballot box but the threat of exit. When rate increases are proposed, 
companies threaten to leave the state and take their jobs and taxes with them. 
As companies began to leave the state or threaten to leave the state with the 
downturns in the economy in the 1980s, regulators began to load rates on 
residential customers to try to keep businesses and their jobs and taxes. 
Before, rates were loaded on industrial and commercial customers. It is 
interesting to note how this practice effectively devalues labor as a class by 
forcing workers as residents as a class to bear a part of the costs which would 
have been borne by the specific workers, stockholders or owners, and 
customers of companies who use to have rates loaded on them through the 
industrial rate. This practice is consistent with deindustrialization practices 
documented by Bluestone and Harrison ( 1982). 
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The problem of exit with respect to downward pressure on rates worked 
directly on ,the company as well as indirectly through regulators. First, 
regulations were passed which allowed industrial concerns to cogenerate 
electricity. Not only did this remove a customer, it also required the utility to buy 
excess generation at a rate which -- according to a regulator interviewed -- may 
actually subsidize the industrial concern. Second, several cooperatives and 
hydroelectric authorities did not engage in the same building programs in 
respond to the Fuels Use Act as did the company under study. Thus, after the 
OPEC price floors collapsed and utilities were no longer required to convert 
from oil and natural gas fired capacity, these organizations emerged with less 
costly capacity. So, they could directly compete for industrial customers. 
Finally, with the excess generation capacity created by the Fuels Use Act, it was 
possible for municipalities, cooperatives, and hydroelectric authorities to buy 
power cheaply in order to compete in franchise elections against large utilities 
who build new capacity. The company under study had lost one of the larger 
towns in the state in a franchise election and was facing a franchise election in 
another town. The increased threat of exit by industrial customers puts direct 
pressure on the company to hold its rates and, therefore, its costs in check. This 
encourages the company to also hold the costs of labor in check. The company 
adopted goals of no new rate increases, no new plant construction, and no new 
positions. 
The Use of the Market Study 
One of the chief devices used to negotiate these conflicting practices at 
the regulatory level is the market study. To establish what a "fair" return to 
investors might be such their property is not confiscated, there is testimony on 
the value of common stock. Here, the value of the company's common stock 
and the dividends paid on the stock is placed in a field of similar sized electric 
utilities in the region. If the change in stock value and dividends are below the 
mean of the distribution of similar sized electric utilities in the region, it will be 
easier to argue for a rate increase than if the value and dividends are above the 
mean. Similar arguments are constructed with respect to credit ratings. The 
wider the spread between the cost included in the rate base and the rate set 
and the more the rate base includes all costs incurred by the company, the 
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better will be the credit rating and the cheaper the company will be able to 
borrow money. Again, the regulators use comparisons with other similarly 
situated companies to get rates as low as possible without negatively affecting 
credit ratings, which would increase costs. Finally, rates are compared with 
rates in the region and with similar regions. Given threats to exit by industrial 
concerns, if rates are too high when compared to other regions, it will be difficult 
to argue for a rate increase. 
The market study is also used to determine the legitimacy of labor costs. 
The wages of various occupations and benefit packages are again placed in 
the context of similarly situated electric utilities. Again, wages and benefits 
which are too far above the mean for those companies included in the study 
may be seen as "unreasonable" and not allowed in the rate base. 
A regulator interviewed cited an interesting case in another state in which 
a union had negotiated a contract with a utility which included wage and benefit 
items which the utility board considered "unreasonable" when placed in the 
context of similarly situated electric utilities. Therefore, they refused to include 
the additional "unreasonable" costs in the rate base. As a result, the 
"unreasonable" portion of the labor contract has to be paid out of the difference 
between allowable costs and the rate rather than included in allowable costs. 
That is, it came out of the amount designated to be paid to the stock holders. 
This ruling was appealed on the basis that the regulators were interfering with 
negotiations by not allowing negotiated items to be counted as reasonable 
costs. After rulings and reversals on appeal, the courts ruled that negotiated 
items in a labor contract could be counted as "unreasonable." This makes 
negotiated contracts problematic for management if wages and benefits exceed 
what the market study technology would establish as reasonable. It means that 
stock holders will not be able to earn the allowed rate of return. 
One would expect that the use of the market value technology by 
regulators would encourage the same technology on the part of the 
management of the company to keep labor costs in the rate base as 
"reasonable" costs. If one examines the interviews with managers and notes on 
observations from negotiations, one finds that a similar technology is used to set 
the salaries of positions for both union and nonunion workers. The bench mark 
for the salaries of both union and nonunion workers in the market method of 
both regulators and management is the salary of the journeyman lineman. With 
respect to union workers, managers point out that the salary for a journeyman 
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lineman has been in the top quartile of the regional salary distribution for 
journeyman linemen. So, the company is putting back pressure on wages 
during negotiations. With respect to nonunion workers, wages are established 
by a large regression equation for predicting salaries based on internal and 
external factors. Internally, the equation includes education, work experience, 
decision making, effect on the bottom line, customer service impact, etc. 
Externally, salary surveys are used. But again, the principal external salary 
survey comparison is the position of journeyman lineman. 
The Past Test Year Method of Rate Making 
Another regulatory practice which encourages practices which can 
become problematic for workers is the use of a past test year to set rates. First, 
inflation tends to drive up costs over time. Thus, as time passes, costs go up 
against a fixed rate and cut into the profit margin. Inflation has not been a very 
big factor in the late 1980s as compared to the 1970s. 
Second, shocks of unexpected cost increases and revenue decreases 
can occur. As noted in an earlier chapter, two downturns in the economy in the 
1980s unexpectedly reduced revenues. Revenues can also be affected by cool 
summers and warm winters when compared to the test year method of 
averaging for temperature variations. Whereas revenues are essentially not 
controllable over the short run, costs are. But, costs are also subject to shocks. 
For example, the federal government recently instituted the Financial 
Accounting Standard 106 which required companies to prefund retiree medical 
liabilities. This very standard resulted in General Motors charging off 22 billion 
dollars to its stockholders. Since this cost was not in the rate base, the 
company could not immediately deal with it without either losing money for 
stockholders or going to the state utility board for a rate increase. Since 
medical and pension benefits were not in the labor contract, the company could 
turn to reducing retiree benefits to deal with this problem. Managers observed 
that not having this benefit in the labor contract made this action possible. It will 
be remembered that the loss of retirement benefits are seen as a breach of trust 
by workers and is a departure from family like practices of taking care of 
retirees. As this is being written, the company has requested a rate increase in 
part to offset the cost incurred because of this accounting rule. 
Third, the problem of balancing costs and revenues after a test year 
could leave the company in a position of underspending against the projected 
132 
costs and fixed rates. This could leave the company in the problematic situation 
with regulators of earing more than the allowed rate. It could also leave the 
company with a lower cost structure for a test year. A lower cost structure could 
be problematic for managing cost against revenue shocks if a lower rate base 
were established. 
This general problem of balancing costs against revenues is complicated 
by the technical nature of the electrical system. An electrical system is built to 
meet maximum requirements. With respect to power generation, enough 
capacity must be built to meet the maximum demand of the hottest day of the 
year with all air conditioning systems running. With respect to operations, 
enough capacity must be obtained to meet the worse storm which would inflict 
damage to the electrical distribution system. At the same time, revenue for the 
system is generated by the number of kilowatt hours of electricity sold. The 
larger the difference between the average use of the system and the peak use 
of the system, the larger will be the costs that must be covered by the rate. If the 
system is built with fixed capacity to meet peak demand with respect to both 
power generation and operations, this problem is accentuated. For example, if 
one builds an operations work force to meet the challenges of the worse storm 
of the year while continuing normal repair, service, and construction work, one 
has a relatively large costs to load on the number of kilowatt hours sold. But, if 
one can build a work force which can just exactly match the current demand but 
no more than the current demand, one will have a much lower cost structure. In 
addition to finding ways to convert operations and power generation costs from 
fixed to flexible to match wide swings in demand, one could also take steps to 
increase the average use of the system while decreasing the peak use of the 
system. This would increase the general level of revenue while decreasing 
costs needed to meet peak demand. 
Practices to Increase Conservation and the Variability of Costs 
The company adopted two sets of practices in responses to regulatory 
practices and market conditions which had an effect on the internal labor 
market. First, the company instituted conservation programs to reduce the peak 
load for electricity in the summef time. While this reduces the absolute amount 
of electricity a consumer would use, it also increased the length of time between 
the operation of air conditioning equipment. To increase the average use of the 
system, the company aggressively marketed electric heat pumps to capture part 
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of the heating market. Given the earlier noted policy of no new positions, this 
necessitated shifting more positions into marketing functions and, in doing so, 
began to reorganize the kinds of employees needed to fill positions. 
Probably the most important practices adopted with respect to union 
workers were practices adopted to increase the variability of capacity. About 
the same time of the layoffs in the mid-1980s, the parent company centralized 
dispatching for power generation. This required reducing the number of power 
plants and the number of workers in plants which were not base loaded. It 
required attempts to change work rules to use fewer workers to do more things. 
It required reducing the number of full time workers and contracting more work 
which could be used when needed and not used when not needed. And it 
required more overtime. A similar set of practices were also applied to 
operations and line work. In the early 1970s, large construction jobs were 
outsourced. Now, every job that was not done all of the time was being 
outsourced. This gives the company the capacity to match variable costs with 
variable demand. Now, contingencies are built into budgets. If storms do not 
materialize which require significant repair work, the company can contract to 
do less critical maintenance and service work. These two strategies used to 
match capacity to demand by converting fixed costs to variable costs resulted in 
the loss of hundreds of union positions over a twenty year period, with most of 
the losses occurring in the layoff and early retirement program in the mid-1980s. 
This significantly altered the internal labor market directly by reducing the 
number of positions for linemen and for power plant workers. It will also be 
seen that these "flexibility" strategies also introduced a number of other 
practices which directly affect rules for mobility among positions and which are 
used in the struggle over the conversion of labor power to labor. 
Practices Which Affect the Construction of the Internal 
Labor Market at the Work Group Level 
As one turns to the work group to explore practices which affect the 
internal labor market and how it works, one can identify practices which work on 
the value Of positions, the number and distribution of positions, converting labor 
power into labor, the externalities of family life and safety, rules for mobility, and 
the ability to exit the organization to another opportunity. 
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Practices Which Work on the Value of a Position 
With respect to the value of positions, it has already need noted that the 
utility board works on rates with market studies and that this encourages the 
adoption of such methods by managers. With this method, positions which are 
not in the labor contract are evaluated with respect to whether they fall in the 
first, second, third, or fourth quartile of wages of positions deemed to be similar. 
If positions fall in the first or second quartile, the percent of wage increase is 
likely to be highest in order to move those workers toward the mean. If positions 
fall in the third or fourth quartile, the percentage of increase is likely to be 
marginal to none in order to slow the movement of the salaries of these workers 
away from the mean. 
Most nonunion positions in the company fall below wages for 
comparable union positions. Thus, nonunion workers have tended to receive 
larger percent increases than those negotiated in the contract by the union. 
Furthermore, since union workers make salaries in the upper quartiles, 
managers are putting back pressure on union wages. 
Union members use a different scheme in evaluating the "fairness" and 
"reasonableness" of wage adjustments. Interviews with both managers and 
union members reveal that a "fair" and "reasonable" wage adjustment is a 
common percent change across the board. Union flyers compare the small 
percent raise being offered by management while managers are giving 
themselves larger increases and claim that the union workers are being treated 
unfairly. Union members look at the larger percentage raises given to nonunion 
members and feel that they have been given "a slap in the face" for being union 
members. 
A different criterion of "fair" and "reasonable" was offered by supervisors 
who were told that the market type study indicated that they should not receive a 
very large raise. The supervisors who used this criterion made the following 
argument: The company's prices for electricity are among the lowest in the 
nation. The employee to customer ratio is the lowest in the region. The stock 
price has been going up. Yet, the market study tells us we are over paid. The 
union is being told the same thing. Why should not we also get a share of the 
profit? What is wrong with both employees and stockholders both winning? 
Here, rather than using a straight percent increase as a standard of "fair" and 
"reasonable," they made a judgment based on the company objectives laid out 
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by the executive level of the company: low prices, low employee to customer 
ratio, and increasing stock price. Since the company seemed successful by 
those standards, it seemed "unreasonable" and "unfair" to have a market study 
device which moves everyone marginally upward toward a common mean 
dictate salary adjustments in the face of corporate success. 
In the nonunionized arena, there appeared to be something of an 
additional merit raise system which works on the individual. There were two 
practices found which seemed to militate against assigning a wage to a worker 
different from workers in similar positions. First, one worker interviewed got a 
merit raise. A person who had been in a comparable position for a longer 
period of time did not get a merit raise. The worker pointed out that this caused 
jealousy which interfered with relating and work. "I caught the spur from her." 
So, rather than deal with anger set up by differential treatment, it is easier for 
managers to give everyone the same raise. Additionally, merit raises make it 
problematic to stay within the parameters of the budget for a department. So, as 
one worker put it, 'They give you an 'average' rating." If managers give one a 
below average rating, they are required to discipline a worker. That can create 
hard feelings. If managers give one superior ratings, they are required to give a 
worker a raise. This is hard to justify to upper managers, affects the budget, and 
creates jealousy. So, workers just get average ratings. 
In addition to the different practices used to construct different reasons for 
valuing positions and occupants of positions, labor relations practices work on 
the value of positions. The labor contract specifies certain wages for certain 
positions. The journeyman lineman is basically at the top of the ladder of pay, 
promotion, and seniority for union workers. By having the wage structure of 
union and nonunion classified personnel pegged to the union position, it makes 
union negotiations a key place for holding the general wage structure for 
classified personnel in check. 
Several practices adopted by the company have worked on the 
perception of union members with respect to how far and hard they can push a 
bargaining position. First, by outsourcing significant portions of power plant 
maintenance and line work, the company has built a large alternative work force 
which could be used by the company to weather a strike. Second, supervisors 
are always reminding union workers that the value of doing work with union 
workers is always being compared to the value of doing work with contractors. 
If their wages get too high, they will not be competitive. This ruse is not used as 
136 
much with nonunion employees. Third, the company and the union have 
become less willing to modify their positions. This pushes negotiations into 
more sessions over longer periods of time. The company has more economic 
resources to play out this game than does the union. This favors the company 
in obtaining its objective to hold back labor costs. 
In addition to practices adopted by the company, external labor market 
factors give workers who are laid off, fired, or quit fewer options to exit. As noted 
earlier, the proportion of manufacturing jobs in the main metropolitan area 
served by the company under study decreased from 20.9 percent of jobs to 18.4 
percent of jobs between 1980 and 1990. During the same period, the percent 
of construction jobs dropped from 5.6 percent of jobs to 3. 7 percent. The overall 
loss of jobs for persons who were thirty-five to forty-five years of age in 1990 --
the age of most union members -- was so severe that the main metropolitan 
area served by the company lost over four percent of this age cohort in net 
migration between 1980 and 1990. Union members perceive that their ability to 
exit to another job which would support the financial and family obligations of a 
person earning union wages with high seniority had significantly decreased. 
These conditions also increase the company's ability to push for concessions. 
As one manager exclaimed, "Let them work for Wal-Mart!" 
While these practices and conditions have improved the ability of the 
company to hold the union in check in terms of negotiations, the union has 
engaged in more organizing efforts with other groups in the company such as 
customer service representatives and vehicle mechanics. While these groups 
have not voted to go union, they have used the threat of unionization to improve 
wages and working conditions. Some of the larger increases in wages have 
been given to groups who were targets of unionization. On the worker's side, 
several persons interviewed indicated that workers intentionally left union 
materials lying around to worry managers. Managers indicated that higher 
raises than normal and modifications in authoritarian supervisory practices 
were implemented in some of these groups to keep them from unionizing. It 
seems that the groups that have the best ability to use the union to enhance the 
wages of their positions are workers who use the union as a threat but are 
themselves not unionized. 
Finally, there is a class of practices which work on the value of all 
positions regardless of the position or its occupant: benefits. Benefits are not a 
part of the labor contract in the company studied even though the union had 
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periodically tried to get them included in the contract. As noted earlier, 
managers claim that this allows them to act unilaterally to control this particular 
type of wage. 
There are several factors which make benefits problematic for managers 
who are trying to hold costs down. First, the costs of health care are increasing 
faster than other sectors of the economy. Second, the average age of the 
company's work force is increasing as the baby boomers work their way into 
middle age. This increases the cost of health care. Third, the new Financial 
Accounting Standard (FAS) 106 required that health benefits for retirees --
which had been fully paid by the company -- must now be funded as the benefit 
is obligated rather than as it is collected. The company has dealt with these 
increases by loading portions of increases in health costs on workers. As 
workers get raises, they also have the amount they must pay for insurance 
increase. The first response to FAS 106 was to require newly retiring 
employees to pay over $1,000 per year for insurance that had been provided to 
retirees for free. 
Even though managers have the right to unilaterally decide about this 
issue, employees did seem to have ways of working on the decision. 
Employees responded to announced cuts in retiree benefits with numerous 
calls of complaint. One human resources managers said that she had received 
more calls over this issue than any other issue during her tenure. There 
seemed to be concern on the part of some managers over this response from 
workers. It is important to note that managers do not respond to complaints 
uniformly. Managers discount complaints if they are seen as simply 
encouraged by the union. They also discount complaints if they are few in 
number or if they come from persons labeled as troublemakers or 
unreasonable. Such discounting inhibits concerns from being taken as real 
employee concerns. Finally, friendship with upper managers seems to be a tool 
that a worker can use in dealing with attempts by other managers to discount 
claims with respect to benefits. For example, one worker had a heart attack and 
was applying for disability. The human resources department resisted granting 
the disability. The worker called an upper manager with whom he had a 
relationship. The manager promised him the disability, and he was granted the 
disability. 
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Practices Which Work on the Number and Distribution of Positions 
Both changes in technologies and changes in methods of organizing 
have an effect on the number and distribution of positions in the company 
studied. A glance at the interviews reveals that the shift from A-frame to bucket 
truck technology made it possible to reduce the size of a line crew from five to 
three linemen. One manager pointed out that, if the company would use 
standardized fiberglass poles, the company could work with a line crew of one. 
Power plants are continually designed and updated with more automated 
systems requiring fewer people to control the plant. Plants in the 1950s 
required the hand operation of valves and switches located all over a plant. 
With automation and new control technologies, a plant operating with two units 
in the 1950s operated with three units in 1990 with 190 percent more 
generation capacity and with thirty-six percent fewer employees. 
Numerous organizational strategies have had an effect on the number 
and distribution of positions. In more rural areas, line crews were based in 
towns in the early 1970s. During the 1970s and 1980s, the number of line 
crews were decreased and centralized. Single servicemen were left in many of 
the small towns. This configuration enabled the company to recombine crews 
as needed to do work that required a full line crew. When line crews were 
dispersed, one could have several crews with less than a full complement of 
workers on any one day. This would prohibit them from doing certain work. 
They may also have less than a full day of work that needed to be done. But, 
with centralized crews and with local servicemen, it is almost always possible to 
make up a crew, and there is almost always work to do. 
The one organizational practice that had a large impact on decreasing 
the number of workers in line and power generation work during the twenty year 
period explored in this study was outsourcing. When the layoffs and early 
retirements occurred in the mid-1980s, the company employed numerous 
outside contractors to do power plant maintenance and line work as it reduced 
its permanent work force by several hundred positions. Since then, other areas 
of the company have come under consideration for outsourcing. 
Two strategic decisions affected the redistribution of positions at the time 
of the study. First, with the problems that developed with licensing nuclear 
power plants after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, a decision was made 
to shed workers to deal with the millions of dollars spent on the proposed power 
plant which was not in the rate base. The nuclear staff was kept. The work 
force was reduced mainly by decreasing the number of line workers. This 
forced some of the reorganization of line workers to cover work with fewer 
workers. Second, with the company's decision to engage in conservation 
strategies and in strategies to penetrate the heating market, more positions 
were added in these areas. 
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If one examines management studies conducted by the company after 
the layoffs, changes in qualifying procedures for entering craft positions, and the 
implementation of a total quality management program, one can piece together 
further practices which could have an impact on the number and distributions of 
positions in the company. First, as noted earlier, management studies made 
after the layoffs made an issue of craft boundaries and past practices as 
impediments from organizing work to be done more efficiently. The study 
recommended that these boundaries be challenged. Second, the 
implementation of standardized testing programs to admit persons into craft 
apprentice· programs is a part of a larger strategy to create a labor force which is 
flexible and can do many tasks. Here, rather than build separate capacities into 
separate positions such that different positions are needed in any one job, one 
can build capacities into people such that they can do the tasks of many 
positions. This enables a job to be done more quickly with less coordination 
and with fewer people. Third, the company is implementing a total quality 
management program based on the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award. 
Such programs are designed to lower costs, raise revenues, create highly 
satisfied customers, and empower workers. Some of the ways quality programs 
affect productivity are by reducing redundancy in procedures, by reducing the 
need to rework jobs, and by discovering more efficient ways of organizing work. 
These strategies reduce the need for labor over time. All of these tactics work to 
create a universal line worker and a universal mechanic who would not be 
encumbered by the division of labor. Similar results could be achieved by 
redesigning equipment and tasks such that a worker could be trained to work 
on a broader spectrum of problems. 
The main tactic used by the union to work on this scene is rigorously to 
enforce distinctions in what work is appropriate for various job classifications. 
This is practically done by refusing or resisting to do a job if it appears to belong 
to another classification. Also, workers will enforce distinctions with each other 
if one worker feels that another is doing work in her classification. If managers 
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force a worker to do a job, workers grieve the issue toward arbitration. To resist 
the grievance machinery, managers refuse to create job descriptions. Such 
descriptions are too easily used to define what is and is not one's work. Since 
the company participated in studies used to validate tests to be used in the 
selection of personnel, a definition of critical behaviors and -- in effect -- a job 
description must exist for the testing technology to work. Many analogies of 
distrust found among managers are built around this practice. For example, if a 
worker claims that a safety problem is created by the small size of a line crew, 
managers claim that they cannot trust that union members are not just trying to 
increase jobs for them. 
Practices Which Work on Converting Labor Power into Labor 
As Edwards (1984) has noted, the problem of management is the 
problem of converting labor power into labor. This problematic is fundamentally 
set up by paying a worker a wage for time rather than for a finished product. If 
managers can get more labor power converted into labor with a fixed cost per 
unit of time for wages, they can increase their profits. This also sets up a place 
for workers to work on management by increasing the amount of time it takes to 
do a job. To work on converting labor power into labor, Edwards (1984) 
observes that managers must direct work, evaluate workers, and reward and 
punish workers. 
A number of practices work on the direction of work. The direction of 
work in the construction of new equipment begins as engineers and planners 
outline schematics and specifications for a job. Equipment used to do a job --
such as a bucket truck or an A-frame truck -- makes certain ways of working 
possible and other ways problematic. Since most union positions in the 
company studied are craft positions, methods of work are embedded both in the 
apprentice program and in the work practices of journeymen. These set up 
certain ways of working. If a piece of equipment needs to be repaired, manuals 
are consulted if the equipment is not familiar. So, equipment manuals direct 
work. In craft areas, little actual hands-on supervision of work by managers took 
place. Managers tended to work on directing work by simply assigning jobs 
and by getting reports on work in progress. Periodically, the progress of work 
might be inspected. But work itself was seldom inspected. Foremen and 
workers usually conducted a "tailgate" session in which they discuss how a job 
will be done and which persons will do which jobs. 
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Occasionally, a supervisor was found who would direct work by 
"showing" and by close supervision. These supervisors tended to be resented 
by workers. Workers tended to report that such tactics implied that workers 
either were incompetent or could not be trusted. To get back at such 
supervisors, workers would engage in such tactics as extending lunch breaks, 
extending coffee breaks, and slowing the work process. These tactics, in turn, 
angered supervisors and encourage them not to trust their workers. They would 
often respond by increasing efforts to "catch" workers in such acts. 
Most work done by craft workers is not easily amenable to scientific 
management techniques because such work involves repair or construction 
work in which different factors are present in each job. It is only possible to 
apply scientific management when one can break a standardized, repetitive job 
into its component parts. Thus, evaluation of work itself can only be conducted 
in rough parameters. A job seems to take too long or it does not. A job costs 
more than is expected in terms of parts and equipment or it does not. When the 
job is completed, things work or they do not. Since the actual efficiency of the 
work itself is difficult to evaluate, non-work factors which add to the time it takes 
to do a job become the focus of evaluation. Workers spend too much time 
talking, too much time getting to the job site, too much time loafing on the job, 
too much time on a break or a meal, too much time cleaning up, and too much 
time getting ready to leave for the work site. Again, these actions would not be 
problematic if the payment for work was for work completed rather than for time 
and if the timeliness of work competition was not a problem. 
Much of the day to day effort of managers to improve the conversion of 
labor power into labor is built around the time issue. First, practices are applied 
to keep workers on a time frame. Workers are reminded if they are slow in 
leaving for a job site or if they return too soon. Before a lunch period is over, 
managers will remind workers that the lunch period is almost over. Breaks are 
treated in a similar way. Managers make surprise visits to work sites and listen 
to radio transmissions to determine if workers are working or loafing. 
Second, managers work on practices that involve time which is paid for 
but not worked on a specific job. For example, a clause was put in the labor 
contract to specify when workers are relieved for meals when kept past their 
normal quitting time on overtime. This was put in the contract during a time 
period when the company required little overtime because of short staffing. 
Now, managers would like to move the meal time to the end of the overtime 
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period even if it required workers to work two or more hours beyond normal 
quitting time. This would, in effect, extend the work day by two or more hours 
and allow certain jobs to be completed. If the meal is taken during the overtime 
period, it increases the amount of clean-up and start-up time since the 
interruption of the meal would add a clean-up and start-up time to the normal 
flow. Workers resist this move. They point out that the meal clause was not 
designed to move to a ten-hour work day. It was designed to deal with call-outs. 
They also evoke analogies of distrust with respect to layoffs and claim that this 
would just give the company an excuse to lay off more workers. Managers 
evoke analogies of distrust in response. They believe that the union just wants 
to make more work and get more overtime. 
Third, the very act of decreasing the size of the labor force without 
decreasing the amount of work to be done forces workers and managers to 
handle more work. As several managers noted, "They now have a full plate." 
While this practice encourages overtime, budgets are used to put back pressure 
on the use of overtime. In fact, breaking the budget seemed to be one event 
which drew negative attention to a manager from a superior. Again, this is not a 
refined technique for examining productivity. It is a gross technique that 
measures costs only against a budgeted amount. 
In addition to time as a substance to work on to increase productivity, an 
examination of training manuals used to teach supervisors procedures for 
evaluating work and for punishing poor performance reveals another set of 
substances on which managers work with respect to workers. Initially, the 
procedures look like they might actually work on work. The manual states that 
all that is necessary to justify job performance counseling is the ability to show a 
difference between job performance standards and the employee's present 
performance. Yet, how is a job performance standard to be established? The 
manual is relatively silent on the matter. It simply applies the rule of the 
reasonable person from law: 
What reasonable men, mindful of the habits and the customs of industrial 
life and the standards of justice and fair dealing prevalent in the 
community, ought to have done under similar circumstances .... 
The company is unwilling to spell out expected behavior in a job description 
because to do so would limit the right of unilateral action of managers. So, the 
argument is thrown back on past practice. At the same time, the very same 
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manual schools supervisors in tactics to keep from creating evidence which 
could be used to establish a past practice. This makes it very difficult for 
evaluation beyond informal evaluation to take place. Once evaluation moves 
toward corrective action and punishment, the necessary tools to establish a job 
performance standard and grounds for punishment are extremely difficult to 
establish. 
It is little wonder that the evaluation and corrective action process works 
on substances which are not directly related to productivity: insubordination, 
severe safety violations, fighting, alcohol or drug misconduct, violations of 
procedural requirements, violations of the no strike-no interference covenant, 
etc. These are items that can be and are stipulated. Thus, they can be 
determined. While they do not work directly on converting labor power into 
labor, they do work on establishing and maintaining a particular type of 
relationship between workers and managers. 
The final set of tactics used to work on converting labor power to labor 
involves the use of contractors. First, one can find numerous accounts and 
observations in which workers are threatened with having their work contracted 
out if they cannot do the work quickly and cheaply. As noted earlier, these 
tactics reenact the layoff of the 1980s in which more contractors were being 
used as workers were laid off. It evokes analogies of distrust, fear, and anger 
with workers. As several managers noted, "It might affect morale, but it lets them 
know that there is an alternative." 
Second, contractors are used to substitute for failed supervision. It might 
be difficult to supervise employees. Or a particular job might be particularly 
difficult. So, a supervisor decides to use contractors rather than face the 
problems. Contractors come with built-in supervisors who work at converting 
labor power into labor with a different game. Contractors have a firm bid. So, 
they push foremen to be productive, and foremen push workers to be 
productive. 
Third, as noted earlier, it is difficult to discipline workers with respect to 
productivity. It is also difficult to fire workers without breaches of rules not 
related to productivity. Large scale layoffs are problematic to the morale of the 
whole company and are hard to justify when profits are being made. So, work 
is reorganized or contracts are let for a new set of services such that a whole 
work group can be laid off. After a several month waiting period, the labor 
contract no longer requires the company to hire back based on seniority. So, 
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the company can hire back whom they will. While company senior executives 
suggested this as a tactic that is used in other industries, they claimed that they 
did not use this tactic. Yet, several persons interviewed pointed out that the 
company did not recall until after the waiting period and that select persons 
were hired back. 
Contractors are not without their problems to management. While they 
do come with a fixed cost for a job, the value of the work is complicated by the 
quality of work. Both supervisors and workers complained about the quality of 
some contract work. A management study was done which found that work 
completed was not closely monitored to see that it was done to specifications. 
Furthermore, there are other factors which complicate the comparability of the 
cost of a job done internally with a job done by a contractor. Are workers hired 
by a contractor the same quality as those internal to the company? Work done 
by company employees is often interrupted with higher priority work. A 
contractor can work a job completely through from start to finish. Contractors 
sometimes use company equipment and supplies without factoring such use 
into the cost comparison. Finally, there were instances of sole source vendors. 
Here, the real value of using contractors to bid against each others as well as 
against internal workers in order to drive down the cost of a job is minimized if 
not lost. 
Union workers also have a set of tactics to negatively work on the 
conversion of labor power to labor. If one examines the notes on interviews and 
observations, almost all of the description of tactics to be described are 
accompanied with accounts of motives of anger over how they, fellow workers, 
or the union has been treated. The resistance to management tends to happen 
around time and work rules. These are precisely where the workers could do 
damage without flagrantly breaking rules which would result in disciplinary 
action. So, lunch hours and breaks are marginally extended to slow down work 
to get back at managers. Managers want workers to be close to a phone during 
off hours without being paid stand-by pay. Workers do not want to flagrantly 
disobey. So, they buy answering machines to screen calls. These tactics do 
not add to the wages of the worker. They only add to the costs of the product or 
service. 
Analogies of distrust used by managers often focus precisely on this type 
of behavior. This helps to set up scenes in which managers get angry with all 
workers -- both offenders and nonoffenders. As noted earlier, this angers 
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workers and is met with the assessment that managers do not trust them. In 
turn, this encourages workers to engage in more of the offending behavior to 
get back at the manager. Human resources personnel have devised several 
strategies to intervene in this set of mutually reinforcing practices. Managers 
are taught to specifically deal with specific individuals and specific behavior. 
They are trained in problem solving and active listening skills to get the worker 
to make an object of their own behavior from the point of view of the manager. 
For example, a worker was asked to pretend that she was the manager and the 
manager was the worker. Then, the manager played out the role of the worker 
and tried to get the worker to see what she saw in the worker. While these 
tactics seemed to meet with some success, some workers began to see them as 
simply ruses to reduce anger without really dealing with issues. One could find 
analogies of distrust build around several of these practices. As noted earlier, a 
worker commented that, "when you hear, 'I hear you, I share your concern, and 
let me see-what can be done about it,' you know that your concern has just 
been dismissed." 
Practices That Work on the Externalities of Family Life and Safety 
A number of practices which work on converting labor power to labor 
also involve the creation of negative externalities for workers. Specifically, a 
number of practices increase the problematic nature of family life for workers 
and increase the chance of accidents. These are externalities in that these 
costs are not made explicit by any practice even though the problematic nature 
of the practice is identified by the worker. 
The main practices which negatively affect family life are shift work, 
overtime, and threatening job security. As one worker noted, "normal family life 
is based on an 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. job, five days a week." To be able to use fewer 
workers to cover more shifts, the company wants to change some workers from 
shift to shift with little notice. To be able to handle emergencies with minimum 
staffing and costs, the company wants workers to be near a phone and 
available for call out without paying stand-by wages. To be able to maintain 
minimum staff, more overtime is required. To put pressure on workers to work 
faster with less dead time and to demand less wages, they are threatened with 
having their work contracted out such that their positions will no longer be 
needed. 
One can find several descriptions from workers and supervisors on the 
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effects of these practices. Divorces have become more common place as 
workers cannot move out of shift work and as shift work becomes more erratic. 
Deposits on vacations have been lost because of last minute schedule 
changes. The opportunity to participate in the school and athletic activities of 
children is impaired. More family responsibilities are loaded on the spouse who 
does not work changing shifts. Long term economic commitments associated 
with purchasing homes or cars are more carefully considered as jobs are 
threatened. As noted earlier, workers were somewhat willing to tolerate these 
negative externalities if they could see some point in the future when they would 
be relieved of them. But, with the changes in practices affecting their mobility 
within the company and with increasing externalities with new practices aimed 
at increasing productivity, such willingness is growing thin. 
Again, the union works on these conditions by grieving changes in shift 
assignment procedures, by trying to change the procedures in the contract, and 
by making such changes costly in terms of overtime. Since the budget is one of 
the principal tools used by the company to assess such matters, its tactics are 
directly aimed at the budget. Managers who had experienced shift work tended 
to by sympathetic to the situation of workers set up by the new practices. Others 
were much less sympathetic and pointed out that such workers knew the 
conditions of employment when they took the job. But, as has been 
documented, such conditions changed. 
There are several practices which seemed to decrease explicit costs to 
the company while increasing risks as perceived by workers. Several workers 
and managers described how extended overtime increases fatigue and the 
chance that an accident could happen. As managers attempt to use workers 
more universally, several incidents were found in which workers unfamiliar with 
the operation of equipment in extreme situation increased the chance of an 
accident by operating the equipment in extreme situations. Accounts were 
found in which workers encountered equipment which they felt was dangerous 
because of its age and disrepair. Some instances were found in which such 
dangerous equipment situations were corrected as a strategy to get workers to 
modify work practices. Other times, new configurations of equipment were 
being proposed which workers felt were unsafe and which reduced the number 
of workers required to work a job. Managers countered with new procedures to 
work on the equipment which they claimed were safe. Accounts were found of 
managers passing a dangerous job from work group to work group until one 
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could be found to do the job. As noted earlier, if workers did not complete a job 
because they deemed it to be too dangerous, incidents were found in which 
supervisors would question the workers as to why they could not complete the 
job. With the threats to employment implicit in contractors and often made 
explicit by threats of outsourcing work, workers are encouraged to take short 
cuts that might not be safe. Finally, one situation was observed in which a 
group of managers discussed how to get union workers to do a job that they 
knew violated Occupational Safety and Health standards. It would have been 
very expensive to have done the job by the standards. 
It should be noted that company safety manuals encouraged work to be 
done safely even at the expense of productivity. Safety meetings were 
systematically held. Senior executives attended these safety meetings and 
encouraged local managers to listen to safety concerns. Yet, if one examines 
every day interactions, such safety meetings often involve resistance to safety 
issues by managers if the resolution of the issue involves costs. While practices 
which focus on safety are periodic events, practices which focus on limiting 
costs and increasing productivity are focused on every day. The priority of 
practice among managers was reflected in the company wide survey when 
managers emphasized productivity more than safety. 
The union tried to address safety issues by getting the company to agree 
to a joint safety committee with equal numbers of management and union 
appointees. This arrangement is used with the committee which conducts the 
line workers apprentice program. Managers resisted this proposal. Managers 
claimed that they must have control since they have the legal responsibility for 
accidents. If one examines the interviews and observations, managers usually 
evoke analogies of distrust with respect to safety issues raised by union 
members. Many safety issues are raised around the issue of the size of a work 
crew. Managers do not trust that the safety issues are real. In this analogy of 
distrust, the issue of productivity and cost containment overrides a concern for 
safety. 
Practices That Work on Mobility 
If one examines the interviews and documents, one finds a number of 
practices that are used to circulate workers among positions. Some are a part 
of the labor contract and others are not. Different practices put different parties 
in the position to work on defining persons as qualified for positions or not. 
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Different practices use different techniques for qualifying persons at different 
places on the job ladder. The job ladder itself is part of a practice of training 
and qualifying. Some practices utilize work itself to qualify persons for 
positions. Other practices utilize extra-work education in schools to qualify 
persons for positions. Some practices work on persons as they move from 
position to position. Others relate a terminal position to a beginning position. 
in the labor contract, different positions are strung together in a line of 
training progression and wage increases for different craft skills. In each 
position, one learns the requisite skills for future positions while engaging the 
work and training required in a current position. Most job classifications are 
broken up into steps based on time in the classification and on skills learned 
during the period. For example, if one examines the apprenticeship standard 
for electrical line workers -- the most formalized training program among the 
crafts in the company studied -- the apprenticeship program is spread over four 
years. Wages increase each year until one reaches the journeyman level. A 
specific number of hours of training are to be covered in specific areas of skill in 
specific time periods. Each year, a committee made up of equal number of 
union and management representatives judge whether or not an apprentice 
has made adequate progress. 
If one returns to the labor contract, one finds a specific practice set out for 
promotion to another job classification. First, employees must have suitable 
qualifications. Second, the worker with the most seniority among those 
qualified is to be promoted to the next higher classification. Qualifications of the 
employees are to be determined by the company and the representative of the 
union. However, if one switches back to the apprenticeship standards for 
electrical line workers, one can find the specification of a practice which puts 
management in the position of establishing the qualifications which are first 
used to screen applicants. Specifically, management first selects applicants for 
the pre-apprentice school. Then, a committee made up of equal number of 
company and union representatives judge the qualify of applicants as a result of 
their performance in the pre-apprentice school. 
One can find a multitude of practices used by managers to first select 
applicants. Historically, seniority was one of the principal practices used by 
managers to determine the most qualified person for positions in both union 
and non-union areas and for both classified and managerial positions. 
Additionally, one can find personal relations, reputation, risk management, and 
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union resistance as other practices for establishing qualifications. For example, 
one manager pointed out how qualified people would be eliminated from 
consideration because they were associated with a work location or a network 
of people who had a bad reputation. With respect to risk management, one 
manager chose to offer a position to one person whom she had interviewed and 
knew rather than open the position to other applicants because the person 
hired was a know and acceptable quantity to the manager. While other 
applicants might be more qualified, they were unknown quantities to the 
manager. Another risk management strategy for selecting staff was to hire a 
person as a temporary employee. If the employee worked out in the actual work 
situation, they were offered a permanent position. In both of these risk reducing 
strategies, qualifications were established by job performance itself as judged 
by the supervisor. Finally, effective union leaders would be promoted to get 
them out of the bargaining unit. 
The most important changes in practices used by managers to qualify 
persons for positions was the institution of a testing program for entering craft 
lines of progression and the establishment of higher education requirements 
and personality testing for entering management lines of progression. The 
testing program modified the practice for constituting a qualified person for a 
position in a number of ways. First, the party determining who is qualified with 
the testing program is the human resources staff. Historically, this determination 
was made by the immediate supervisor and manager alone. While immediate 
supervisors still made final determinations for hiring or promoting persons, the 
test was used as a required screening device. If it was not passed, a person 
was not qualified. During this study, several managers found themselves in the 
position of selecting a person as qualified based on their interviews and criteria 
only to find their selection overturned by the testing program. 
Second, practices used by managers are based on assessing actual 
performance demonstrated by a worker as judged by either first hand 
experience or by reputation. Practices used in the testing program are 
designed to predict a future rather than a demonstrated work outcome based on 
a non-work performance such as a pencil and paper achievement, aptitude, 
intelligence, or personality test. Such testing programs begin by analyzing jobs 
for critical components and adequate performance standards as judged by 
some segment of management. They use these criteria to determine good 
workers.and problematic workers who currently hold positions for which testing 
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is to be developed. Then, tests are administered to determine which testing 
elements can distinguish between workers judged to be good and workers 
judged to be problematic. These tests are then used to admit persons to those 
job ladders on the basis that such testing predicts a final outcome. 
Third, testing is combined with a different strategy for correcting 
inadequacies. If the pencil and paper test is failed, workers are encouraged to 
attend remedial class work to prepare them to retake the failed test. This 
remediation process is usually the responsibility of the worker and is usually 
done outside of the work context. It should be noted that the company did pay 
for educational courses. If a person is not qualified through demonstrated work, 
they must continue in the work until they learn it well enough to qualify. Here, 
no extra responsibility or time commitments outside of work are involved. 
If the testing program put a hurdle in front of workers to enter craft lines of 
progression, the establishment of college degree requirements put a wall in the 
way of being promoted out of the ranks of workers. This requirement devalues 
work experience and values classroom learning in its place. While a worker 
could go to college and be paid by the company to do so, it is a difficult and 
lengthily task to accomplish while one is working full time and raising a family. If 
one is engaged in shift work when shifts rotate frequently, it is all put impossible 
to take college classes. Yet, a person who went through college and never 
worked a day in a craft could be hired to supervise craft workers. With this act, 
the company bifurcated the internal labor market. 
At the same time, this bifurcation opens the supervisory labor market. 
Before, one could become a supervisor only by working her way up the ranks 
beginning with entry work positions. Thus, only a few people with seniority 
could qualify for supervisory positions. When workers were promoted on the 
basis of seniority and from the work group itself, the market for a supervisory 
position with such qualifications was one: the person with the most seniority in 
the work group. This promotion practice would probably discourage college 
educated persons from entering the company. Many college educated persons 
may not be willing to spend ten years as a worker to reach their goal when they 
could hire on with another company as a supervisor and do so right out of 
college. College graduates have been worked on in college by practices of 
testing to demonstrate skill. Craft programs tend to be based on demonstrated 
skill and on proficiency. With enough time, most people can reach proficiency. 
On the other hand, college grades tend to be based on one-time, all-or-nothing 
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exams. This might also tend to discourage college graduates from working their 
way through the ranks to supervisory position. 
Within the ranks of management, another practice was instituted which 
again bifurcated the management labor market. Beginning a few years before 
this study, the parent company began to replace senior management with 
managers from other companies which the parent company owned. Before this 
practice was instituted, promotions had been made from within the company. 
Many of the managers who would have been moved up were moved up in a 
different company that the parent company owned. This would indicate that the 
parent company rather than the executive level of the company being studied 
established qualifications and chose managers to fill positions. So, there 
seemed to be a change in practice of who selects upper managers and of 
qualificatio_ns: One must change companies owned by the parent company to 
qualify for an upper management position. 
Whereas the company had a ladder of progression that would literally 
allow a worker to work their way from the lowest job to the president of the 
company, the new systems of qualifications encourage workers to stay in their 
current levels. If one wants to change lines of progression or work locations, 
one probably has to take a test. If one wants to be a supervisor, one has to go 
to college while working and maintaining a household. If one wants to move 
into upper management, one must be willing to relocate to a different company 
owned by the parent company. 
As with other changes in practices, one can find numerous analogies of 
distrust and accounts of anger related to these mobility limiting practices. 
Several workers were chosen for a position only to be foiled by a test. 
Managers interviewed considered many of them to be good workers who were 
loyal employees. Now, they no longer feel loyalty toward the company and 
harbor anger. Most accounts of anger include the test itself and how specific 
individuals used it to deny the worker a promotion or engage in perceived 
deceit about how the test was used. Workers who looked forward to a possible 
supervisory position and were now blocked by the college requirement 
indicated that they would do the minimum job and bide their time since there 
was nothing to which one could look forward. Middle aged workers working 
shift work or physically taxing jobs now see no exit from what is becoming a 
problematic existence. 
The company responds to these concerns by· providing rationales for why 
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an educated work force is necessary to try to get workers to see the legitimacy 
of their actions. They also train workers in problem solving tactics to help 
workers cope with the new conditions. Finally, they offer resources so workers 
can take classes on their own time to try to qualify for new positions. Workers 




Three principal practices were used by management to construct 
relationships with workers: (1) management rights, (2) command, and (3) 
punishment. 
As an overview before turning to a more detailed analysis, management 
rights are practices used to establish and reinforce who may set up a line of 
action rather than what line of action is set up. Management rights practices 
allow managers to take unilateral action on any matter not limited by such 
devices as the labor contract, labor law, or policy and procedures that the 
company has established. It will be seen that unilateral action from the 
perspective of a person affected by the action often appears as arbitrary action. 
A number of practices that aggravate or ameliorate the appearance of the 
arbitrary wHI be explored. Finally, participatory practices that develop at the 
edge of the practice of management rights will be explored. 
Command refers to strategies by which managers direct work. These 
techniques vary with respect to how they elaborate and direct action. Here, the 
practices of command, role taking, technological control, surveillance, 
evaluation, hierarchy, responsibility and accountability, rules and regulations, 
and training will be explored. 
Next, strategies used to evaluate and to deal with the problematic will be 
explored. Here, punishment refers to a complex of practices borrowed from the 
court scene to gather evidence, gain confessions, assign guilt, and punish 
offenders. Specifically, the use of the practices of responsibility and 
punishment will be explored to see how they make the person rather than work 
itself the problem when things become problematic. 
Finally, several management practices explored in this chapter were 
problematic because they contained elements which were common to several 
practices that either set up conflicting lines of action or posited and worked on 
different substances. Some of these dually embedded elements of practices 
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will be analyzed. 
Management Rights 
Management rights are practices that establish a fundamental asymmetry 
between the owners and managers of a company and its workers. They 
fundamentally work on who may set up a line of action. Law is the principal 
practice used to establish management rights. It is in labor law (Gold, 1989), in 
the labor contract between the company and the union in this study, and in 
training manuals used to train supervisors that the doctrine of management 
rights gives managers the right to take unilateral action in the management of 
the business organization. Management rights are set up in the grievance 
process: managers act and workers work and then grieve the action. Here, 
managers are the party setting up the line of action. The grievance proceeds up 
the chain of command of management. This reinforces management again as 
the party setting up the line of action. 
Though law fundamentally establishes managers as the party who can 
take unilateral action, law also establishes other parties who can limit such 
unilateral action. Laws such as utility regulation, environmental regulation, 
health and safety regulation, civil rights, and labor law all limit unilateral action. 
With respect to labor law (Gold, 1989), managers are required to negotiate over 
wages, hours, and working conditions in good faith. But, they are not required 
to accept any item set forth by the union. While grievance procedures must be 
followed during a contract, managers can continue to find no violation of the 
contract and force a grievance to arbitration. Even though there is an avenue 
for workers through the union to resist the unilateral action of managers, the 
rights and procedures tend to favor management rights by giving them priority to 
establish the situation. 
While law sets up the fundamental asymmetry between managers and 
workers with respect to initiating action, managers use numerous practices to 
continually reinforce themselves as the locus of decision and action. In this 
section, tactics which use appeals to management rights or which cut off or 
divert competing lines of action to enable managers to take unilateral action will 
be explored. Unilateral action, by nature of being unilateral, has the ability to 
appear arbitrary. Practices that aggravate the appearance of the arbitrary will 
be explored. Managers use tactics to ameliorate the appearance of the 
arbitrary to appeal to workers to accept their unilaterally taken action. These 
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practices will be examined. Finally, participatory practices that develop at the 
edge of the practice of management rights will be explored. 
The Use of Appeals to Management Rights to Take Unilateral Action 
If one examines the notes on interviews and observations, one can find 
several instances in which managers appeal to management rights to limit the 
ability of workers and lower managers to set up their own line of actions. 
First, such appeals are used as a criterion in the development of policies, 
procedures, and programs. For example, in one interview, a person described 
how the company initiated the development of a participative management plan 
because it was felt that "ownership in decisions" is better if workers are a part of 
decision making, especially since workers are closer to the actual outcomes 
and situations being decided. This proposal was greeted with a cry from 
management that the actual decision is management's responsibility. Thus, a 
definition of participation was worked out which put ultimate decisions in 
management. As a consequence, one finds the slogan indicating that 
participation means having a voice but not a vote. And one finds a practice of 
soliciting ideas, concerns, and possible solutions from workers followed by 
referring the decision up the organization for a decision. In a similar way, a 
senior executive pointed out that training was being used to teach managers 
proper procedures and participative management styles because "it's not your 
liberty to decide how to relate." In yet another instance one manager wanted to 
modify management rights to give workers more say in how work was done. 
She was reminded that, if the company did that, there would come a time when 
managers would have no right to say. 
Second, appeals to management rights are used as part of a command 
to close off appeals or discussion of the command. For example, a study done 
by lower level supervisors in one location described how the more senior 
managers were friendly and open when dealing with non work related activities. 
But, when it came time to deal with work, they became autocratic, reduced 
communications, and issued orders. Once the work was over, they would again 
become open. ,In another instance, one found that managers issued decisions 
with the instructions, "Here is what we are going to do and why, but we aren't 
going to discuss the decision." 
Third, appeals to management rights are used as an argument of last 
resort when discussions of issues are not leading to a decision which the 
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manager wishes to take. One can find numerous accounts in which questions 
or suggested alternative actions raised by workers are eventually met with the 
assertion, "Because I said so." For example, in an account of negotiations in an 
earlier year, a union representative described how they were trying to point out 
areas where the company was -- from their perspective -- wasting money. The 
observation from the union representative was met with an assertion that the 
company had the right to run its business however it wanted. It could throw 
money away if it wanted. 
Techniques for Cutting Off Lines of Action and for Diverting Criticism 
In addition to using direct appeals to management rights to limit the 
ability of workers and lower managers to set up their own line of action, 
managers sometime degraded expressions of concerns and alternatives 
expressed by workers and lower managers as complaining or as 
nonconstructive criticism. For example, several stories were related by workers 
and lower managers in which a worker or lower manager would be sharing a 
concern with a work group. Then, a manager would get up and tell the person 
to stop complaining. As one position paper developed by a group of lower level 
managers noted, managers treat expressions of concerns and alternatives with 
sarcastic mannerisms, short responses with dead pan expressions, threatening 
phraseology, abusive language, and talking down or "preaching." The paper 
went on to describe how the company initiated a type of participative 
management in which a few workers would be put in the position of having to 
participate in a committee or having to give in depth responses to problems. 
Then management would study the issue and make a decision behind closed 
doors. Finally, more meetings would be held with workers to give them a 
chance to respond to the decisions that managers now had made. When 
workers would respond with concerns or alternatives, they could expect a 
response: "Well, you had your chance to speak your piece. So, don't start 
complaining after the fact!" 
A second tactic used to limit the ability of workers to set up their own lines 
of action was active listening. The human resources staff and upper managers 
recognized the problem of hurt feelings and anger evoked by degrading tactics. 
So, they developed training in techniques to allow a worker to express or vent 
concerns while not degrading the worker with abuse and while not 
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relinquishing management control. The previously cited litany -- "I hear you; I 
share your concern; let me see what can be done about the problem" -- allows 
the worker to express a concern, affirms the workers concern as valuable, and 
leaves the resolution of the concern in the hands of management. From the 
perspective of several workers and lower managers interviewed, their concerns 
-- once expressed -- are usually dropped. As one manager stated, "At least they 
can vent their anger." As one worker stated it from a different viewpoint, "It is the 
school of blow off steam." 
A third tactic identified in the interviews and observations of interactions 
was a recognition and affirmation of a concern expressed by a worker followed 
by a redirection by the manager. In one meeting observed, two union members 
were participating in a committee of fourteen persons. The other twelve 
persons were managers. A senior executive was leading the meeting. In one 
instance in this meeting, a concern that was raised twice by a union member 
was ignored by the leader. Later, the union member made another suggestion. 
The executive leading the meeting said, "Good." Then she directed a manager 
to carry out a totally unrelated task and did not return to the suggestion. In a 
different meeting of a work group, a union member raised a policy issue. The 
manager responded by pointing out that everyone had concerns about this 
issue but that their work group could not decide about it. So, the manager 
suggested dealing with the work at hand rather than an issue not appropriate 
for them to decide. In yet another situation, a management trainer who was 
working on a quality management program pointed out that the training team 
listens to union criticisms as a first step. Then, they put those concerns aside 
and work on the quality management process. Finally, a manager wrote a 
memo to a union steward thanking her for her concern and then redirected how 
that concern should procedurally handled in the future. The steward had written 
an open letter to the manager, copied it to the union business agent, and posted 
it in the break room for all workers to see. The grievance procedure referred to 
by the manager required that the steward personally communicate the concern 
with the manager. In all four cases, the concern expressed was affirmed rather 
than punished. The redirection by the manager placed the issue in 
management's hands and out of the hands of the worker or the union. 
While these practices work on cutting off the lines of action being set up 
by workers and lower level managers and on redirecting control to managers in 
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a direct fashion, these practices have an indirect effect on lines of action set up 
by workers and lower managers. Consider the following quote from the 
previously cited position paper developed by some lower managers: 
The typical employee feels that (management) only hears what they want 
to hear and dismisses opinions that are negative or are not easy to 
handle .... Employees have lost the desire to give input to (the 
company) because they have developed the perception that 
Management listens but does not hear. 
This analogy that management listens but does not hear is widely found in the 
interviews of workers and lower managers. The position paper indicates that 
this analogy would discourage employees from giving input. There was 
concern expressed from upper managers that employees were no longer 
participating in the processes designed to elicit information from employees for 
decision making purposes. 
While one might conclude that workers thus stopped trying to influence 
the outcome of management decisions because such input was not perceived 
to be heard, one finds that workers simply developed different and -- from the 
perspective of management -- more troubling tactics. Consider the case cited 
above in which a steward wrote an open letter to a manager over an issue, 
posted it, and sent a copy to the union business agent. According to the labor 
contract and management procedures, she should have taken her concern to 
her manager. The analogy that management listens but does not hear was 
contained in her interview. If one cannot trust managers to hear and act on 
worker concerns in a sympathetic fashion, workers work to find alternative 
methods to influence decisions. 
Unilateral Action and the Appearance of the Arbitrary 
The labeling of a managerial act as arbitrary by workers and the use of 
management rights by managers as a practice of governing are directly linked 
in the unilaterally taken act. If one examines the interviews, one can find 
workers using the term "arbitrary" to describe management decisions and 
actions in five situations. First, managerial acts were labeled as arbitrary by 
workers when workers were not consulted or when their views were not 
incorporated in a decision as they expected them to be. For example, several 
workers pointed out that there had been changes in safety rules and that such 
changes were arbitrary because workers had no say in the changes. In should 
be noted that managers would point out that input was solicited from some 
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workers. But, how this input was used and the decisions with respect to new 
rules was determined by management. Second, managerial acts were labeled 
as arbitrary by workers when the acts seemed to violate the rules that 
management set up for evaluating a situation. For example, workers pointed 
out that the safety manual was developed from accident and near miss reports 
and from federal and state laws. So, when safety rules were modified or 
eliminated, managers appeared to violate the very conditions indicated by the 
accident and near miss reports. Third, managerial acts were labeled as 
arbitrary by workers when explanations were not given for decisions. For 
example, a worker noted that management may be working with information 
that workers do not have about reducing the number of people at a power plant 
to extend the life of the plant. The worker noted that it would help workers 
understand if managers would share the information with workers. Fourth, 
managerial acts were labeled as arbitrary by workers when they were attributed 
to specific managers. One workers described how she and some of her fellow 
workers had calculated that it would be less expensive to leave a work crew 
deployed as it had been before a reorganization. But, she noted, it will not 
change until two specific managers die or leave. Fifth, managerial acts were 
labeled as arbitrary by workers because of the doctrine of management rights 
itself. As one worker noted, "The biggest rub with management is the right they 
have to run the business as they wish in the contract." 
Several managerial practices tend to increase the chance that 
managerial actions will be labeled as arbitrary by workers. First, the practices 
described in an earlier chapter that increase the perception of deception also 
tend to increase the chance that an act will be labeled as arbitrary by workers. 
Centralized control removes decisions further away so workers cannot be easily 
consulted and informed regarding reasons for decisions. Also, when one 
involves different functional departments -- such as accounting and human 
resources -- in the review of local managerial decisions, the reversal of locally 
made decisions by the central office staff tends to increase the chance that 
these decisions will be labeled as arbitrary by workers. 
Second, the practices which seemed to most aggravate the perception of 
the arbitrary nature of managerial decisions were associated with labor 
relations practices which were initiated or intensified in a two year period 
leading up to this study. Rather than discuss and negotiate issues that were 
being contested by union members, labor relations staff would work with 
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managers to formulate a position based on their interpretation of the contract. 
Then, they would announce the decision to the worker and union officials by 
asserting that this is management's position and the reason for it. However, 
they would point out that management does not intend to discuss the decision. 
The union could grieve the decision if it wanted to do so. This practice seemed 
to increase the labeling of managerial decisions as arbitrary by workers. 
Furthermore, rather than recognize various memos and letters as part of the 
labor contract and rather than leave in force informal letters of agreement, the 
company unilaterally canceled over one-hundred such agreements. Finally, a 
management training manual was adopted which instructed managers not to 
create any consistent evidence of a practice which could be used to argue for a 
past practice as the basis for an arbitration case. Both of these practices 
seemed to increase the labeling of managerial decisions as arbitrary by 
workers. 
Tactics to Ameliorate the Appearance of the Arbitrary 
One of the practices instituted by managers to ameliorate the labeling of 
acts as arbitrary was giving reasons for actions being taken. Or as one worker 
observed, "Explaining things so people understand is crucial." 
But, more important than explanation is casting commands as requests. 
By request it is meant that workers are given the opportunity to modify or reject 
the request. Consider the earlier cited example when labor relations staff 
announced a decision, gave an explanation for it in terms of management's 
interpretation of the contract, and concluded by stating that management was 
not open to further discussion. Such acts are usually labeled as arbitrary by 
workers even though they contain explanations. As a counter example, one 
manager described the following strategy: 
We tell workers that we know that this might be against the contract, but 
we need this done. Will you do it? You'll get more cooperation than 
when you just tell them and not recognize the contract. 
Other interviews with lower level managers were found in which similar 
practices of a request associated with a recognition that the request probably 
violated the contract but was needed and why were met with compliance 
without being labeled as being arbitrary or deceptive. 
Another practice to amelioration the labeling of acts as arbitrary is an 
appeal to conditions portrayed as uncontrollable as a reason for an action. The 
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letter which announced the potential layoffs which eventually occurred in the 
mid-1980s was filled with explanations of business conditions and with all 
possible alternatives other than layoffs that had been exhausted to try to deal 
with the business conditions. Thus, the managers of the company were not free 
actors but were themselves being controlled by economic forces. At a work 
group level this tactic can be seen as managers substitute the command of 
higher managers, the constraint of the budget, rules and regulations, 
productivity, work procedures, or the labor contract for unilateral action in 
constructing reasons for actions taken. These practices break down and 
become ineffective if workers are able to either identify the portrayal of the 
uncontrollable as the handy work of a manager or if they could identify other 
alternatives which managers had not considered. For example, a manager 
claimed that her hands were tied with respect to changing a practice unless all 
of the other workers would go along with the change. Workers had seen the 
manager make changes without the approval of all persons in the work group. 
Her condition was seen as arbitrarily imposed. 
Rules, regulations, and work procedures take the place of an actual who 
as well as work on what gets done. As already noted above, such rules were 
labeled as arbitrary when they could be associated with unilateral actions taken 
by management. When the rules and regulations were agreed to and 
recognized as such by both workers and managers, these regulatory devices in 
and of themselves become the who and the what for controlling work. One 
manager described how this practice worked in a way that was found in several 
interviews: 
The union does a lot for me as a manager. There is no argument over 
rules because they are set by the union in the contract. There's no 
personal involvement. I just enforce the contract. There is no arguing 
over what they get paid or the rules. 
In one work group, the work group manager, the work group union steward, and 
the workers would met each year and develop a document which specified how 
issues which emerged during the year would be worked out. In this situation. 
the manager could actually go to the steward and enlist her help in the 
enforcement of the rules. Neither the rules nor the manager was labeled as 
arbitrary by workers. 
As also noted earlier, the centralization of decisions and the consequent 
distance of the decision makers increase the chance that decisions will be 
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labeled as arbitrary by workers. As a part of a program of participatory 
management, the company developed a policy of moving decisions to the 
lowest possible level of management. Yet, as a senior executive noted on 
several occasions, senior management does not want lower level managers to 
take unilateral action. Senior executives want all managers to act uniformly. 
Thus, the company developed and executed extensive training programs for 
lower level managers on how to manage workers to encourage uniform action 
while at the same time encouraging lower level managers to make decisions 
and act. 
As long as lower level managers act consistently with the training and as 
long as their actions do not become problematic to some party, it appears that 
they are making their own decisions. But, once a lower level manager violates 
one of these two conditions, the regulatory nature of the training appears. One 
can find several accounts from workers in which a middle manager encourages 
lower level managers and workers to develop personal, individualized solutions 
to problems with workers. Then, a training program is initiated which 
encourages every lower level manager to do things alike. If the result of the 
training is not satisfactory from the perspective of upper management, it is 
repeated or different training is applied. The uniformity effect of the training was 
recognized by workers. However, it was not labeled as arbitrary by them. 
Another practice which ameliorated the labeling of management as 
arbitrary was the upper management rescue. Several unionized employees of 
the company were also a part of U.S. Army reserve units. When Desert Storm 
occurred, they were activated and deployed to the Middle East. Originally, a 
policy was announced which would have terminated employees when they 
were deployed. They would have to go through a rehire process when they 
returned. An arrangement was made through a senior executive that allowed 
workers to return to their jobs after Desert Storm and that maintained benefits 
while the workers were away. 
It could have been possible that senior executives did not know about the 
first policy before it was announced. If that were the case, it would run counter 
to most major personnel policies explored in this study. However, it appears 
that -- since senior executives can take unilateral actions -- they took such an 
action to reverse an unpopular policy. As a result, workers labeled senior 
managers as concerned and reasonable. This practice of going to more senior 
executives to reverse decisions was associated with attributing arbitrariness to 
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the managers in the middle who where charged with upholding the policy that 
got reversed. One could find similar examples of this same practice used by 
different levels of management. It should be noted that the lower level 
managers who carried out unpopular decisions made by upper managers and 
who had the decisions reversed on them felt unsupported by upper 
management in such situations. 
Finally, the unilateral nature of managerial action was ameliorated 
through practices which put workers in the position to see things from the 
perspective of managers. In one situation, a worker who was injured was 
assigned to help her manager for a period of several weeks while she was 
recovering from the injury. During this period, this worker watched the manager 
work to deal with problematic workers and with the demands of higher level 
managers. At the end of the period, she apologized to her boss for some of her 
actions as a worker because she did not know how much trouble such actions 
created for her boss. Given this experience, a higher level manager decided to 
rotate all workers in this work group through a similar assignment and to apply 
the practice to other work areas. As this manager observed, "When you walk in 
the other fellow's shoes, you can better understand him." 
Participatory Practices at the Edge. of the Practice of Management Rights 
As observed earlier, the company in this study had developed a 
participatory management program designed to elicit information and address 
criticism while carefully retaining management's right to take unilateral action. 
The failure of this process has been seen as workers have gone through 
frustration, anger, and finally withdrawal and passive aggression in response to 
a practice which elicits information and concerns while producing decisions by 
managers which workers do not recognize from the input given by them. At the 
same time, managers struggle to counter the "misconception by craft people 
that the final decision should look like their input" with slogans, by carefully 
framing participation as having a voice or brainstorming, and by reminding 
workers that decisions are made further up the organization. 
While management rights take away the influence promised by calling a 
practice participatory, various participatory practices were found exactly at the 
point at which a manager abandoned the practice of unilateral action. 
First, several practices modified the work group supervisor as unilateral 
actor with respect to the work group. When a person is put in charge of a work 
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group -- which is an act in and of itself which defines one person as the 
unilateral actor -- and that person is not the most technically competent person 
in the group, that persons is now in the position of making decisions without the 
most adequate information or evaluative practices. This asymmetry encourages 
a supervisor to rely on the advice and judgments of workers. While the 
supervisor's position constitutes her as a unilateral actor, her lack of 
competence encourages a reliance on the worker for decisions. Several 
instances were found in which college educated supervisors who had no craft 
experience consulted workers and took their advice more than supervisors who 
were the most expert worker in the group. Both workers and supervisors in 
these situations recognized that the asymmetry of knowledge helped to create 
the openness in the relationship. 
A similar scene was set up when the company did away with the larger 
line crews with a nonworking foreman. With larger crews, the nonworking 
foreman was the most skilled person in the work group. This person's job was 
to direct work. As one worker observed, "You didn't know what you were doing 
until the foreman started assigning tasks." When the crew size was reduced to 
three with the new bucket truck technology, the foreman was now also a worker. 
Here, there emerged the "tailgate" session as a way to manage. As one worker 
defined it, "'Tailgating' is when crews go out to a job, sit around and plan it, and 
do it." In every interview of both supervisors and workers in which "tailgating" 
was mentioned, the interviewee described the practice similarly and defined it 
as a shared decision making. This activity is confined to the work group level of 
line crews. All interviewees indicated that management above this level still 
"tell us how it will be done." 
Friendship also modified the supervisor as an unilateral actor. In one 
work group interviewed, one worker and supervisor described in separate 
interviews how they were friends. They described strong disagreements they 
periodically had. But, they also described apologizing to each other and 
valuing each other as friends. They both also described relationships between 
this supervisor and other workers which were unilateral and hostile. In another 
work group, a manager related an incident in which a worker who was a friend 
confronted her by asking her how she liked it when her boss told her, "Because 
I said so." The friend did use a technique which appealed to a common 
experience to give the supervisor a viewpoint from which to judge an act. But, 
friendship enabled the confrontation and its outcome. 
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A second practice which generally erodes the practice of unilateral action 
is problem solving. Several situations were observed in which a manager or 
group of managers would take a decision and then try to get workers to go 
along with the decision. In each situation observed, the ability of a manager to 
take a unilateral action was made problematic either because of the presence 
of the union or because of the presence of a higher level manager who was 
encouraging participation. The managers all took a tack of announcing their 
decision, enumerating reasons, and then either expressing disinterest in 
entertaining worker's objections and questions or continuing to enumerate 
reasons in response to questions and objections. Some workers would then 
begin to ask questions to elicit information about the problem behind the 
decision and about the managers concerns and values with respect to the 
problem. Eventually, the problem and a reframing of the problem became the 
focus of the discussion rather than the position originally taken by the manager. 
A new solution would begin to emerge. Then a break would be called in the 
meeting. Both parties would retire to another room and formulate a position or 
reinforce the original position. Problem solving tended to end with the 
retirement to a back region and with the taking of a position again before 
engaging each other again. In fact, it would be difficult to formulate and 
maintain two different viewpoints in the face of problem solving without the 
dividing practices of back regions and position taking. 
The one place in which problem solving seemed to be most consistently 
used was within different levels of management teams. Here, all managers on 
the team are on similar levels. Their actions are oriented toward problems and 
projects. One could identify attempts to reframe issues and to gain allies in 
decisions. With no ability to take unilateral decisions with respect to each other, 
tactics other than command were required. But, if a committee was composed 
of multiple levels of managerial authority, the nature of the interaction tended to 
change. Such committees were usually lead by the most senior manager 
present. The interaction shifted from the give-and-take of the meetings 
composed of one level of management to interaction lead by the senior 
manager. Senior managers tended to initiate the lines of discussion, make 
pronouncements of judgment about the value of proposals and discussions, 
and cut off problematic lines of action. Participants shifted from initiating lines of 
discussion to responding to lines of discussion initiated by the senior manager. 
A third set of practices which utilized practices other than the unilateral 
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action of management rights were associated with interaction between 
management and the union. In a few locations found in this study, one could 
find one of two practices. First, some locations used a negotiating model to 
work out formal procedures and policies. Here, union and company labor 
relations officials would meet with their members involved in the work group 
before the-negotiations and develop a position and alternative positions to use 
as bargaining ploys. Then, they would meet in a formal bargaining session. As 
noted earlier, often one side or the other would stop arguing for a position a11d 
begin a problem solving line of inquiry which tended to dissolve the positions. 
Breaks for consultation would be called. Again, a position would be 
reestablished and the session would begin again. Neither union members nor 
managers saw this as participation. They identified the activity as bargaining. 
Yet, it is participation in the sense that one side cannot take unilateral action 
with respect to the other side. 
The second practice for working out work group rules and practices was 
described by two managers from one work group: 
We sit down with union stewards and here's how we approach it. 
Resolve issues before the fact rather than management behind closed 
doors make decisions and then act. This has done us a world of good .... 
We have a set of working rules in which the crew negotiated how they 
would work. Supervisors check off on this. Contract provides lots of 
latitude. 100 percent agreement with workers. Any changes require 100 
percent agreement. Our involvement is as an umpire in working out rules. 
as workers work out rules. Union steward writes up the rules worked out. 
Both union members and managers involved in this work group describe this 
activity as participation. It differs from bargaining in several respects. First, 
neither the union business agent nor the company's labor relations staff are 
involved until the process is finished or unless the process reaches an impasse. 
As a manager noted: 
There are rare occasions when we can't come to an agreement. I tell 
them to call their business agent and I call (name of labor relations staff). 
If irresolvable, then the company goes ahead with its plans and the union 
can grieve. 
Second, the process involves consensus. This means that all workers, the 
stewards, and work group managers agree with the outcome. It also means that 
they can all initiate proposals with respect to modifying the development of work 
rules. Third, it involves the abandonment of a back room and the establishment 
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of a position by both parties. Fourth, bargaining assumes and constructs two 
parties. Here, parties are not well defined. 
Finally, the presence of the union and due process with respect to 
disciplining and terminating employees make possible the expression of voice. 
Several union members observed that union members will be the only 
employees vocal about issues because they have security because of the 
contract. Several workers cited examples of how employees in nonunion areas 
of the company had serious problems but were afraid of losing their jobs if they 
voiced their problems. The state in which the company in this study is located 
has an employ at will law. Instances of terminating supervisors and managers 
after limited warning was noted in conversations with managerial staff. These 
employees were not covered by the labor contract. 
Command 
Whereas the practice of management rights posits and works on who 
can initiate action in an organization, command refers to practices used to work 
on directing what is done. Simple command -- as noted by Edwards (1984) and 
as described in interviews -- involves a person giving instructions to workers on 
a job-by-job basis, showing workers how a command is to be carried out if 
necessary, and directly monitoring the work by observation. This method of 
controlling what is done could be found with the five person line crew with a 
nonworking foreman using the old A-frame truck technology. 
As noted earlier, command tended to be resented by workers. As one 
worker observed, 'They treat us like dogs." Workers reported that such tactics 
imply that they are incompetent or untrustworthy. Command tends to bring the 
unilateral nature of management rights to the surface of interaction with 
assertions such as, "Because I said so." The senior executive level of 
management and the human resources department recognized this problem. 
Thus, various human relations and participatory management strategies were 
devised as substitutes for command. In this section, these practices will be 
explored. 
Command Through Role Taking 
Role taking (Mead, 1934) is the process of mentally assuming the 
perspective of another, thereby enabling one to respond to that imagined 
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viewpoint. While Mead theorized this activity as a voluntaristic activity 
emanating_ from the actor, imagining a viewpoint of another requires some sort 
of analogy or practice. Such analogies or practices encourage one to see the 
view point of the other in particular ways. Furthermore, analogies are offered as 
part of practices in various asymmetric relationships. Managers engaged in the 
practices to be described below in order to get workers to go along with the 
manager's point of view. While managers use these practices to give workers a 
way to "walk in the manager's shoes," there was no concern on the part of 
management to deploy practices which would give managers a way to "walk in 
the worker's shoes." As noted in an earlier chapter, sympathy toward the view 
point of a worker on the part of a manager is enough to make the motives of a 
manager suspect among other managers. Role taking is less of a voluntaristic 
activity that an activity encouraged by specific management practices. 
Therefore, it can substitute for command by encouraging lines of acting from 
analogies offered. 
One practice of encouraging a particular way of looking at things was 
discovered quite by accident. As noted earlier, a worker who was injured was 
assigned to help her manager for a period of several weeks while she was 
recovering from the injury. During this period, this worker watched the manager 
deal with problematic workers and with the demands of higher level managers. 
At the end of the period, she apologized to her boss for some of her actions as a 
worker because she did not know how much trouble such actions created for 
her boss. In this case of "walking in the other fellow's shoes," the practice of 
helping the manager as an observer made a manager's performance of the 
daily acts of a manager, workers' performance of the daily acts of workers, and 
hlgher managers' performance of their daily acts visible to a worker as an 
audience rather than as an object or subject of the acts. This practice 
constituted role taking. In other words, the worker came away with another way 
for imagining the viewpoint of the manager based on the practice of helping the 
manager as an observer. Now that the worker has another analogy for 
imagining the viewpoint of the manager, different lines of action are possible 
between the manager and the worker than were earlier possible. 
Another analogy for role taking with respect to managers was offered 
through a total quality management program. In this program, the manager was 
portrayed as a customer to be served by the worker. By using the analogy of 
the customer, the worker is encouraged to think about what the needs of the 
169 
manager as customer are and about how those needs can be satisfied. Here, 
the worker is no longer the object of command. She is the subject of role taking 
and makes the needs of the manager her object of concern. Even though she is 
the subject in that she is the one engaged in a practice of imagining a viewpoint 
and adjusting her activity in response to the imagined viewpoint, she is the 
object of the managerial practice of making the manager the customer and the 
worker the server. It does not appear as command to the worker because the 
worker is the subject of the activity. Yet, the implementation of the command of 
the manager is the purpose of the practice. 
Yet another practice for encouraging role taking was through setting 
expectations. This practice usually involved a verbal reframing of a command 
with a phrase, "Here is what we expect ...... This device explicitly elaborates 
what a manager wants from a worker without ordering the worker or explicitly 
placing the worker in a subordinate position. Rather than simply being the 
object of command, the worker retains some latitude of initiation to adjust her 
behavior to the expectation. The expectation is defined in the expectation 
exercise as a manager's "need" rather than what the worker "must" do. 
A final practice used to encourage role taking was role reversal. Here, a 
manager tells a worker that the manager will be the worker and the worker will 
be the manager in a role play. Then, the manager -- in the role of the worker--
acts out the behavior which is problematic to her as a manager. The worker --
in the role of the manager -- has to deal with her own behavior as acted out by 
the manager from the perspective of the manager. The manager used this 
practice to let the worker see how the manager sees the worker's behavior. 
The offering of analogies through various practices to encourage certain 
ways of imagining the viewpoint of the other does not only occur in the practices 
of management. From what has been seen with respect to analogies of distrust 
and of arbitrariness, stories told about past events and about managerial or 
union actions are the tools with which people imagine the viewpoint of the 
other. In fact, the very stories told in the interviews for this study and the 
performances observed are analogies offered for imagining viewpoints of 
others. 
Incomplete Technological Control 
Technological control was a term used by Edwards (1984) to denote the 
use of machines and assembly lines to direct work as a substitute for direct 
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personal command. As noted earlier, such techniques of control are difficult to 
develop in situations in which jobs vary from job to job. Line work, power plant 
maintenance, and transient situations in power plant operations all present 
variety and complexity from situation to situation. 
Innovation is often laid at the door of economic conditions, technological 
discovery, or the struggle between labor and management. With the company 
in this study, the application of a form of technological control to power plant 
maintenance was encouraged by the Internal Revenue Service. The company 
was called into question over the issue of inventory control. In the process of 
looking at computer programs to utilize in inventory control, a program was 
suggested by a vendor which could also be used to coordinate work in a 
fashion to optimize expenditures on materials. Software was also available to 
compare the efficiency of work groups and work methods. But, according to 
several managers interviewed, this part of the software was rejected because of 
the anxiety it evoked in the work force. There was a fear that the computer 
would become "big brother." 
Before the use of the inventory control/operations software system, 
supervisors of mechanics, electricians, and technicians would get repair cards 
and decide what work needed to be done and now to do it. They would 
coordinate with each other when a job involved mechanical, electrical or 
technical aspects. Crews could address problems which they identified as well 
as assigned problems. 
With the new computerized system, a central planner was required to 
operate the computer to set work priorities, assign jobs, and coordinate crews. 
Supervisors of work crews lost much of the arena over which they could take 
decisions. Now, the central planner handed out jobs and coordinated work. 
The ability of supervisors and workers to take direct action to fix problems was 
eliminated. 
While it is clear that the computer program had a particular way of 
assessing work, it is also clear that this way was different from the way used by 
most supervisors and workers who mentioned the program. As one supervisor 
observed, the computer programs deals with the costs of repairs and ignores 
the consequences of failure. While neither the program's or the supervisor's 
methods of assessment were revealed, the comment does indicate a perceived 
difference in how the computer and the supervisor would assign work priorities. 
The comment also fits the emphasis on the budget and cost containment noted 
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by most managers. 
What the computer program and the planner did seem to work on was 
the motivation to improve work: 
People don't do anything if you don't have a card. Before, if you saw 
something, you attacked it. 
It takes you're motivation away. 
Once supervisors and workers were made the objects of specific commands, 
they were no longer embedded in a position of being responsible for identifying 
and solving problems. To be responsible for a set of machinery is to view it as a 
set of problems to be discovered and solved. When something becomes a 
problem, the fact that it is a problem encourages attention until it comes to 
resolution or closure. Commands make very specific tasks and their resolution 
problematic. One is not encouraged to look beyond the command. In fact, if 
workers went out and worked on things which they saw on their own without first 
reporting it and waiting for the planner to assign the problem a priority and 
devise a plan to address the problem, they could get in trouble. 
Surveillance 
Surveillance was identified by Foucault (1979) as an element of the 
panoptican structure of prisons by which prisoners were exposed to observation 
by a guard at all times. At the same time, the guard could not be seen by the 
prisoners. This arrangement encouraged prisoners to act as if they were being 
monitored. 
At the company in this study, surveillance was attempted or used to 
check to see if workers were complying with commands or not. · Line crew 
supervisors would listen to the communication radio to assess how a job was 
going. Maintenance supervisors would make surprise visits to work sites or 
sneak around to observe workers. On several occasions during this study, a 
supervisor would enter the room where an interview was being conducted and 
appear to be examining a wall chart. When workers would be absent for 
medical treatment or for a funeral, calls from managers would sometimes occur 
to check if workers were there and to encourage them to hurry back to work. 
Such tactics were described by workers as "hounding." Workers described 
such acts as distrust on the part of managers. Sometimes, workers would 
retaliate in ways that deepened the mistrust of managers: "(The manager) 
keeps checking up on us. So, we don't stay busy in defiance." 
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Unlike Foucault's (1979) prisoners in the panoptican, surveillance here 
does not result in workers monitoring their own behavior in response to the 
surveillance. Unlike the prisoner who cannot observe the guard but cannot 
escape the gaze of the guard, workers often are aware of when they are being 
observed and when they are not being observed. They can slow down work in 
defiance without easily being caught with enough evidence for disciplinary 
action. Yet, enough evidence is left to anger the manager. Of course, this was 
part of the intended effect of the practice. 
The other form of surveillance carried out by management is a part of 
record keeping and data collection. Accountants review overtime, travel, meals, 
and .other expenditures and compare them to company averages. Studies such 
as this one and the periodic employee survey are conducted to identify trouble 
spots that need attention. Safety audits are conducted see if work procedures 
are in compliance with safety rules. In each of these cases, no identifiable 
surveillance is taking place. Instead, workers are simply filling out the 
necessary paper work to do business or are participating in a study. Workers 
are not necessarily encouraged by the practice to monitor themselves because 
they do not know that they are being observed. However, once an action is 
taken in a way that exposes the surveillance devices, workers tend to modify 
their behavior to avoid detection or to counter the evidence being collected 
rather than monitor their own behavior to stay in compliance. For example, one 
foreman went through a dispatching procedure in great detail and identified 
exactly th~ practice that would erroneously result in a visit from an auditor 
inquiring why the dispatcher's log did not match a time sheet. The foreman 
knew exactly how to challenge the auditor. In this study, the persons who chose 
not to participate did so because they claimed that such studies in the past had 
been used against them in disciplinary proceedings. Workers are not locked 
into the gaze of the manager in a panoptican once they discover how the 
method of observing works. 
Evaluation 
Most personnel evaluation schemes involve command in that they work 
on time and how it is used or rules and whether or not they are followed. 
However, one finds in evaluation a set of practices which posit and work on the 
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worker as a self. That is, they work on a definition of the worker as a person 
rather than on work itself. The formal system of evaluation is built on 
procedures for gathering evidence for conviction from the court room and on 
procedures for constructing a perception of fairness. Here, one counsels a 
worker about a problem. If the worker does not adequately respond, more 
counseling is given. If the worker still does not adequately respond, verbal and 
then written reprimands are given. All such interaction is to include a reminder 
that disciplinary action up to and including termination is possible. This process 
of stepwise discipline constructs a perception of fairness because persons 
being disciplined are given chances to conform. At the same time, as this 
process continues, the worker is having her essential self defined by the 
process as an employee unworthy of employment. Finally, the process 
provides evidence for justification for termination which would hold up in a court 
of law if the termination decision is challenged in court. 
This process is not evenly applied to all employee problems. If the 
problem is minor and if an employee alternates between compliance and 
noncompliance, the process will most often stay at the counseling level. If the 
problem involves insubordination, the violation of a serious safety rule, or 
criminal activity, the process can go immediately toward termination of 
employment. Since the process takes many steps for more minor problems, it is 
not very effective. One can find complaints from managers in the interviews that 
a manager has no real power or incentive unless.a worker "gets way out of 
line." One manager complained that workers seem to know exactly how many 
absences they can get before the process moves to the next step of 
seriousness. 
While this type of formal evaluation is conducted to deal with situations 
defined as problematic, there is an evaluation process which formally occurs 
once or twice a year in which a manager must evaluate the strengths and 
weakness of a worker. It is in this evaluation process that too many "strengths" 
lead to a necessary but problematic promotion and too many "weaknesses" 
lead to a necessary but problematic disciplinary action. While this evaluation 
procedure is not a part of the disciplinary procedure in which termination is the 
ultimate goal and threatened at each step, it still works on the worker rather than 
the work. "Strengths" and "weaknesses" may relate to what a worker does. But, 
the very fact that they are the strengths and weakness of a worker mean that the 
definition of the self of the worker is the substance which the practice posits and 
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defines. This definition is officially recorded in company personnel files. Such 
definitions of a person are used to decide on that persons worthiness with 
respect to promotion or disciplinary action. The actual behaviors of the worker 
which are problematic are not what is recorded apart from how they define the 
worker. 
A reliance on these technologies of evaluation that essentially work on 
the self of a worker set up a number of problems. First, there is a perception 
found in some interviews that evaluation can do no good for a worker and can 
only penalize them. This perception is consistent both with the use of stepwise 
discipline to evaluate workers to move them toward termination and with the 
inclusion of negative definitions of the self in both methods of evaluation. 
Second, these forms of evaluation turn evaluation into confrontation. One is not 
interacting with a worker to solve a problem. One is interacting with a worker to 
negatively work on the definition of the self of the worker. Thus, one is not 
surprised to find friendship getting in the way of evaluation when managers do 
not want to offend or hurt the feelings of workers who are their friends. Or again, 
one is not surprised to find managers who become upset with the behavior of 
workers but do not confront them until the manager's anger and the worker's 
behavior make the situation serious. 
A different method of evaluation was suggested by a wall poster found on 
the wall of the office of a human resources staff person. According to this 
poster, managers are to evaluate by focusing on issues, practices, and 
problems, not people. Managers are to guard worker's self esteem. They are to 
focus on what can be done positively to resolve situations. The general thrust of 
this second practice of evaluation is to work on what is done by a worker by 
engaging the worker in problem solving. As noted earlier, problem solving 
posits issues, problems, and practices as a substance to be jointly worked on by 
participants in the problem solving session. Further, the goal of the process is 
the positive resolution of problems rather than the termination of an employee if 
discipline fails. The self esteem of a worker is protected -- or even enhanced --
by working on the problem with the manager and by working on the problem 
rather than having her self threatened with negative definitions. By calling this 
practice evaluation, the practice is threatened by the potential use of other 
evaluation practices. Perhaps the practice should just be called problem 
solving rather than evaluation. If the results of this practice are used in any way 
with the other practices of evaluation, the practice will be once again rendered a 
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practice which attacks self esteem. Neither manuals nor training embodied this 
practice. 
Hierarchy, Rules and Regulations, Training, and Accountability 
As with all bureaucracies (Weber, 1978), the company in this study relied 
on hierarchy as a practice through which to command. Using management 
rights rooted in property rights, representatives of the stockholders appoint 
executives who are given the management right to take unilateral action. A 
chain of command -- a technique that Foucault (1979) notes was borrowed from 
the church and the military -- is established through which the chief executive 
officer cou!d command every worker. But, with 2,000 employees located over a 
major portion of a state engaged in numerous and varied activities, command 
as an activity of directing workers breaks down. Yet, as a senior executive 
noted, employees are not free to act on their own. All employees are to act 
uniformly as management wants them to act. 
Instead of direct command through the hierarchy to direct each worker, 
managers create rules, procedures, and standards, place them in manuals, 
train managers and workers in these, and sample behavior to insure that the 
procedures, rules, and standards are being followed. The labor contract itself 
represents such a manual. Various groups or departments in the company are 
charged with developing various rules and procedures, training, and auditing. 
The effect of rule establishment and training can be seen from remarks from 
managers: 
(The training) has caused me to move more responsibility to the first line 
supervisors. We all have policies and the same flow of information. So 
we can all make the same decisions. 
(The training) was the most useful stuff I got. It gave me a frame work for 
functioning. It gave me procedures. 
Another aspect of training with respect to command is the fixing of 
responsibility. Managers and workers are required to go to various training. 
Once they have received the training and a record of the event has been 
created, the manager or worker is now responsible and accountable for the 
rules, procedures, and standards covered in the training. No one will 
necessarily command the trained person about the content of the training. But, 
if there is a violation of the rules, procedures, or standards, those trained are 
now in the position of having blame fixed to them for purposes of punishment. 
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This encourages persons to monitor their own behavior if they know they will be 
held accountable and if there are devices to audit or sample deviations. 
Punishment 
If you have poor performers, you need to retrain, transfer, or fire them. 
It' almost easier to fire them that to discipline. 
(Two different managers) 
Punishment refers to any practice which works on the problematic 
aspects of a person's performance by directly working on the person's body or 
its socially created substitutes of the self, position, or salary rather than on 
specific aspects of the performance itself. In other words, punishment makes a 
person the problem rather than the person's performance. 
There are several elements of this practice which will be explored. First, 
a person is set up as the problematic element by the practice of responsibility. 
Once responsibility is set in place, it is used to connect problematic events to 
persons so the person can be punished. After exploring these elements of the 
practice of punishment, four ways in which this practice was used will be 
explored: stepwise discipline, retaliation, deterance, and scapegoating. 
Finally, the problems set up by combining elements of other practices such as 
training and problem solving with the practice of punishment will be explored. 
Using Responsibility and Punishment to Construct the Person as the Problem 
Responsibility essentially involves the elaboration of a controlling 
relationship between a person and a set of duties. This involves defining duties 
by such devices as command, job descriptions, training, and rules, procedures, 
and standards. Through these devices, a persons has expected conduct 
outlined. More important, the person has now been given charge for carrying 
out these expectations. As noted earlier, these devices do work on what is 
done .. But, by making the expectations a duty, the connection of the person with 
the set of duties now makes the person the problem if a problem associated 
with duties develops . 
. An essential element in these connecting processes is an 
acknowledgement on both the manager and worker's part -- or on the senior 
manager and junior manager's part -- that a persons has been assigned a 
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responsibility. For example, workers were trained in a sexual harassment 
policy. Once trained, workers and managers recognized that the workers now 
bore responsibility for duties outlined in the policy. So; if sexual harassment 
occurred, the worker would be the target of punishment rather than the 
company or higher managers. Or again, workers are trained in safety rules. 
The safety rules themselves define the worker as responsible for carrying out 
safety rules. Thus, if an accident occurs and a worker can be found in violation, 
the worker is now the responsible agent. In several interviews, both workers 
and managers recognized that , unless expectations were clearly outlined and 
acknowledged or unless there was a training or some other formal way of 
acknowledging the assignment of duties, it was difficult to claim that a party was 
responsible for a realm of actions. 
Training and fixing responsibility alters legal liability. For example, if the 
company did not train workers in sexual harassment policies, it would be easy 
for an employee to sue the company for the actions of another employee. But, if 
employees are trained and a document of the fact is created, it is now easier to 
fix responsibility for the act to a particular individual in terms of liability. The 
individual knows about the policy and indicates that she has been informed 
about the policy in the training. 
Another device used to connect persons with duties and consequences 
is the hierarchical device of the chain of command. A hierarchical command 
structure works by making one layer of persons responsible for all actions of 
persons and activities under their charge. Each level of command has duties 
outlined for them. So, if a problem occurs, the trail of duties and responsible 
parties can be traced up the chain of command to find a responsible party. If a 
worker has an accident, the investigation looks at safety rules and duties 
assigned to involved workers, managers, and other managers up the chain of 
command. Persons are identified as responsible for the accident if rules were 
not followed of if inadequate procedures were used to communicate, 
acknowledge, and monitor the rules. Here, responsibility and accountability do 
not work on actual work practices and working conditions. Responsibilities set 
up persons as the causal agent of the problem. 
While punishment itself is not necessarily an element of responsibility, 
the use of punishment requires the identification of a responsible party on 
whom to administer the punishment. On the one hand, investigations of 
accidents and other problematic events could proceed by looking at what 
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workers do and at working conditions. The company in this study does look at 
what is done and tries to change problematic practices. But, punishment is a 
key element in addressing the problem. From the interviews, managers point 
out that -- from their perspective -- training does not work unless workers are 
held accountable. They point out that consequences are important for holding 
persons accountable for their actions. While the practice of responsibility links 
a person in a causal manner with consequences through duties and thereby 
makes the person the problem rather than work practices and working 
conditions, punishment is not the only device that could be used to work on the 
person. In fact, training works on what a person does. But, by using 
punishment, a person is required to be the problem. 
Four Uses of the Practice of Responsibility and Punishment 
The practice of punishment outlined in the training manual for stepwise 
discipline does begin as discipline in that it works on what a worker does. First, 
a manager counsels a worker about what the manager expects from the worker, 
about how the worker's performance does not meet this expectation, and about 
steps that need to be taken to improve the worker's behavior to an acceptable 
level. While such sessions were often experienced by workers as rituals of 
degradation, at least one practice was identified which, if used, would work on 
behavior while minimizing the degradation of the workers. If such counseling is 
not satisfactory, then it becomes formal in that documentation about the problem 
is created and put in the worker's personnel file. The worker's personnel file is 
a potentially legally binding definition of the worker's self. Furthermore, the 
threat of action to reduce a persons pay or rank or to terminate employment is 
communicated. Now, the act of discipline -- working on a worker's performance 
-- becomes punishment -- working on a worker's self. The very process of 
counseling, verbal reprimands, and written reprimands prior to punishment 
defines the person as the problem behind the performance. It becomes the 
worker's unwilling confession of her inadequacy as a person. The process also 
works on the definition of the company's management. It portrays the company 
as fair and reasonable rather than arbitrary and capricious. 
The second use of the practice of responsibility and punishment as 
retaliation can be found in several interviews with managers. Here, workers 
seem to be adequate to good at performing their actual work. The real problem 
with workers is their attitude toward management. Behaviors that tended to be 
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labeled as antimanagement included complaining about or criticizing 
management decisions, challenging management commands as violations of 
the labor contract, verbally degrading managers in front of other employees, 
and using procedures from the labor contract or safety rules in ways that make 
the manager's job more difficult. Since these behaviors are done by workers 
who are adequate to good at their work, it is difficult to find adequate grounds to 
use in the stepwise discipline procedure. 
Once a worker has been labeled as a trouble maker, some managers 
begin to search for violations of rules and procedures to begin a formal 
disciplinary action to get rid of the worker. Inspections increase to find safety 
violations. Surveillance increases to catch workers who abuse breaks or lunch 
periods. Rumors are spread about the inadequacy of the worker's work or 
character. Small problems and infractions are now noted in evaluations. 
Workers who were the object of such practices tended to keep documentation of 
their own to counter that of supervisors. As one worker noted, "You have to 
document everything because they are going to come back on you." 
A third use of the practice of responsibility and punishment is deterence. 
Here, punishment is threatened for the next person who violates a rule. For 
example, one manager indicated that her work area had experienced several 
accidents of one particular type. Upper managers threatened that the next 
person in the work group who had such an accident would be made an 
example. In this case, the behavior itself triggers the practice of punishment. 
The person who received the punishment does so on a somewhat random 
basis. 
Fourth, the practice of responsibility and punishment encourages the 
search for a scapegoat. Interviews with both managers and workers use similar 
language to describe the practice: 
Upper management sees (name of a problem) and looks at the first line 
supervisors for a scapegoat. The company looks for "who can we blame" 
rather than "how can we solve the problem." 
Since a problem with a serious consequence requires someone to hold 
responsible, various practices are used to assign or avoid responsibility. First, 
to avoid being identified as the problem, cases were found in which a manager 
redefined her actions to normalize them within acceptable procedures. For 
example, a supervisor tripped a boiler feed pump. Fortunately, a worker caught 
it and reset it. The supervisor covered for the mistake by saying that she was 
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just testing it. Second, other cases were found in which middle managers 
ordered lower managers to take an action without leaving a documentary trail of 
the order. When the action resulted in a serious problem, the middle manager 
would deny issuing the order. Third, the general practice of encouraging first 
line supervisors to make decisions and of making each worker responsible for 
safety shifts blame to the lower levels. Several supervisors and workers noted 
incidents of being encouraged to make decisions only to be reprimanded when 
problems arose. Fourth, some managers intentionally take the blame for upper 
managers to curry favor for promotion. 
The Problem of Dually Embedded Elements 
of a Practice 
To say that an element of a practice is dually embedded in practices is to 
say that an element of a practice is common to several different practices that 
either encourage conflicting lines of action or posit and work on different 
substances. Several management practices are problematic because they are 
dually embedded. 
If one examines attempts to use participatory management practices, one 
sees participation being modified with management rights. Initially, workers 
were hopeful when task forces composed of workers and managers were 
established to address various issues. But, when recommendations were 
referred to the executive level of the company for review, revisions, and 
decision, disillusion set in as decisions did not resemble recommendations. 
Participatory practices encouraged the generation of alternative viewpoints and 
judgments with an expectation of control. Management rights precisely foils this 
by giving managers the right to take unilateral action regardless of what workers 
and lower managers devise through participatory practices. It is interesting to 
note that workers were disillusioned with participatory schemes and felt them to 
be a ruse while upper managers who have the right to make decisions tended 
to like the participatory practices used among themselves. 
If one examines the company's combination of discipline with 
punishment, one sees the practice of punishment foiling what the practice of 
discipl,ine attempts. A supervisor often interacts with workers to examine how 
work is being done and how it can be improved. Here, the supervisor is 
practicing discipline by working on work itself. But, once this interaction is 
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framed as ·disciplinary action, the worker and her position and reputation is 
being officially defined for purposes of punishment. Defensiveness rather than 
behavioral change is evoked. 
Similarly, when one looks at how problem solving is combined with the 
documentation for punishment in safety, one finds workers and supervisors not 
reporting accidents or near misses to avoid punishment. The valuable 
information which could limit accidents and save money and human suffering is 
withheld. Furthermore, the very practices of responsibility and punishment 
make who is responsible more of a solution than what is the problem. Finding a 
person to punishment to solve the problem blocks finding a solution to the 
problem in terms of work practices and working conditions. 
The focus on rules, procedures, and standards as a duty block an 
examination of work practices and working conditions as the cause of problems. 
When an accident occurs, it is investigated in terms of whether or not safety 
rules were broken. It was apparent that the company did investigate work 
practices and conditions with respect to accidents. But, rules and procedures 
narrow and define what constitute relevant conditions and practices. 
Finally, the framing of working conditions and practices both in terms of 
costs of production and safety often block each other. In its most obvious form, 
this conflict is apparent in such situations as cleanin-g up an asbestos spill in a 
way that is not safe by federal safety standards to cut costs. Here, workers are 
being exposed with no appearance to the contrary. In its less obvious form, 
working conditions are changed in a way that increase the chance of an 
accident or increase the chance of death or serious injury from an accident. For 
example, the company was proposing to reconfigure how electrical lines were 
configured. Here, the configuration of an electrical line was both a part of a cost 
accounting practice and a safety assessment practice. Workers complained 
that the reconfiguration increased the danger of working on the lines by 
decreasing their window of escape in case of a problem. The company 
responded_ by revising safety rules and work procedures to "control the risk." 
This strategy shifts the burden of the risk to the worker. 
CHAPTER VIII 
LABOR RELATIONS PRACTICES 
Introduction 
Two principal complexes of practices are established in labor law on 
which labor relations practices seemed to be built in this study: arbitration and 
representation. 
Just as the National Labor Relations Act contains two conflicting sets of 
rights -- management's right to operate its business as it decides and the 
requirement to bargain with workers over wages, hours, and working conditions 
-- arbitration also contains two conflicting practices used to define the scope of 
the collective bargaining agreement -- the "reserved rights" doctrine of 
management rights and the "past practices" implied in a contract. In this 
chapter, the practices used by arbitrators to determine whether a "past practice" 
contractually exists will be explored. Then, the practices adopted by 
management and the union to establish or to resist the establishment of past 
practices will be examined. During the period when labor relations appeared to 
be relatively unproblematic from the viewpoint of management, the labor 
relations staff of the company and the business manager of the union utilized 
"teflon" agreements, conflict aversion, and personal relations to work out 
problems. During the period when labor relations were problematic, the union 
used the grievance/arbitration process to attempt to create binding agreements. 
The company countered by forcing grievances to arbitration and by adopting 
practices that made it difficult to establish a "past practice" in an arbitration 
hearing . 
. The practice of representation in labor law involves voting. Workers vote 
on whether or not they wish to be represented by a union, on policies and 
contract ratification, and on who will represent them as union business 
managers. In this chapter, ways in which the union used the discontent of 
workers evoked by managerial actions and methods of involving workers as 
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union members will be explored. Since management is effected by the voting 
activity set up by labor law, they developed tactics to counter voting and other 
practices of representation. Even though labor law prohibits companies from 
interfering with the concerted activity of workers in various ways, management 
in this study devised tactics to ameliorate or redirect worker discontent, 
developed alternative avenues to the union to address discontent, and 
engaged in practices to involve managers in enacting labor relations policies. 
Arbitration 
Before World War II, St. Antoine (1984) notes that approximately ten 
percent of all collective bargaining agreements in the United States provided for 
arbitration. During the war, the National War Labor Board encouraged the use 
of arbitration clauses in contracts to provide an alternative to strikes to deal with 
disagreements over the interpretation and application of collective bargaining 
agreements. These contracts also tended to include no-strike clauses. In this 
study, the first collective bargaining agreement was struck between the union 
and the company in 1947. Thus, it is not surprising that the agreement contains 
both a no-strike clause and a provision for final and binding arbitration as the 
last step in the grievance procedure. Now, St. Antoine (1984) notes that 
ninety-five percent of major collective bargaining agreements contain clauses 
requiring final and binding arbitration as the last step in the grievance 
procedure. 
The legal status of arbitration was enhanced by the Supreme Court's 
decisions in the Steelworkers Trilogy in 1960 (St. Antoine, 1984). Before the 
Taft-Hartley Act, agreements between unions and employers were enforceable 
only under state law as contracts between parties. Section 301 of the 
Taft-Hartley authorized federal district courts to establish a substantive body of 
law for the interpretation and enforcement of contracts between unions and 
employees. This gave the Supreme Court the final say on law governing 
collective bargaining agreements. With this authority, the Supreme Court laid 
down guidelines on the arbitrability of contract issues and on the review and 
enforcement of arbitration awards in the Steelworkers Trilogy. Specifically, the 
court held that, in the absence of the clearest and most unequivocal kind of 
exclusion, an issue in dispute is to be held subject to arbitration if it is covered 
by the language of the arbitration clause of the contract. Thus, the grievance 
and arbitration process became the basic formal practice to resolve differences 
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between workers and management. 
To understand the practices devised by both management and the union 
in this study to build a relationship, one must first explore the practices used in 
arbitration. To do this, arbitration practices as defined by texts used to train 
arbitrators (Zack, 1984; Gold, 1989) will be analyzed. Then, two different 
systems of labor relations found in this study will be examined. During the 
period that both workers and managers found relatively harmonious, the union 
business agent and the company's labor relations staff utilized a personal 
relationship, problem solving, and "teflon" agreements to minimize the 
involvement of workers and managers, to protect management rights, and to 
resolve worker grievances. During the period in which relations became more 
conflictual and filled with distrust, the union leadership and the company's labor 
relations staff utilized formal agreements, two different approaches to past 
practices, and dividing practices to increase the involvement of workers and 
managers, to fight over management and worker rights, and to force grievances 
to arbitration. 
Practices Utilized in Arbitration 
The need to examine the practices used in arbitration presents an initial 
problem because only one arbitration session was observed. However, Jones 
( 1984} has noted that arbitrators tend to be people with legal training. Thus, 
they tend to be trained in the same practices of analysis and reasoning with no 
variation from region to region. Furthermore, they are all embedded in the 
same judicial system in the National Labor Relations Board and the federal 
courts. Thus, manuals used to train arbitrators probably provide one with a 
picture of the practices used in arbitration. 
Zack ( 1984} has edited such a volume for the expressed use as a 
training tool for new arbitrators and as a continuing education tool for 
experienced arbitrators. The articles that compose the volume were adapted 
from speeches made during a training program for new arbitrators conducted at 
• I 
I 
the University of Michigan Law School in 1975 under the auspices of General 
Electric Company and the International Union of Electrical Workers and with 
cooperation from the American Arbitration Association and the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service. The collective bargaining agreement 
between the union and the company in this study used one of these arbitration 
services. Thus, articles from this volume will be analyzed as a manual of 
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practices reflective of those used in the setting studied. 
As noted earlier, the National Labor Relations Act contains two conflicting 
sets of rights. On the one hand, management has the right to run its business 
as it sees fit. On the other hand, management is legally obligated to bargain 
with a union if the business' workers vote for such representation. Management 
cannot change the terms of employment without bargaining with the union. But, 
management is not required to accept proposals put forth by the union in 
bargaining. 
In a similar fashion the practice of arbitration contains two conflicting 
practices used to define the scope of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Mittenthal (1984) -- the essay in Zack's (1984) volume which deals with past 
practice in arbitration -- notes that management reads the contract in a very 
restricted way. Relying on the "reserved rights" doctrine of management rights, 
management claims that all rights not explicitly limited by the collective 
bargaining agreement are retained by management. This very doctrine was 
outlined by the lawyers interviewed for this study who represented the 
management of the company. The doctrine was also found in the company's 
labor relations training manual. It is even contained in a clause in the collective 
bargaining agreement between the union and the company in this study: 
It is understood and agreed that the functions of management listed 
herein are not all-inclusive and that all such rights, powers or authority 
possessed by the company prior to the signing of this Agreement shall be 
retained by the Company, subject only to such limitations as provided in 
this Agreement. 
The union reads the contract in a much broader fashion. Mittenthal 
(1984) notes that unions claim that an agreement is struck in light of practices of 
the working environment. Thus, it is assumed that existing practices will remain 
in effect. To the extent that these practices are unchallenged, the parties must 
have adopted them as part of the agreement. This understanding of a contract 
is similar to Mcneil's (1978) analysis of a contract. All elements in effect when 
the contract is struck that are relevant to the contract are implied by the contract. 
The union officials interviewed for this study expounded this broader 
understanding of the collective bargaining agreement. For them, past practices 
which exist but are not enumerated by the collective bargaining agreement are 
still a part of the agreement. 
This broader reading of the collective bargaining agreement has been 
upheld in court cases regarding arbitration in collective bargaining agreements. 
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In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., 36 U.S. 574 
(1960), Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court held that the labor 
arbitrator's source of law is not limited to the expressed provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement. The past practices of an industry and work 
place are equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not 
expressed in it. Mittenthal (1984) notes that most arbitrators view past practices 
that are in existence when an agreement is negotiated and that are not 
discussed during negotiations as binding on the parties for the life of the 
agreement. With respect to the collective bargaining agreement itself, past 
practices are used to give specific content to what is general in the agreement, 
to clarify what is ambiguous, and even to modify or amend what appears to be 
unambiguous in the agreement. If one of the parties challenges a practice in a 
timely fashion, the other party must then have the practice written into the 
agreement if it is to continue as binding. 
One of the chief problems facing an arbitrator is how to establish that a 
past practice exists. Mittenthal (1984) develops six tests to be used by 
arbitrators to establish a practice as a past practice. First, a practice must 
exhibit clarity and consistency. If a practice being argued is vague or if it has 
been contradicted as frequently as followed, it cannot qualify as a practice. 
Second, a practice must be repeatedly used over a period of time. Isolated 
incidents do not establish a practice. Third, a practice must exhibit acceptability. 
Employees and supervisors must have knowledge of a particular practice and 
regard it as the customary way of addressing a situation. Acceptability may be 
implied from a long acquiescence in a known course of conduct. When a party 
protests a practice, acquiescence cannot be implied. Fourth, a practice is only 
as broad as the circumstances out of which it developed. Thus, practices must 
be related to their origins and purposes. This is particularly important when the 
consequences of a practice are argued as a practice itself. For example, if an 
equalization of overtime was a consequence of how workers were assigned to 
different tasks, the equalization of overtime cannot be claimed as a practice. 
Fifth, a practice must exhibit mutuality. A strong case can be made for the 
existence of a practice if ajoint understanding exists in the creation or 
application of a practice. A case which only relies on managerial action is a 
weak case to demonstrate mutuality. Finally, the scope of a practice must be 
defined. Was a practice intended for all levels of an organization or just some 
levels? 
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Mittenthal (1984) notes that arbitration cases based on past practice are 
difficult to win. It is difficult to establish that a past practice exists. Union 
witnesses will remember things one way. Company witnesses will remember 
them another way. In the face of such conflicting testimony, Mittenthal (1984) 
observes that arbitrators tend to rely on written records. Such records are not 
often either made or retained. 
Before a problem of interpreting, applying, or operating the collective 
bargaining agreement reaches binding arbitration, it proceeds through a 
grievance procedure which is outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. 
According to the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the 
company in this study, a worker first discusses a complaint with her immediate 
supervisor in the presence of a representative of the Union. The supervisor and 
the aggrieved worker attempt to reach a satisfactory settlement. If the grievance 
is not settled, the worker submits the grievance in writing to the supervisor for a 
written judgment. If this resolution is not satisfactory to the worker, the 
grievance is submitted to the union for appeal to the appropriate company 
manager. If this manager's resolution is not satisfactory to the union business 
manager, it may finally be appealed to the company's labor relations manager. 
If this manager's resolution i,s not satisfactory, the matter goes to binding 
arbitration. In this process, the role of the union is defined by the duty of fair 
representation in labor law (Gold, 1989, p.7): 
... this duty requires a union to represent each worker fairly; that is, the 
union must always have good reasons for what it does. The duty of fair 
representation applies both to negotiating contracts and to enforcing 
them. 
In other words, the union is legally bound to act as the worker's advocate. 
Grievance settlements are very important. Mittenthal (1984) observes 
that such settlements result in understandings that are more durable than the 
terms of the contract itself. Thus, the grievance/arbitration process becomes 
more critical in working out labor relations between the union and the 
management of a company than negotiations over the contract. It is not 
surprising to find in the company's labor relations training manual for managers 
in this study a series of tactics to avoid the appearance of past practices. It is 
not surprising to find the union filing grievances to demonstrate that a change in 
work practices has not been accepted by acquiescence. It is not surprising to 
find the company avoiding written commitments and to find the union requesting 
written commitments. As the practices used by the company and the union in 
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this study to work out labor relations are explored, it will be seen that the 
practices adopted are encouraged by the practices of arbitrators and the courts. 
"Teflon" Agreements, Conflict Aversion, and Personal Relations 
It is not surprising that work force reductions, increased overtime, and out 
sourcing would raise the concerns of workers over job security and work 
conditions. Nor is it surprising that attitudes of unionized workers worsened 
over a period when these activities were happening. What is interesting is that 
it took four years from the major work force reduction, from the initiation of 
increased out sourcing of line work and power plant maintenance, and from the 
initiation of the economic shut down of several of the company's power plants 
before labor relations became definably more problematic to management. If 
one were to relate the appearance labor relations problems to economic 
conditions and organizational policy, one would have a difficult time exactly 
correlating these events. 
Both the company and the union in this study identified new leadership in 
the opposing camp as the cause of the deterioration of labor relations. Given 
the use of punishment and the resulting definition of persons rather than 
practices as problems, this is not surprising. However, one can see that the 
relationship between the company and the union did not become fully 
problematic until new labor relations practices were adopted by both the union 
and .the management of the company. Given the aggravating conditions of 
layoffs, out sourcing, and changes in working conditions, what practices were 
used to maintain the appearance of relatively unproblematic labor relations for 
so long? 
The first complex of practices which one can identify were used by the 
company's former labor relations manager and the former union business 
manager to maintain personal control of the resolution of grievances and 
complaints. One practice by which this was done was direct intervention in the 
resolution of grievances at the lower level of the grievance process. If one 
reads the collective bargaining agreement, the grievance has to be judged not 
to be :in violation of the agreement by a worker's immediate supervisor and by a 
: . 
company manager before it is officially appealed to the company's manager of 
labor relations. If the grievance follows this process, at least two persons in 
management have judged and taken a position on the grievance. The manager 
of labor relations now has to take a management position held by several 
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managers into account. By intervening at the level of the immediate supervisor, 
the labor relations manager could avoid having other managers take a position. 
This enabled the company's labor relations manager to work out solutions 
rather than to defend a position taken by other managers. 
The union business agent and the company's labor relations manager 
would further eliminate the judgment and interference from their respective 
audiences by working out a solution in private. Once they resolved the 
grievance or negotiated the issue, they would garner the necessary legal 
opinions and develop the necessary rationales to explain the resulting 
resolution to their constituents. Sometimes, they would simply tell the 
immediate parties the resolution of the grievance but would not share it with 
other parties who might question it. Some accounts include descriptions of a 
practice of telling concerned parties one thing and then doing another. 
The importance of the practice of maintaining personal control over the 
resolution of issues to the company's former labor relations manager during this 
period can be seen in a labor relations policy document developed after the 
layoffs. According to this document, the company would take a less 
paternalistic stance toward the union and would press for increased 
productivity. The document also states that the resolution of all labor issues 
would remain the purview of the company's labor relations manager. Until this 
labor .relations manager left the company and the labor relations practices 
changed, labor relations appeared to be relatively unproblematic. 
The second set of practices used to encourage relatively unproblematic 
labor relations were friendship like practices. The labor relations manager 
would carry a brief case and wear a pin with the union logo. The labor relations 
manager and the union business manager would drive to places together to 
conduct business and work out problems. They would go out for drinks and 
exchange views on matters. As a management associate of the company's 
labor relations manager observed, "They could say to each other, 'I think you 
are making a mistake here.'" This type of exchange happened both ways. 
A series of practices which had the effect of conflict avoidance constituted 
the third group of practices. Business conditions contributed to conflict 
avoidance. Before the layoffs, the company was in relatively good financial 
condition. As one person stated, "No one cared what you did." So, there was 
little encouragement to resist grievances or to alter conditions in ways that 
would encourage grievances. Furthermore, there was a policy of evaluating 
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managers on how many grievances were filed against them. This encouraged 
managers to accommodate worker concerns rather than resist them. 
The labor relations manager and the union business manager engaged 
in conflict avoidance practices with each other. These two parties engaged in 
compromise. They would use problem solving to find a solution that would be 
acceptable to both of them. One of the principal practices used by the 
company's labor relations manager was an open-ended grievance process. If a 
resolution of a grievance could not be reached, the official letter sent by the 
labor relations manager to the union business manager would indicate that the 
company's action did not violate the contract. But, the letter would also indicate 
that discussions would continue on the matter until an acceptable solution could 
be found. Thus, rather than closing interaction and taking a position, further 
interaction was encouraged. The union's business agent would sometimes 
avoid conflict by not representing the views of the union membership. 
Both the labor relations manager and the union business manager 
practiced conflict avoidance by hiding or redefining the resolution of issues 
which would be problematic to their constituents. In other words, they kept 
issues from becoming issues for others. Union members would not be informed 
about the resolution of a grievance if it was not entirely satisfactory to union 
members. As noted earlier, legal opinions were obtained to close issues such 
that they could not longer be issues for constituents. 
· "Teflon settlements" constitute the fourth complex of practices which 
contributed to relatively unproblematic labor relations. A company lawyer 
defined "teflon settlements" as the settlement of disputes in nonbinding 
language. For example, a clause could be added to the letter of agreement 
which gave either party the right to terminate the letter of agreement with a few 
months notice. A slightly different definition of "teflon" was offered by a 
management colleague of the labor relations manager of this period: 
Lot's of deals were made which were not written down. Nobody could 
remember how it went. (Name) was good at being "teflon." 
In short, "teflon settlements" were settlements which resolved a problem but 
which contained language which would allow parties to unilaterally revoke the 
settlement or which left little evidence which could be used to establish a past 
practice in an arbitration hearing. Thus, "teflon settlements" fundamentally 
protect management rights. 
If one examines the principles used by arbitrators (Mittenthal, 1984) to 
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establish that a past practice exists compared to practices used to make "teflon 
settlements," one can see that principles used to establish past practices in 
arbitration correspond to practices used in "teflon settlements." First, the 
settlements struck between the labor relations manager and the union business 
agent were often verbal. If they were changed or revoked by management, 
there would only be two parties' testimony against each other with no written 
documentation. As Mittenthal (1984) noted, in the absence of written 
documentation and in the face of conflicting testimony, it is almost impossible to 
establish a past practice. Second, since agreements were made between the 
labor relations manager and the union business manager, they were not widely 
knowh or approved. This makes it difficult to argue the acceptability of a 
practice. To successfully argue acceptability, one must show that employees 
and supervisors have knowledge of a particular practice and regard it as the 
customary way of addressing situations. Third, since settlements were not 
written down, no one could really remember exactly to what the parties agreed. 
This makes it difficult to argue for the clarity of a practice. Finally, issues were 
often settled differently from place to place. This makes it difficult to argue for 
the consistency of a practice. 
Tactics Used in the Fight over Rights 
Just as a number of practices contributed to the appearance of good 
relations in one period of time, a different set of practices were adopted by both 
the union and the company which encouraged conflict. 
The earlier labor relations manager and union business manager had 
utilized a system of verbally and informally resolving issues while formally either 
incorporating nonbinding language in grievance settlements or officially finding 
no violation of the contract. Such a record is difficult to use to establish past 
practice in an arbitration case. The new union leadership adopted a practice of 
getting binding settlements and of holding the company to informally adopted 
settlements. Otherwise, the company could continue to take unilateral actions 
that threatened job security, •promotion, etc. if such actions were not covered by 
the exact language in the collective bargaining agreement. The new union 
leadership also began to challenge what had been done in earlier grievance 
settlements. Both Mittenthal (1984) and the company's labor relations training 
manual note that past practices become part of the collective bargaining 
agreement if they are officially resolved through binding language in the 
grievance procedure or through arbitration. Since such practices challenge 
management rights, one would expect them to encourage conflict. 
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It was exactly this type of activity that executive level managers identified 
in interviews as the beginning of their labor relations problems. As an executive 
state<;i, "We're making them realize what it could really be like if it were a true 
union-management situation." Thus, management adopted a number of 
strategies designed to protect and reinforce management rights that also 
encouraged conflict. 
In response to grievances based on past practice filed by the union, 
management used the "reserved rights" doctrine and a narrow reading of the 
contract to continually find that managerial action did not violate the contract. 
Furthermore, they were not interested in finding a compromise. If the union did 
not like the finding, they could appeal it to arbitration. Thus, most grievances 
were forced toward arbitration. Given past relations with the company's former 
labor relations manager, union officials had expected managers to continue to 
engage in negotiation and compromise over grievances. 
The very act of forcing most grievances to arbitration itself encourages 
conflict because negotiations over the resolution of grievances was one of the 
few real avenues open to the union to address issues. The contract has a 
no-strike clause. So, the union cannot strike over the application of the contract 
or over a past practice while the contract is in force. Even if the contract did not 
contain a no-strike clause, a number of factors would discourage a strike. The 
union in this study had an open shop contract. This means that only union 
members pay dues. It also means that employees are not required to join the 
union to work in the company. This combination makes defection from the 
union and free riding relatively easy. Additionally, the company had 
demonstrated a willingness to lay off workers. A significant amount of out 
sourcing of line work and power plant maintenance had been done and was 
be.ing planned. Consequently, there'.was a capacity to replace workers by 
contracting their work out if they went on strike. From the union's own 
newsietter, outside construction electrical work was scarce. Under these 
conditions, the union would also be discouraged from striking during 
I 
nego~iations after the contract lapsed to press for items in the contract. Thus, 
the o~ly real route for resolving grievances was the grievance process. Now, 
the company's resistance to binding settlements forced all settlements toward 
arbitration. 
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Arbitration is expensive. Each party incurs a filing fee of $125, $1,500 to 
$2,000 in arbitration expenses, wages for witnesses for each case, and legal 
fees. The company has vast resources. The union has limited resources. 
Furthermore, it is hard to win an arbitration on past practice with little written 
evidence and with no binding settlements. So, the arbitration process favors 
the company. As a result, the company can adopt new policies and procedures 
which are not obviously covered by the contract. According to a company 
attorney, the collective bargaining agreement in this study is small and limited 
when compared to the agreements of other companies. Then, the company can 
claim "reserved rights" and resist grievances over the changes. If the company 
wins the resulting arbitration, its new policy or procedure is now binding. If it 
loses, the company has not lost ground. In an interview, a supervisor who used 
to be a business manager of the union in this study indicated that, if she were 
the current union business manager, she would be afraid that the company was 
trying to destroy the union with these tactics. Even though the company claims 
that it is not out to destroy the union, these tactics encourage distrust and 
conflict. 
Forcing grievances to ar:bitration encourag.es conflict in one other way. 
There are work practices and wage and benefit issues which are not covered by 
a narrow reading of the contract. Yet, workers and supervisors need ways to 
work these issues out in an agreeable way. When issues are met with a 
managerial judgment of "no violation of the contract," it does not mean that the 
issue has gone away. Company management tends to claim that the issues is 
resolved if the union drops the grievance or fails to process it in a timely fashion. 
If the union continues to push an issue over and over again, this tends to 
encourage conflict with managers. Yet, in the interviews for this study, several 
workers had issues that had not been resolved in a way agreeable to them. 
They were still angry .over the issue and told the story of the problem again and 
again. These analogies give hearers an unfavorable analogy to interpret the 
moti~es and actions of management. Thus, they encourage conflict and 
i 
perp¢tuate issues over time and among workers. 
: In response to the company forcing grievances to arbitration and to no 
real ability-to strike, the union adopted other tactics to increase pressure on the 
company to negotiate rather than to take unilateral action on grievances. In an 
interview with a supervisor, she observed that, with an open shop and a 
no-strike clause, the grievance process is about the only avenue available to 
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solve problems. What can the union do if grievances are forced to arbitration? 
What levers does the union have? 'These are it: refusing to participate, 
dragging things out, not cooperating." If one examines the union newsletters 
published soon after the company began to resist grievance resolution, one 
finds the union requesting that members not participate in voluntary activities, 
not participate in participatory management meetings unless ordered and paid 
to do so, and not carry pagers or take trucks home unless the company pays a 
I 
stand-by wage. Furthermore, the union mounted a negative advertising 
campaign against the company for the first time in the company's history 
through information pickets of the company's headquarters, radio spots, 
newspaper advertisement, and flyers. Finally, negotiations and arbitration 
issues were carried back to the work group level. Workers confronted 
supervisors over these issues. Such resistance, noncooperation, degrading, 
and confrontation encouraged more conflict. 
Other new approaches to labor relations adopted by the company were 
incorporated in a training manual developed by a management consultant firm. 
One can find conflict enhancing practices embedded in this manual. The 
manual defines the relationship between the company and the union as 
adversarial. On the company's side, economic pressures are claimed to 
encourage management to eliminate inefficiencies and to maintain the ability to 
unilaterally do so. On the union's side, political pressures are claimed to 
encourage the union to attempt to constantly better the terms and conditions of 
employme~t of its constituents. The labor contract is portrayed as a 
compromise of management rights. While union members are entitled to the 
benefits outlined in the contract, they are entitled to no more. Thus, any 
grievance fil.ed represents a potential right or benefit gained or lost. 
One can see this definition of labor relations reflected in interviews with 
supervisors who went though the training. One supervisor noted that this 
training manual tried to make the relationship with the union more adversarial 
than it was. Other supervisors tended to use the analogy of relations offered by 
the m'anual. One supervisor interpreted the union as wanting more wages and 
benetits for less work and the company as wanting more work for fewer wages 
I 
and Qenefits. Using language from the manual, another worker stated, 
"Everything in the contract is theirs; everything else is the company's." 
Additionally, the manual defines the supervisor as management's front 
line representative in dealing with the union. Top-level management provides 
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the interpretation of the contract. Supervisors must represent top management 
by following the interpretation. There is no room for the first line supervisor to 
deviate from the established interpretation. All management must stand 
together. This analogy encourages dividing the organization into those who 
stand together around one position against those being supervised. One 
supervisor who went through the training in which this manual was used 
indicated that the trainer discouraged supervisors from forming or maintaining 
friendships with workers because it might compromise their loyalty to 
management. 
By virtue of obligating first line supervisors to maintain upper 
management's interpretation of the contract, not only did the practice 
implemented by management and included in the training manual encourage 
conflict, it also eliminated the ability to compromise at the supervisor-worker 
level. As the manual notes, 'There can be no middle of the road for front-line 
supervisors, and there can be no conciliation in order to obtain the cooperation 
of the employees working directly for the supervisor." In interviews with workers 
and managers, instances were found in which a supervisor and local manager 
would try to work out a settlement over a grievance. Then, higher levels of 
management would intervene to stop the settlement. Both the company and the 
union define the supervisor's role and the steward's role as a representative of 
the company or union. Neither are authorized to settle grievances without 
getting approval from their superiors. As several workers and supervisors 
noted, this effectively reaches down and takes away the supervisor-worker 
relationship. 
While this conflictual period did not utilize "teflon settlements,." one can 
still find a correspondence between the practices adopted by management and 
by the union and the principles used to establish past practices in arbitration. 
First, the company avoided creating evidence of a past practice while the 
union attempted to establish evidence of past practices. For example, the 
company would not provide written job descriptions for union positions. When 
questions of intent behind the contract arose, the company would informally 
discuss intent but would not commit such understandings to writing. The union 
tried to get job descriptions, letters stipulating understandings of the intent of the 
contract, etc. to create evidence of a past practice. 
Other strategies for avoiding the appearance of a past practice are 
outlined in the company labor relations training manual. One practice 
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described to avoid the appearance of past practices involved the type of 
language used by supervisors in resolving grievances: 
The supervisor is advised to refrain from using those types of words 
which indicate that management's actions are based upon its previous 
actions or past practice. Supervisors should avoid using words such as 
Husl,lally, H ff customarily, H "normally, H ff routinely, H ff ordinarily, H ff regularly, H 
ff historically," "similarly," "habitually·" "as previously," "in the past, H 
Htraditionally," "accustomed," "as in previous instances," Has in similar 
instances, H H according to past relationships, H etc. 
Another practice outlined in the manual is the reaffirmation of an old rule. Here, 
through neglect or acquiescence, a practice other than an established rule has 
emerged. By reaffirming the old rule by stating that it will again be followed, the 
emerging practice can be eliminated. Yet another strategy outlined in the 
manual is the introduction of new methods or equipment to eliminate the 
circumstances which the·past practice address,ed. 
Second, one can find descriptions in the interviews of practices by which 
one party or the other will try to extend an element of the contract to a new set of 
circumstances and thereby modify the meaning of the contract. For example, 
there is a complex set of rules in the contract as to how overtime pay, holidays, 
and shift work interact. Over a period of time, one particular work group utilized 
these rules to maximize their incomes through overtime. When upper 
management realized this, they intervened to apply the same clauses in the 
contract in a way that significantly reduced overtime and holiday pay. In 
another case, there was a rule about giving workers a meal within a specified 
time ifthey were. held over to complete a job. A manager wanted to wait beyond 
the specified time and give the meal to the workers at the end of the work. In 
effect, this manager was creating a longer work day. The union intervened 
before this practice was implemented. They pointed out that the overtime and 
meal practices were put in the contract to apply to emergencies. Normal work is 
to be done in an eight-hour day. 
Third, one can find descriptions of practices in which the work 
circ1.:1mstances are changed by the company to attempt to alter the contract that 
applies to existing circumstances. For example, the company has tried to get 
I 
workers to work with a line crew smaller than that stipulated in the contract. The 
i 
unidn filed a grievance aod won the arbitration case. Then, the. company. 
changed the technology from one size and use of a line pole to a smaller size 
and :different use of a line pole and worked the job with a smaller crew again. 
Even though the contract stated one minimum size for a line crew, the company 
I 
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won the arbitration due in part to the changed circumstances. Now, the 
company has the legal ability to do line work on the changed technology with a 
smaller crew. Following this decision, one can find in the interviews examples 
of attempts to work with a reduced crew size on the old size and use poles. 
Fourth, one can find descriptions of practices in which the work 
circumstances have changed but the union continues to resist changing 
practices because the practices are contained in the contract. For example, 
language about not working in wet weather except in an emergency was put in 
the contract when all line work was done from the line pole and was usually 
done while the lines were energized. Working in wet weather under those 
circumstances, according to a person who was a supervisor and had been a 
line worker, would be very dangerous. The new bucket truck technology is 
much safer. Also, much line work done now is done on de-energized lines. 
Yet, the union continues to insist on the same rules in the contract that were 
incorporated in the contract under different circumstances. 
Finally, one can find numerous descriptions in the interviews of practices 
by which the company tries to get workers to acquiesce to a practice and by 
which the union resists such attempts. One tactic used by management is to try 
to find a crew who will work under conditions or using practices different from 
those stipulated in the contract. For example, a crew might be encouraged to 
do a job with less than the minimum crew size stipulated in the contract. These 
attempts are usually carried out in areas of the company which are 
geographically remote from the union hall and company headquarters or which 
do not have strong union members. Another tactic is to involve a few union 
members on company task forces or committees to address various issues. If 
questions are raised by the union or workers about the outcomes of those 
committees, the company often claims that workers had a say. Finally, the 
company established a total quality management program to get workers to 
redesign work in participatory group settings controlled by management. 
Since the appearance of acquiescence can be used by either the union 
or the company to establish past practice, the union instituted practices to 
' 
cha1:1enge officially and practically the changes in working conditions being 
instituted by the company on a unilateral basis. As noted earlier, when a party 
protests a practice, acquiescence cannot be implied. First, the union increased 
its communication with bargaining units in areas geographically remote from 
the ~nion hall. Changes in practices were challenged through the grievance 
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process in every instance found by the union. This would prevent the company 
from claiming the practices were accepted in some places and not in other 
places. Since the company was forcing most grievances to arbitration and 
since over thirty grievances had been filed in a year, the union had to drop 
many grievances because of financial constraints. Yet, they filed such 
grievances to leave a written documentary trail of evidence of challenging 
rather than acquiescing to managerial changes in work practices. Second, the 
union instituted a campaign of noncooperation in areas where noncooperation 
could be done. From the union newsletter, one can see the union instructing 
workers to not carry pagers or take company vehicles home. To do so would be 
to acquiesce to performing stand-by work with no stand-by pay. Workers were 
encouraged to not voluntarily participate in the total quality management 
program. To do so could imply acquiesce to changes in working conditions 
made by these committees. Third, stewards would -- on their own -- devise 
strategies to prevent or resist changes in work practices. For example, one 
steward s~ared her understanding of work practices with a new supervisor to 
set expectations for the supervisor. Another steward wrote open letters to all 
work groups in an area questioning changes imposed by the local manager. 
The Problem of DuaUy Embegded Elements of Problem Solving and Contract 
Construction 
In the chapter on management practices, it was argued that combining 
participation practices with management rights, discipline with punishment, and 
cost cutting with safety sets up contradictory lines of action. The very acts used 
in one practice become problematic in the other practice. 
Here, similar problems emerge with combining problem solving at the 
work group level with contract construction through past practices and 
grievances. On the one hand, workers and supervisors engage in discussions 
to work out differences over work practices. If this practice did not potentially 
mod,ify the labor contract, it could occur with no problem. But, through the use of 
past: practice to implicitly construct a contract and the use of the grievance to 
make the practice explicitly a part of the contract, such work group problem 
solving becomes contract construction. Instead of simply making an object of 
some work practice and working on the practice, contract construction turns 
such work practices into rights and obligations which are enforceable through 
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the government's legal apparatus. As long as neither the union or the company 
try to use problem solving over work practices in the work place to argue for or 
against a past practice, such problem solving appears to be unproblematic. 
But, if either party tries to use such problem solving as evidence regarding a 
past practice is a grievance, the other party engages a set of tactics to resist the 
move. 
It should be pointed out that problem solving to reach nonbinding 
agreements is not unproblematic for the union. With no legally binding side 
agreements, clauses in the collective bargaining agreement, or adequate 
evidence of a past practice, the company can take unilateral actions which may 
damage the well being of workers. 
Representation 
The practice of representation is built into labor law (Gold, 1989). 
Workers vote to determine who will represent them. Once a work unit elects to 
be represented, the union is obligated to represent the interests and concerns 
of all workers in the unit. Workers vote on whether or not to ratify the terms of a 
contract. They vote on who will represent them as union officials. 
Given the practice of voting to determine representation and as a tool to 
adopt policies and contracts, Michels (1964), Walton and McKersie (1965), 
Gamson (1968), and Freeman and Medoff (1984) note that voting encourages 
practices of influence. Workers can always take their vote away from supporting 
particular union leaders, a proposed labor contract, or the union itself. In this 
particular study, the collective bargaining agreement contained an open shop 
clause. That is, no worker in a unit represented by the union is either required 
to join the union or pay union dues unless they are a member of the union. In 
an agency shop, all workers in a unit represented by a union must pay union 
dues whether they are union members or not. The practice of the open shop 
gives workers the additional ability to exit with their union dues. This would 
probably encourage the union to encourage workers to join the union more 
than the agency shop. 
Since workers are involved in voting on whether or not to have a union, 
i 
on u'nion leadership, and on collective bargaining agreements, the company is 
affected by the outcome of such voting. The National Labor Relations Act bars 
companies from interfering with concerted activity. As Gold notes (1989), the 
company is prohibited from restraining or coercing workers as they engage in 
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organizing. However, the company and the union enjoy the right of free 
speech. Also, managers may engage in one-on-one, occasional discussions. 
The company can also alter conditions which are problematic to workers before 
workers turn to the union for collective bargaining. 
In this section, the various practices by which the union and the company 
work at encouraging workers and managers in some way with respect to 
representation will be explored. 
The Use of Discontent and Involvement by the Union and Workers 
Discontent. One can find a series of management practices in stories 
told in interviews or meetings that opened problems for workers. The layoffs 
and the perceived deception around them are the most prominent practices 
which open the question of trust in management. These stories tended to be 
told throughout the company by workers and many supervisors. Other 
management practices included in stories of discontent were the institution of 
testing for entry into jobs that had been filled by seniority and demonstrated craft 
skill, the use of college requirements for promotion into management instead of 
seniority and demonstrated craft skill, out sourcing work that had been done by 
the company's unionized workers, and various changes in work rules which 
altered overtime, the scheduling of shift work, and the size of line crews. While 
these stories involved company wide practices, they tended to be told by work 
groups that were specifically involved in the practice. 
The object of discontent associated with these problematic actions 
tended to be dependent on a variety of practices. As noted earlier, the former 
union leadership would work out an issue with the former labor relations staff 
and either not widely inform the union membership or would tell union members 
what they wanted to hear. At some point, union members made the union 
leadership an issue because they felt that they were not being represented. 
There are stories about the former union leadership "selling out" the union 
membership by not following through with grievances, by not visiting outlying 
are~s on a regular basis, and by agreeing to grievance settlements and 
company actions with which union members did not agree. These issues 
inclJded testing to qualify for positions and reducing the number of days of 
notice necessary to change shift schedules. Here, the practice of 
representation constructed the union leadership as the problem. The practice 
of representation designates an elected person to act on behalf of the elected. 
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If the elected agent is seen to fail to represent members of the union, the 
practice of representation makes the election of a new person the immediate 
solution to the problem. 
The new union leadership tried to address concerns that had been 
neglected or resolved in ways unacceptable to union members. As noted 
earlier, this included revisiting issues which had been unsatisfactorily resolved 
and resolving issues in more contractually binding ways. At this point, the 
former labor relations staff was still in place and utilized practices of problem 
solving and compromise which made the mutually agreeable resolution of a 
problem the object of interaction. However, from letters exchanged between an 
even earlier set of union leadership and the former labor relations staff, the 
former labor relations staff did not begin its tenure using problem solving and 
compromise. In these letters, it appeared that the labor relations staff had 
closed off negotiating over issues. Here, the former labor relations staff was 
made the issue. Similarly, the new union leadership seemed to make the new 
labor relations staff and the new executive level management the issue only 
after management adopted the practice of taking unilateral action and closing 
further negotiations over grievances: "Here's our decision; here's why; we're 
not interested in discussing it; do what you have to do." It would seem that the 
ad hominem practice of making management the issue is used more often after 
the practice of making working conditions the issue breaks down. 
Once the management of the company adopted practices to make it 
difficult to argue for past practices and closed off problem solving and 
compromise, the audience of the conflict was widened by the union. The union 
told stories which elicited discontent through its newsletter, flyers posted on 
bulletin boards, radio spots, newspaper adds, and an information picket. If one 
examines the content of these items, they mainly have to do with current items 
included in negotiations, issues involved in grievances, and practices used by 
the company in relating to the union. The appeals used in these 
communications reflected a sensitivity to audience. The advertisements in the 
public media portrayed the negative consequences of a reduced work force on 
customer response time and the unfairness of practices such as changing work 
schedules such thaUamily life is difficult to sustain .. When the publication 
shifted to the union newsletter and flyers used on work place bulletin boards, 
content became more technical with respect to labor relations practices, work 
practices, and the contract. It also became more directly degrading of 
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management: "Ask your supervisor if COMPANY labor relations and employee 
shaft relations 'are the same.'" 
These analogies of discon~ent are used by workers in a number of ways 
in the work setting. First, some are used to degrade managers. One worker told 
of a manager who said, "The best system is to catch it five minutes before it 
fails." Everyone in the work area used this phrase in arguments for years. This 
worker observed that both managers and workers take each other's mistakes 
and use them in rituals of degradation. 
Second, analogies of discontent are related in work discussions in a way 
to elicit the cooperation of other workers in challenging a management 
decision. For example, one worker would try to bring up issues that were being 
negotiated when work practices related to them were discussed in the morning 
meeting to discuss the work to be done for the day. In another situation, rather 
than privately discuss a management decision with a supervisor to try to work 
out a solution before filing a formal grievance, a worker wrote a letter to the 
manager stating what should be done according to past practice, posted the 
letter for all other workers to see, and sent a copy of the letter to the union 
business agent. 
Involvement. As one turns to examine practices used to involve union 
members in union actions, one can identify a shift in practices which either 
place the union member in the role of an actor or in the role of a spectator with 
respect to the union itself. Under the former union leadership, it was earlier 
observed that union members tended to be excluded by the former union 
leadership in the resolution of grievances and in the striking of agreements in 
negotiations. Contract issues were sometimes worked out between the labor 
relations staff and the union business manager away from the negotiating table. 
The resolutions of issues were not widely shared. As a former labor relations 
staff persons observed, the former union leadership was not involved with the 
union membership enough to take things to them to get them approved. 
Outlying areas were neglected. Other than voting, there were few practices by 
i 
which union members were actually involved in acting out being in the union. 
During this period, a comment by a labor relations staff person indicated that 
about sixty percent of persons in units represented by the union were members 
of the union. As several union members noted, the union during this period of . 
time did not seem to care about them. 
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The new union membership engaged in numerous tactics to involve the 
union membership. Systematic visits were made to all units of the company 
served by the union to solicit problems and to share information about union 
activities. Proposals for annual contract negotiations were actively solicited 
from the membership. 
The more effective practices to engage union members in acting out their 
union membership emerged in response to new practices used by 
management in response to the union's attempts to revisit issues that had been 
inadequately resolved by the former union leadership with practices that would 
contractually bind the company. As noted earlier, the union began a resistance 
campaign in response to company practices to make it difficult to establish past 
practices and to resist any resolution of grievances other than management's 
decision o~ arbitration. The union leadership discouraged workers from 
carrying pagers or taking trucks home to make call outs easier for management 
without receiving stand by pay, from voluntarily participating in company 
sponsored activities during or after work hours, from voluntarily participating in 
participatory management programs, from going to work early or staying late 
without over time, and from voluntarily changing classifications, working hours, 
or days off. Additionally, the union.conducted concerted activities such.as an 
information picket at the general offices of the company during negotiations. 
These acts gave union members a way to participate in every day acts that put 
them in the role of acting out their union membership. Such acts were defined 
by union members as acts of solidarity. 
These acts encouraged by the union leadership did not work uniformly 
with the membership. One of three other practices seemed to be needed. One 
practice was peer pressure. This involved such acts as some workers pointing 
out to other workers what is expected, degrading workers who do not conform to 
expectations, and shunning workers who do not conform. For example, one 
line crew had a person to whom others would not speak because she went 
along with some of the activities which the union discouraged. In general, as 
one union steward observed, "If you don't do your job as a steward, you're 
going to catch hell." Here, it is evident that the practice of representation in 
labor law sets up the expectation that the steward will represent the views of 
workers. Such a practice would invite more peer pressure tactics than would 
probably otherwise occur. Such acts by which one catches "hell" for not 
conforming become analogies for role taking that block the worker even when 
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others are not present to give a person "hell." As one worker said, "When your 
boss asks you to do something that is against the contract, you wonder if you 
are going to piss the others off." 
A second practice which encouraged workers to carry out the union's 
resistance tactics was set·up by the presence of workers who felt that they had 
been unfairly treated by some of the new management practices. Several work 
groups whose members were interviewed contained workers who had not been 
promoted because of the new testing system and education qualifications. 
These workers were constantly comparing their skills with the new persons in 
the position to show fellow workers how wrong the company's decision was. In 
carrying out its representation role, the union filed grievances in some of these 
cases. Having such an avenue for attempting to change management practices 
probably encourages the continuation of such practices of discontent. 
The most potent practices which encouraged union members to act out 
their union membership occurred when management decisions challenged the 
worker's understanding of the contract or past practice, when managers closed 
off discussions. to resolve grievances with the litany ending with the phrase, 
"Here's our decision; do what you have to do," when managers tried to pit 
workers against each other over overtime or classification boundaries, or when 
managers challenged union involvement or concerted activity. An example of 
this developed when a manager from a nonunion background forced workers to 
remove the union logo from their lockers, hard hats, and clothing. Now, 
everyone wears them. This practice was also a ritual of loyalty and a 
demonstration of rights. As a supervisor noted, "This forced people to choose 
sides." 
Effects. A measure of the combined effects of these practices of 
involvement can be seen in increased union membership among the unionized 
units in the company. Over an approximately two year period, a labor relations 
staff member stated that union membership had increased from about sixty 
percent to about eighty percent in represented units. Another measure of the 
effects of these practices was noted by a senior executive of the company. 
Duri~g the information picket of the company's general office, she was 
surp~ised to see union workers on the picket line whom she had know for a long 
time to be reasonable people and not union radicals. 
Management Practices to Counter Union Practices Developed Around 
Representation and Involvement 
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Countering Practices Developed Around Representation. Just as 
man:agers adopted practices to make it more difficult for the union to use the 
grie~ance process to contractually bind management to practices, managers 
also' adopted practices to counter the practices developed by the union around 
representation. With respect to managing discontent, practices were adopted to 
provide avenues for addressing discontent which placed managers in the role 
of showing concern while allowing for an expression of discontent by the 
worker, to offer explanations and analogies for interpreting events as 
alternatives to those offered by workers or the union, to resolve issues with the 
nonunionized work force to discourage votes for representation, and to drive a 
HwedgeH between workers. 
Most of the practices used to give workers a chance to express 
discontent while putting managers in the role of showing concern have already 
been discussed. Whether it is a manager listening to the complaint of a worker 
or a group of workers raising an issue in a meeting, the practice is the same. 
Listen to the concerns without being critical of them. Indicate sympathy by 
stating that the concerned is shared by the manager who is listening. Then, 
move on to the next issue. Managers often do take the concern to their 
superiors. But, between the delay in time between an expression of concern 
and a decision and the lack of correspondence between the workers 
expectation and the manager's decision, it appears as if the concern has simply 
been set aside. 
The most dominant practices used to address discontent involve offering 
explanations or analogies for interpreting the actions of managers from the 
point of view of managers. As noted in a management reported on 
negotiations, the principal strategy used to counter discontent is a Hparticipative 
management style. H Here, employees are allowed to raise wage and benefit 
issue~ in company meetings or in one-on-one sessions with managers. But, 
rathe~ than expressing sympathy for the worker's concern, managers try to 
i 
refrarine the managerial decision causing discontent such that it is seen as 
! 
"reasonable ff and ff right. H If one examines company newsletters, interviews with 
managers. and notes on observations, the company's position is consistently 
framed with the market devices described in an earlier chapter. The workers 
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wages are among the highest in the region. They have comparable benefits to 
othe_r companies. Costs must be kept reasonable when compared with other 
companies. As also noted earlier, these are the devices by which utility 
regulators judge the reasonableness of costs. In light of such reasons, the 
union's proposals are framed as ff demands. H Rather than working from reasons, 
the union is framed as working from "emotion" or "politics." The company used 
newsletters and an electronic mail system to continuously communicate its 
viewpoint to supervisors and workers. 
The company also has special "coachesff and trouble shooting teams to 
address specific cases of discontent with the above strategies. Several 
strategies used by these coaches or teams involve the practices of command 
through role taking described in the last chapter. These practices are designed 
to get a worker to see things from the point of view of management. Sometimes 
coaches t~ke the role of showing concern for the actions of a supervisor which 
cause discontent among workers. Here, the coaches often take the workers in 
as "insiders" and enlists workers in "helping" their manager to become more 
· participative and less authoritarian. 
While locations of discontent came to the attention of the human 
resources department through its everyday work, the company conducted a 
survey every few years to systematically identify trouble spots. Additionally, the 
company had begun to select supervisors based on tests which were designed 
to find people who already used these "participatory" practices. They further 
trained supervisors in "participatory" practices. Thus, these strategies to· 
address discontent could be systematically spread through out the company. 
In the locations which were not unionized but which were threatened by 
organizing efforts or by expressions of discontent linked with threats to 
unionized, efforts were made by the company to work more directly on the 
issues associated with expressions of discontent rather than mainly on venting 
discontent_or rhetorically reframing how conditions are viewed. As the 
nonunionized workers expressed discontent, not only did managers exhibit 
more1concern, but salaries were raised, tools and uniforms were purchased for 
I 
work~rs, and working conditions were altered. 
In addition to devising tactics to manage discontent, managers used 
tactics to encourage discontent between workers and between workers and the 
union. As already noted, the Hwedgeff is a practice by which a difference in pay, 
I 
overtir,e, or a work practice or a difference in judgment about a management or 
i 
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union practice is identified and compared in a way that encourages a conflicting 
definition of interests among workers. For example, managers will engage in a 
practice which is liked by some union members but is opposed by other union 
members. Here, a management practice is combined with differing judgments 
by unionized workers to set up a "wedge." In one situation, the union distributed 
flyers and newsletters pointing out how participatory management practices had 
been used to destroy unions. At the same time, managers would "talk up" how 
union workers who had actually gone through the participatory program liked it. 
As already noted, "wedges" change the focus of discontent from between 
management and workers to between workers and workers or workers and the 
union. "Wedges" also make it more problematic for the union to take action. A 
vote to authorize an action around which a wedge has developed becomes 
questionable. Finally, with an open shop, workers who become discontented 
with the union through a "wedge" can leave the union and take their dues with 
them. 
Countering Union Involvement and Encouraging Management 
Involvement. Some management practices reduce worker representation by 
reducing the union's influence in managerial areas. 
One group of practices work on the resources of the union to make it 
difficult to carry out representation. By forcing more grievances to arbitration 
and by resisting proposals in negotiations, the company drove up the expenses 
of the union. At some point, the union drops grievance cases or negotiation 
proposals because of a lack of the money required to pursue them. In addition 
to working on financial resources, the company worked on leadership 
resources in the union. Historically, the company hired union members who 
were seen by management as effective union leaders to remove them from the 
bargaining unit. In the case of the new union leadership, the company removed 
them. The collective bargaining agreement in this study made provisions for 
employees who were elected as union business managers to return to work 
after serving one term. The agreement also provided that -- at the company's 
discretion -- the union business managers could return to the company after 
more than one term. In the case of the new union leadership, they were not 
allowed to return if they served more than one term. This was the first time in 
the history of the agreement that this had been the case. While this move 
removed the union business managers from the company, it also removed the 
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potential to return to work as a device to encourage cooperation. 
A second group of management practices reduced representation by 
reducing the opportunities to negotiate over working conditions. Gold (1989) 
and :Mittenthal (1984) note that the practice of arbitration was devised to avoid 
strikes over the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement during its 
effective life. However, since past practice was established as a basis for a 
common law interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the 
resolution of grievances effectively modify the labor contract. By first consulting 
with union officials and workers before implementing new decisions, there was 
an opportunity to negotiate in the grievance process. This was the practice 
carried out by the former labor relations staff and the former union business 
managers. But, by using the provision in the contract to work then grieve, by 
resisting grievances to arbitration, by the asymmetry in funds available to 
pursue grievances, and by the probability that most of the grievances will be 
resolved in favor of the company because of the difficult procedures required to 
establish past practice, the company could unilaterally change past practices 
without negotiating. It is ironic that this management practice seemed to be 
evoked by the new union leadership as they tried to use the grievance process 
to make binding or to change the "teflon" agreements made by the former union 
business managers and the former labor relations staff. 
A third group of practices utilized various participatory practices to 
provide an alternative to union representation for managers to resolve issues 
with workers. These practices varied from information sharing sessions in 
which the company clarified decisions for workers to brainstorming sessions in 
which workers share work related information with managers, area or company 
wide task forces or committees created and controlled by managers but which 
included nonmanagerial employees to propose actions to senior management, 
and a total quality management program established and controlled by 
managers but which included nonmanagerial employees to devise changes in 
how work gets done and to propose such changes to senior management. 
Whil~ the management of the company tried to get the union to go along with 
I 
these; programs, the union was excluded from the creation and control of these 
committees, groups, and task forces. 
1 Some of these participatory practices have been made problematic by 
two recent rulings by the National Labor Relations Board. In 309 NLRB 163 
(1992) and 311 NLRB 88 (1993), some types of participatory management 
: 
209 
schemes were declared illegal because, according to the Board, they 
constituted labor organizations as defined by Section 2 (5) of the National 
Labor Relations Act and they constituted a company union, which is an unfair 
labor practice as defined by Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act. The opinions in these 
cases reasoned that, if these participatory committees included nonmanagerial 
workers and are established by the company to come up with proposals from 
representatives of employees and if management on the committee or outside 
the committee can reject such proposals, then the participatory committees are 
a labor organization and are illegal company unions. The NLRB ruled that this 
is the case for both a nonunionized company (309 NLRB 163 (1992)) and a 
unionized company (311 NLRB 88 (1993)). 
The use of testing and education requirements as a means of promotion 
constitute a fourth group of practices which provide a practice of promotion 
which is an alternative to representation practices of negotiations and 
grievances. With the practice of representation, increases in salaries and 
benefits are negotiated. By establishing the testing system and education 
requirements as a method of promotion, the company established a system 
which evaluates persons as individuals. It provides workers with ladders of 
mobility which only they as individuals can use. To the extent that individuals 
use this ladder, they can improve salaries and working conditions for 
themselves as individuals. The company makes available financial resources 
for personnel to attend college and other training. To the extend individuals are 
successful with this method of changing their own salaries and working 
conditions, the union and representation is not needed by them. This has 
potential to work as a "wedge." If the system works for a worker, it makes union 
membership less inviting. 
While the above series of practices utilized by managers make it difficult 
for workers to use representation or encourage other means of dealing with 
discontent, a second series of practices were used to organize and involve 
managers to carry out the company's labor relations practices. Whereas former 
labor relations practices tended to exclude managers from a role in labor 
relations practices, the new labor relations practices put managers in the role of 
carrying out management policy. As already noted, the labor relations training 
manual put supervisors in the position of guarding management rights by 
adopting practices which make the establishment of past practices difficult. 
Furthermore, the manual clearly placed supervisors on the manager's side as 
management's local agent. Finally, the manual defined the union and 
management as having two, mutually exclusive purposes. 
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It should be noted that various practices used by the union encouraged 
supervisors to identify with management and to see the union as other. Flyers, 
newsletters, the information picket, and media appeals which degraded 
supervisors angered many supervisors. Furthermore, the act of taking the fight 
outside of the company to degrade the company angered many managers. 
They questioned the appropriateness of these actions since they were not done 
when they were in the union. They questioned the motivation of union 
leadership. The practices noted above by which workers challenged managers 
in the work group in ways that brought other workers against a manager also 
encouraged managers to work together to counter the workers. It is difficult to 
see the viewpoint of the other when one is under attack. 
Finally, the new labor relations staff developed practices which 
encouraged management participation in developing the labor relations 
policies of the company. Supervisors were polled about what they wanted in 
the contract. They were consulted about what problems they had with 
proposals set forth by the union in negotiations. A group of middle and senior 
managers was formed to elicit and address problems which arose with 
interpreting the contract. These practices involved many managers in coming to 
a position. The development of a widely held position supports the duty 
outlined in the supervisor's training manual to support such positions in 
solidarity with management. 
CHAPTER IX 
A GENEALOGY OF DISTRUST 
(AND TRUST) 
Introduction 
If one examines the analogies of distrust summarized in Table VI and 
Table VII, one finds that the content of each these analogies contains two 
different practices. In Table VI, one finds analogies which elaborate reversals of 
practices. On the one hand, a practice on which workers or managers relied or 
in which they trusted can be found in the analogies. On the other hand, the 
analogies also contain the elaboration of another practice which replaced the 
expected practice and, by doing so, evoked distrust. Thus, the analogies of 
distrust themselves are the principal tool for identifying what changed in the 
relationship between the union and the company to cause the relationship 
between them to deteriorate. Once two practices are identified in an analogy, 
one can then explore what practices changed and in what ways to facilitate the 
shift from the practice counted on to the practice evoking distrust. 
After exploring the emergence of distrust based on reversals of practice, 
distrust based on dually embedded practices will be explored. Unlike the 
analogies found in Table VI, the analogies found in Table VII do not contain 
historical reversals of practices. Instead, they contain references to two 
practices which either utilize common elements of different practices or two 
practices which simultaneously work on actors to encourage different lines of 
action. 
, Finally, the interpretation of trust and distrust made in this study will be 
place~ back into the context of the review of literature on trust to recast the issue 
I 
of trust in social relations. 
Distrust and the Reversal of Practices 




ANALOGIES OF DISTRUST AND REVERSALS OF PRACTICES 
Analogy of Distrust 
Stories relating dis-
trust to practice of 
no layoffs and per-
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no layoffs 
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trust to testing and 
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ments to advance 
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trust to the failure 
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to "bei~g radical" 
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ANALOGIES OF DISTRUST AND DUALLY EMBEDDED PRACTICES 
Analogy of Distrust 
Stories of distrust of 
former union business 
manager by member-
ship related to 
representation 
Stories of distrust of 
former labor 
relations staff by 
managers related to 
representation 
Stories of distrust 
of company by union 
related to company's 
unwillingness to 
engage in binding 
grievance settlements 
and stories of distrust 
of union by company 
related to union's 
attempts to engage 
in binding grievance 
settlements 
Stories of distrust of 
participatory 
management practices 
by workers and first 
line supervisors 




work rules and 
stories11 of distrust 
of worK:ers by 
manag:ement over 
raising ';staffing and 
work practice issues 
with safety issues 
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ANALOGIES OF DISTRUST AND DUALLY EMBEDDED PRACTICES 
Analogy of Distrust 




Stories of distrust of 
workers by 
management around 
time and work rules 
Stories of distrust of 
management by 
workers over being 
told to share openly 
only to have it 
negatively effect 
them at a later date 











traditional institutionalists, such as Kalleberg and Berg (1987), would 
encourage one to examine how changes in product or service markets -- such 
as electricity -- affect labor markets. From Table II in Chapter IV one can see 
that, even though the number of customers increased during the period ( 1980-
1985) just prior to the layoff, the company experienced a significant decrease in 
the number of kilowatt-hours of electricity sold. Thus revenue decreased over 
the period. At the same time, several executives noted that the operations and 
maintenance budget of the company was growing at about sixteen percent per 
year. Thus, the company took action to cut costs to maintain profitability by 
reducing the work force by fifteen percent to just over 2,000 employees. About 
half of the work force reduction was achieved through a special early retirement 
program for employees in their late fifties. The other half was achieved through 
layoffs. 
While models that relate product or service markets to labor markets can 
show that environmental conditions make things problematic for a company, 
how the company responds is a matter of a number of practices that such 
models ignore. From interviews, it was learned that, during the Great 
Depression in the 1930s, the company reduced wages or hours or both to keep 
the work force employed. This was a strategy that could have been used but 
which was not discussed with the work force. Additionally, it may have been 
possible for the company to have gone to the state utility board for rate 
adjustments. However, the company had adopted low rates and other 
marketing strategies to attract industry to the state. Finally, the company could 
have reduced earnings paid to stockholders. According to a report on National 
Public Radio aired in August 1993, the parent company of the company in this 
study was among the top companies in the nation with annual increased 
earnings each year for the last ten years. 
The exact ways in which layoffs beyond the special early retirement plan 
were made can only be understood in light of competitive strategies adopted by 
the company. Competitive strategies represent the practices that link the 
product market to the firm internal labor market. As noted earlier, the practice of 
providing electricity on demand interacts with the use of refrigerant air 
conditioning to set up the problem of building a system to deliver peak demand 
while earning revenue on a much lower average demand. In the early 1980s, 
the company adopted a marketing strategy of conservation combined with 
increasing the share of the heating market to both decrease peak demand and 
! 
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to increase average demand. According to one company annual report, this 
program led to the constraint of almost 100 megawatts of peak demand over a 
period of a few years. 
If one examines the company's annual report from the year of the layoff in 
the rnid-1980s, one can see another round of strategies adopted which now 
work on the electrical production and delivery system itself to match the 
production and operations capacity of the company in a flexible way to the 
seasonal changes in the demand for electricity and services. Thus, two plants 
were base loaded. One was closed. Four plants were put on a stand-by status. 
Additionally, line workers in the company's largest areas were laid off and 
operations were reorganized to meet average demand. Peak demand for line 
service and for plant maintenance was now met by out sourcing. Finally, the 
company adopted a pricing strategy to become one of the lowest cost electrical 
utilities in order to attract new industrial customers. 
The executives in the company studied tried to reduce the impact of the 
work force reduction by creating the special early retirement plan. Some 
executives shared that they did not think that the president of the company in 
this study could sell this plan to the parent company. Executives hoped that 
necessary work force reductions could be achieved by the early retirement plan. 
But, when people had to be laid off, the way in which the layoffs were deployed 
and the restriction of union seniority protection to work units combined to have 
an impact on the union much larger than the seven to eight percent of the work 
force that was laid off in addition to the seven to eight percent of the work force 
who took advantage of the early retirement plan. 
If layoffs had been made equally in every unit, the line workers in the 
company's largest area would have had seven to eight percent of the newest 
workers laid off. Instead, the early retirements and the layoffs resulted in a work 
force reduction of about thirty-five percent. The power plant that was closed 
was also located in this same area. A traveling power plant maintenance crew 
based out of this same area lost about sixty percent of its work force. 
Colleetively, these three groups lost over fifty percent of their work force. So, the 
i 
cut into seniority for these groups was much more significant than the seven to 
eight percent that would have occurred if layoffs had been effected equally 
across the company. 
The work force in this area made up one-fourth to one-third of the union 
membership at the time of the layoffs. The union office was located in this area. 
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Most of the union leadership came from this area. Thus, the layoffs happened 
to a group of workers who had a position in the union to make their distrust of 
the company evoked by the layoffs more effectively the whole union 
membership's distrust of the company. 
While the layoffs had an immediate impact on trust in the company 
amohg the unionized work force, the implementation of the economic shutdown 
of four power plants created other reversals of practices. First, one of these 
plants did experience a reduction in work force of about twenty percent. 
Second, the schedule of plant operations were subject to frequent and 
impromptu changes as these power plants were put on line or shut down as 
demand changed. Such schedule changes not only reversed previously used 
practices, but they also made family life more problematic for the workers 
effected. This set up a continual, chronic reinforcer of the distrust initiated by the 
layoffs for a different fifteen percent of the unionized work force from those most 
directly effected by the layoffs. 
Subsequent to the layoffs, decisions to employ industrial/organizational 
psychology practices to restructuring the work force reversed the use of 
seniority as a practice for advancement on a company wide basis and replaced 
it with testing schemes and college educational requirements. This would effect 
all persons in the company with seniority who were waiting to enter an 
apprentice program and all union members with seniority who were waiting for 
a supervisory position or a union position in a different line of progression. Both 
in places effected by layoffs and by changes in work practices and in places 
relatively unaffected by the strategic restructuring described above, persons 
were found who had been passed over because of a test or educational 
requirement who would have been promoted on the former practice of seniority. 
In an interview with the union member who was the most sympathetic with 
management of any worker interviewed, she said that not receiving the 
promotion to supervision that she expected would be the one event which 
would cause her to lose trust in the company . 
. Thus, the effect of the layoffs, changes in work practices, and changes in 
prom9tion practices was much more extensive on union members with 
significant seniority than a simple seven to eight percent work force reduction 
effected th'rough voluntary early retirement followed by a seven to eight percent 
work force reduction across the board would be. It is therefore not surprising 
I 
that tije attitudes of unionized workers toward management deteriorated after 
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the layoffs nor is it surprising that they elected leadership which would try to 
reve.rse the effects of strategic decisions. Since management was continuing to 
try to strategically restructure various aspects of the company, it is not surprising 
that they adopted practices to resist any contractual entanglements which would 
impede their efforts. Again, compared to a labor relations practice of 
compromise and accommodation, such a practice represented a reversal of 
practices which set up further distrust of management on the part of union 
members. 
As noted earlier, these reversals made the practice of compromise and 
accommodation on the part of the union leadership unacceptable to the union 
membership because, in the face of a management adopting new practices, 
accommodation means going along with the management practices that are 
now problematic to union members. As also noted earlier, strikes were 
prohibited during the life of the contract by the contract itself, and strikes were 
dangerous once the company engaged in out sourcing to the extent that 
workers could be replaced with contractors. Furthermore, the parent company 
could lend workers from other utilities that it owned to weather a strike. The 
practice of increasing the degradation of management and of engaging in 
passive aggressive tactics which increase the costs of doing business and the 
effort required to manage were about the only avenues open to the union to put 
pressure on management to address their concerns. 
The very economic conditions that made the electricity product and 
service market problematic to the company also affected the labor market in the 
areas served by the company in a way that made exit problematic for workers. 
Throughout the 1970s, all industrial categories were adding employment in the 
MSA. Employment grew during this period by an average of over 15,000 jobs 
per year. But, in the 1980s, employment grew by only an average of over 1,000 
jobs per year. During this period, mining, manufacturing, construction, and 
wholesale trade were losing employment while the other industrial sectors were 
adding employment at a rate slower than in the 1970s. The jobs which were 
being lost in the 1980s tended to be the jobs which paid higher wages in the 
1970s: manufacturing, mining, and construction. The only sector which paid 
higher wages and continued to marginally add jobs was transportation and 
public utilities. Since the only electric utility in this area for whom workers could 
work was the company in this study and since employment in the alternative 
indus~rial areas in which their skills could apply were shrinking, workers had no 
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place to exit. 
The lack of a place to which workers can exit in the face of layoffs, 
changes in work rules, and changes in rules for advancement probably 
intensifies distrust of the company for at least two reasons. First, workers cannot 
easily exit the organization without losing a significant source of support. Thus, 
they·.cannot escape the constant source of threat which constantly evokes 
distrust. With no place to go, layoffs, out sourcing, and reorganization represent 
a continual threat to the destruction of one's source of support and associated 
life style and family commitments. Changes in the use of seniority leave 
workers in the position of being middle age with additional burdens for 
advancement added with no assurances that obtaining further education will 
lead anywhere. Second, if workers who distrust management cannot exit the 
organization without serious consequences, they will stay in the organization 
and perpetuate the practice of distrust. 
Having explored how management's strategic restructuring of the 
company involved the reversals of practices for particular work groups which 
evoked distrust on a broader scale than one might expect from a simple across 
the board work force reduction, now consider how the company adopted such 
practices rather than other practices in the first place to deal with its economic 
problems. On the one hand, practices adopted as competitive strategies 
became available through a number of practices. Before the person who was 
the president of the company in this study for most of the 1980s took office, the 
company sent her to a nationally known business school for a semester. In fact, 
the parent company sent many of the senior executives in the company in this 
study through this program. During the period when the company's president 
was in the one semester program, the faculty of the school had recently 
published works on competitive strategy, participative management, and worker 
empowerment. In addition to business school, electric utility trade organizations 
provided training and workshops on various practices used to manage an 
electric utility. In fact, the testing program which was developed was developed 
as a part of an industry wide effort organized by an electric utility trade group. 
Mana:,gement consulting firms and human resources management firms were 
involved in various projects. 
The very fact of learning new practices gives people new ways of 
thinking about things and, thereby, encourages change. Yet, the reversal of 
practices which evoked distrust involved eliminating workers' sources of 
I 
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support, limiting workers' careers, and effecting workers' family life. If the 
company employed family like and friendship practices on a broad scale in the 
1980s, could the executives have chosen layoffs rather than income or hour 
reductions, rate increases, dividend decreases, or some other practice that 
protected ~orkers? For example, one manager entered the work force in an 
entry level position along with other workers. At the time of this study, she 
occupied one of the upper management positions in the company. One worker 
who entered the company about the same time and who was a friend of this 
manager had health problems that forced her to quit work. She applied for 
disability. The persons in charge of disability denied the request. These 
persons represented a latter cohort of workers who were college trained and 
who did not enter the company through entry level jobs. Here, the judgment of 
those applying rules about what constituted a disability followed the rules. The 
manager intervened and reversed the decision. What would have happened if 
this worker did not have a relationship with this manager? Again, the senior 
executives of the company developed a special, one-time early retirement plan 
for workers in their late fifties as the first phase of the layoffs. Coincidentally, this 
was also about the same age as most of the senior executives. This plan had to 
be "sold" to the parent company. One senior executive did not believe that the 
president <;>f the company in this study would be successful with the parent 
company. Would such a plan have been developed if the parent company were 
dictating the reductions? Or finally, a senior executive had once been a part of 
the team training apprentice line workers. She found it disturbing to see 
workers on the information picket line whom she had known and had know to 
be "reasonable." Without such relations, would the information picket have 
given her pause to question the company's position? 
Friendship practices also seemed to modify labor relations. The labor 
relations staff in the 1970s came out of the ranks of the union workers. Even 
while this person worked as a manager, she maintained her union membership. 
From the interviews, it appears that this labor relations staff would make 
I 
I 
informal agreements and would honor those agreements. It appears that there 
! 
was a general practice of working out issues before they were implemented. 
From .the historical file of news articles from the local library, one can find stories 
from the 1970s in which agreements were worked out with unions about craft 
bounqf aries before work began on a power plant. Friendship also worked to 
! 
allow !the labor relations staff to influence union members on issues. The labor 
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relations staff could get the union membership to go along with company plans. 
To understand how practices were adopted which reversed job security, 
mobility, and working conditions, it is important to trace practices that would 
have eliminated or made ineffectual practices of friendship and family like 
practices that made it difficult to ignore the consequence of actions on the other 
party. 
One can find three basic practices which the company used prior to 1970 
which would encourage the friendship practices sited in the interviews. First, 
the family night dinners and holiday parties were a strategy adopted by the 
company as a training strategy. In the local library's historical file, an article was 
found from the 1950s in which a representative from the local chapter of the 
American Society of Training Directors indicated that business leaders over the 
nation began to seek organized methods in 1947 to provide employee 
education in human relations and in what it takes to operate a business. 5 
According to the article, the purpose of such training was to "fight socialism and 
communism. n 
The program of the company in this study was described in this article. It 
began in the late 1930s. The corner stone of the training program was a 
monthly area level educational meeting which were open to families, children, 
and friends of employees as well as to employees themselves. While the 
purpose of the meeting was to inform employees about company activities, it 
was also a time of recognizing employees and of hearing the concerns of 
employees and their families. 
The helpful clarification made by this article was that the family like 
practices were a particular adaptation of practices being circulated by 
professional training groups to work on workers' definitions of management 
decisions. As the article notes, " ... people need to know the why of things 
instead of just how." Thus, family like practices are management practices. In 
effect, family practices and management practices are dually embedded in this 
situation. While evidence was not found to exactly identify how family practices 
either became problematic or unimportant to management, they could be 
reversed since they were controlled by management. 
· The second practice which made the practice of friendship possible was 
local control. As already noted, everyone in the small district knew each other 
and worked with each other. Managers had more latitude to set their own 
agen~a. Managers were capable of responding to the concerns of workers. It 
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is not really possible to value the other and the relationship with the other 
unless one can take the other into account in ways to maintain the relationship. 
As also earlier noted, control over the company became more centralized. 
Local managers became more the instrument of the central controllers. This 
blocked local managers from taking the concerns of workers into account in the 
same way when they could do something about the concerns. 
The centralization of control seemed to be less a matter of a group of 
individuals deciding to control things than a matter of deploying devices to build 
systems. Again, the historical file from the local library contained stories of 
personnel being brought from various local operations to the central office to 
start groups to devise uniform practices to be used company wide. For 
example, around 1970, a group was brought together in the central office to 
develop a technical operations section to standardize various systems involving 
relay engineering, communications engineering, metering, relay,. and control 
field activity. Once this group was established, they would then centralize 
control by _simply creating a centralized group who developed and implemented 
approaches. Throughout this study, one can find examples of arenas over 
which local persons had control that were centralized by an effort that is usually 
academic, e.g., applying computerized operations research to power plant 
maintenance and inventory control or applying industrial/organizational 
psychology to identify critical behaviors involved with various jobs to validate 
tests to predict success in those jobs. The very business of bringing a group 
together to create and implement a standardized way of doing things removes 
latitude from the local manager and puts it somewhere else. 
The third practice which made friendship possible was the promotion 
system. When workers began worktogether, they created relationships as 
peers. Some rose up through the ranks of management. Thus, the potential for 
continual relationship was present. Even the engineers hired by the company 
tended to work extensive periods in the field. Part of this was enabled by each 
local area doing most tasks. Once an area of work was centralized through a 
I 
stand.ardization effort, it became possible for engineering, accounting, planning, 
and personnel staff to have less extensive relations with workers in the field 
durin~ their careers. With the changes implemented in the late 1980s of 
promotion by testing, college education requirements for management, and 
sele~ion of senior management from other companies owned by the parent 
I 
company, the process of developing systems to standardize things established 
dividing practices which effectively break the opportunity of lifetime work 
relations that begin as peer relations. 
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Thus, even though the reversal of relations which evoked distrust were 
encouraged by economic conditions and strategic reorganization, were made 
possible by new practices circulated through business schools and other 
devi~es, and were made more problematic by how they affected workers with 
significant amounts of seniority, it is still doubtful that the exact practices would 
have been adopted if the earlier training program, decentralized control, and 
the promotion system based on seniority that supported and utilized friendship 
and family like practices had not been earlier abandoned or displaced. 
Distrust and Dually Embedded Practices 
If distrust were only evoked by reversals of practices, it would be difficult 
to reestablish trust. Once distrust is evoked, analogies of distrust are available 
to interpret scenes and, thereby, perpetuate distrust. Analogies of distrust are a 
useful political tool for those running for union office. There are few practices 
such as forgiveness available to repair the definition of the distrusted. With little 
opportunity for exit, workers who know and use the evoked analogies of distrust 
remain in the organization. Yet, if reversals or practices were the only practice 
which created a potential for distrust, one might look forward to some point in 
the future ~hen trust might be reestablished. When executives leave or retire, 
those identified as responsible for the reversals of practices will be gone. Thus, 
the object of analogies will no longer be present. The credibility of analogies of 
distrust with the newer workers may be low in the face of consistent practices 
after the reversals. Once the number of newer workers exceed older workers, 
alternative analogies of trust may be easier to apply and sustain with less peer 
pressure from older workers. 
As one examines the analogies of distrust found in Table VII, one sees 
that the company and the union themselves use dually embedded practices as 
a part of their ongoing relationship which evoke distrust. Thus, the capacity to 
evoke distrust is endemic to the scene and cannot be solved by simply 
I 
repla¢ing actors. One must operate on the practices themselves. · 
I 
The potential for distrust is principally set up by combining management 
rights with some other practice. Management rights make it possible for an 
owner or manager to take unilateral action with respect to anything owned: 
capital or labor. It is rooted in property rights. Once labor power is purchased,· 
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an owner can do with it as she pleases. It implies no further consideration than 
the labor power purchased. If it is no longer needed, it is no longer purchased. 
Rather than replacing management rights, other practices have been 
added to modify management rights or the effects of using management rights. 
If one looks at labor law, one sees management rights affinned and the rights of 
workers affinned in the right to representation and the duty of the company to 
bargain. If one stands inside the practice of management rights, any limitation 
put on the right to use one's property can only be seen as opportunistic. If one 
stands inside the practice of the rights of workers, unilateral action by 
management without bargaining can only be seen as opportunistic. 
The purpose of collective bargaining is to establish a contract which 
limits the unilateral action to which workers are exposed. However, the practice 
of contract construction does not solve the problem. One has the problem of 
interpreting the contract. Once again, the "reserved rights" doctrine of contract 
construction is combined with the "past practices" doctrine of contract 
construction. If one stands inside the practice of "reserved rights," any attempt 
by the union to limit unilateral action of the company beyond the company's 
interpretation of the contract is seen as opportunistic. Inside the practice of 
"past practices," any attempt to change any practice without first bargaining is 
seen as opportunistic. 
Most dually embedded practices involving management rights become 
dually embedded through the practice of compromise. The practices of 
representation and compromise in negotiations seem to encourage dually 
embedded practices. Consider an observed negotiation session to negotiate 
work rules at a power plant. Before the negotiation session began, the 
company managers met to decide what position they would push for and which 
positions they would first offer to latter discard when moving to compromise. 
The union leaders also met with workers and decided what position they would 
take. During the negotiation session, various positions were offered, 
questioned, and advocated. Breaks were taken for the union to consult with 
members. During the break, managers would consult. . After the agreement was 
struck, one union member involved in the work unit complained that their 
position was not obtained by the negotiation team. However, many elements of 
the union members' position and some elements of the management position 
were in the final compromise. Here, the position of a represented group frames 
the options open to the negotiation team. It is possible to eliminate or modestly 
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modify elements. But, having to represent a position taken by other actors 
mak~s it very difficult to develop totally new practices which might address what 
is problematic to both union members and managers. The practice of 
representation encourages compromise around elements of positions already 
taken by the group represented rather than totally new positions. 
The problem with such compromise solutions which combine 
contradictory practices can be seen in the problem of trust faced by labor 
leaders and company labor relations staff. By law, labor leaders have a duty to 
represent the members of the union. Practically, they will be voted out of office if 
they do not. By management rights, a labor relations staff that does not 
represent senior management will probably be fired. Yet, labor law requires 
that they bargain over wages, hours, and working conditions. To bargain is to 
reach a compromise which is neither what the union members nor management 
want in the first instance. 
Furthermore, compromise also tends to contain and perpetuate the 
differences in positions between the two groups. For example, in the 
negotiations that took place during this study, the compromise reached over 
shift language contained elements of the union's proposal and elements of the 
company's proposal. Managers felt that the language would allow them to carry 
out the practices to which the union was objecting. Union members felt that the 
compromise would prevent the practices to which they objected. One could see 
the very language of the compromise enabling managers to act in ways that the 
union would see as a violation of the contract. 
The practice of compromise can also be seen as a group of managers 
attempt to solve problems set up by management rights while, at the same time, 
preserving management rights. For example, managers believed that unilateral 
action is not adopted as well by workers as decisions made by workers 
themselves. Also, managers recognized that they are often removed from 
situations and work group information that would be necessary to make a good 
decision. So, a planning group was set up to develop a participatory 
management plan to involve workers to get better solutions and to get workers 
to ad9pt decisions. As the plan was circulated for review, managers criticized 
I -
the plan because it took the right to decide -- i.e., to take unilateral action --
away from managers and put it in the work group. So, it was modified to 
engage work groups in the development of ideas and proposals which 
mana,gement would then judge or modify. As a result, workers who participated 
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in a "participatory" program in which their idea and proposals were solicited 
were less than pleased when they found out that senior managers would they 
do with their ideas what they wanted. Thus, one finds the compromise slogan, 
"Voice not Vote," develop and spread to modify the expectations of workers 
about the meaning of participation. Ironically, the very tactic became a part of 
analogies of distrust. 
A second practice which sets up dually embedded practices is contract 
construction. Here, the intertwining of practices is created by using the contract 
to work out legal relations while using other practices to work out problems on 
an informal basis. One problem lies with the potential to bring the practice of 
contract into the situation at any time through past practice. If workers and 
managers work out a new solution, it potentially modifies the contract through 
the application of past practice arguments in arbitration. A second problems 
lies with the application of workers rights and management rights to the 
contract. Managers use tactics to try to work out issues without leaving a trail of 
evidence to prove past practice. The union uses tactics to create an evidence 
trail t.o prove past practice. 
The third practice which sets up dually embedded practices is the 
dividing practice. As noted earlier, dividing practices involve linguistic, ritual, 
and physical practices of dichotomously separating groups into in-groups and 
out-groups. 
Several practices already discussed encourage the dividing of the 
organization into different groups with different perspectives. Management 
rights divides managers and the managed by virtue of the right of the buyer of 
labor power to do with it as she pleases. One group takes as its basic task to 
objectify and work on the other group. 
The contract and labor law contain devices to establish the 
independence of the two parties. In the earlier cited NLRB cases on 
participatory practices (309 NLRB 163 (1992), 311 NLRB 88 (1993)), it was 
argued by Board members that the ability of managers to unduly influence 
workers through the participatory groups damaged the ability of workers to act 
as an independent agent with respect to management. Thus, the NLRB 
interJenes to reinforce two groups who are parties to the collective bargaining 
agreement. As one observes negotiations, they are replete with devices to 
divide the parties into two groups. Both groups represent different groups in a 
representational relationship. Both groups meet separately and talk only to 
each other to establish positions for bargaining. The negotiation setting is 
divided into two tables facing each other with opposing sides at each table. 
There are legal ramifications if one side works with the other outside of this 
context. 
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The practice of constructing a system by creating a centralized group to 
standardize practices contains several aspects which encourage dividing the 
organization into different groups. When the centralized groups were created, 
people and their capacities and ways of looking at things were withdrawn from 
the local work group. This changed their problematic by shifting from solving 
problems that were made problematic for them by local workers and customers 
to solving problems that were made problematic by the task of creating a 
system. In the 1980s, this centralization was taken one step further by making a 
system of all of the utilities owned by the parent company. Most of the reversals 
of practices earlier described can be traced back to actions to operate the 
parent company and its utilities as a system. Such centralization divides the 
central management from the work level even further. 
Various personnel practices encourage the division of the organization 
into different groups. Whereas it was possible with the seniority system for 
persons at the work groups level to progress with time and job experience, the 
use of academic and psychological testing and of college education 
requirements discouraged mobility for workers without extensive academic 
backgrounds. It differentiated those in management from workers. It broke lines 
of friendship and experience across the management-worker boundary. By 
centralizing the circulation of senior management among the companies owned 
by the parent company, it differentiated those in senior management from the 
remainder of management and the work force as well as again breaking lines of 
friendship and work experience across the management-worker boundary. 
The~e dividing practices set up dually embedded practices by creating 
different groups who use and are embedded in different practices but who must 
work on common issues. In the language of social phenomenology, this 
constructs different life worlds for the different groups as they interact. What 
creates the potential for distrust is the use of practices by one group that set up 
lines of action which are seen as opportunistic from the perspective of the other 
group. For example, a manager who has never worked on a line crew who 
orders a foreman to close a circuit during a rain storm sees no problem. The 
foreman who has almost been caught in an arc in a similar situation sees a 
problem. The manager cannot easily hear the problem because there are 
con~equences for her if she does not get the line energized. Again, an 
' engir,eer who is not exposed to coal dust every day objects to testing a 
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respirator because she does not think it is necessary and such testing is not in 
her budget. The worker exposed to coal dust and who is now having 
pulmonary abnormalities is concerned about the respirator. Or again, a 
manager who finds a way to combine jobs and increase earnings sees no 
problem with reorganizing jobs and reducing the number of people working. In 
a weak labor market and at middle age with family and financial obligations, 
such a move represents the destruction of a worker's life. Or finally, a college 
educated manager who has no experience in the union or with the labor 
contract or past practices discounts concerns of workers regarding the contract. 
A supervisor who came out of the ranks of the union backs off of a decision 
when workers raise issues regarding the contract. 
Recasting the Issue of Trust 
From what has been discovered in this study, distrust is not merely the 
absence of trust. Analogies of distrust are used to interpret situations and -- by 
doing so _.; replicate distrust. By replicating distrust, analogies of distrust block 
the development of mutual lines of action. For example, one's boss asks one to 
do something out of the ordinary. If one has an analogy of distrust of bosses 
who use new situations to force future changes in work rules,· one questions the 
motives of the boss and looks for ways out of the request. Or again, a union 
worker raises questions about the safety of working with fewer workers than is 
the normal practice. If one has an analogy of distrust of union members using 
various tactics to maintain the number of available positions, one questions the 
motives of the worker and discounts the safety concern. 
Analogies of distrust contain within themselves the genealogy of distrust. 
While one can periodically find distrust defined in terms of reputations in this 
study, one also finds practices of punishment widely used which make persons 
rather than practices the problem. What one can find consistently contained in 
I 
analqgies of distrust are either reversals of practices or dually embedded 
practices. One set of practices establishes what was counted on or trusted. The 
other practices -- either replacing the trusted practice or placed in relation to the 
trust~d practice -- represents an opportunistic act when compared to the trusted 
practice. This would suggest that the issue of trust should be recast in terms of . 
. i 
the potential for trust or distrust created by practices and the relation of 
practices. 
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The practice of trust was not readily exposed in this study. First, changes 
had taken place to evoke distrust of the union by management and of 
management by the union. Second, by theoretically and methodologically 
following the trail of the problematic, it reduces the chance that the ' 
unproblematic will be exposed; Thus, the practice of trust was not as easily 
surfaced. However, a few instances of trust were uncovered because trust 
made certain actions problematic for actors. This offers a view on the practices 
that evoke trust. Once again, the analogies contain the practices and their 
gen~alogy . 
. ' The principal practice that seemed to set up trust was friendship or a 
history of working together and respecting each other. One can find instances 
of how such friendships or histories of personally working together made it 
difficult for managers to take unilateral actions. As noted earlier, a senior 
executive was taken back by the presence of persons on the union's 
information picket line whom she had know and trusted as reasonable persons. 
She could not simply dismiss their actions as just "union radicals." When she 
attended a safety meeting at a power plant and heard workers whom she again 
knew to be reasonable criticize safety issues, she could not just dismiss the 
criticism as simply "complaining." A different senior executive intervened in an 
earlier set of layoffs because she felt personally responsible for the workers 
whom she had hired and who worked for her. She did not want to see them laid 
. 
off. Anoth~r upper manager found it difficult to announce a reduction in retiree 
benefits that was decided by the parent company when her friends called and 
complained about the historical reversal. A union steward was friends with a 
manager in her area of responsibility. When workers would complain about the 
managers, the steward felt compelled to explain and defend her friend's 
position. 
· The second set of practices that seemed to set up trust were the family 
like p(ractices that the company had adopted. The company family -- as workers 
refer~ed to the company as it use to be -- was made such by the training 
progr~ms adopted in the late 1930s. While the genealogy of the benefits 
programs that constituted family like practices could not be identified by the 
sourc::es available for this study, it is probable that they were adopted during 
World War II as a strategy to compete for scarce labor during a period of 
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regulated wages. A National Public Radio broadcast on September 23, 1993, 
noted that the current health care crisis was in part set up by the use of health, 
retirement, and other benefits to compete for scarce labor during World War 11. 
This interpretation tended to be confirmed by interviews with older managers 
and executives who indicated that salaries tended to be lower when all of these 
benefits were extended. Finally, older managers and executives involved with 
labor relations through out their careers indicated that, until the layoffs in the 
mid-1980s, the company was paternalistic toward the union and tended to look 
out for the interests of workers. These practices were the principal practices on 
which workers relied in the reversals described in the analogies of distrust. 
With these two practices, trust is not simply tolerating a risky situation in 
which one must depend on another (Griffin, 1971; Luhmann, 1979, 1988; 
Williams, 1988; Powell, 1990). Nor is trust simply an assessment of the other's 
self (Griffin, 1971; Baker, 1983; Cantrell, 1987; Good, 1988; Lewis and Weigert, 
1988). Rather, it is a reliance on practices that inhibit opportunistic lines of 
action. In this study, it was a reliance on friendship and family-like practices to 
inhibit both unilateral action of management rights and the use of the contract 
and past practices on the part of the union. 
As suggested in the conclusion to Chapter 11, the review of literature, the 
differentiation of the work place into the work group level, the labor relations 
level, and the strategic level did involve the establishment of different 
discourses about what constitutes opportunism. But more important with 
respect to trust, the very practices which differentiated the levels by developing 
the capacities to treat the company as a system also broke the friendship and 
personal relations that workers tended by rely on to modify unilateral action and 
that managers relied on for "reasonable" action from union members. The 
layoffs and other reversals of practices represented a move of the strategic level 
of the company to the parent company from the company in this study. They 
also represented the final end of the family like practices that workers counted 
on as the meaning of their relationship with the company. 
NOTES 
1 The feminine pronoun will be used in this study to counter the traditional use of 
the masculine as standard and to help protect the identity of persons interviewed 
or observed. 
2 Significant portions of this section are drawn from my articles, u A Critical 
Analysis o~ the Concept of Power: An lnteractionist Revelation of Its Moral 
Nature.ff Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology 18 (1990), pp. 121-126, and 
UEmancipatory Practice and the Use of the Ruse of Agency and the Ontology of 
Actors and Scene in the Analysis of Structure, u Humboldt Journal of Social 
Relations 19 (1993), pp. 31-72. . 
3 It is interesting to note that utechnical competence, u a visible performance with 
appropriate ucredentiar props, corresponds to the phenomenologist's and 
ethnomethodologist's common background expectations of the ability to perform 
(Zucker, 1986) and that ufiduciary obligation and responsibility, u a visible 
performance with appropriate "liscensing" or "professional membership" props, 
corresponds to constitutive expectations regarding independence from 
self-interest (Zucker, 1986). As noted earlier, the taken-for-granted may be more 
a result of a good performance that a result of an assumption about the other. 
4 One notes that Zucker applies the secondary relationship assumption even with 
process trust by focusing on reputation and brands as a way of signaling 
trustworthiness. 
5 1947 was the year in which organized labor carried out several very effective 
strikes and in which the Taft-Hartley Act was passed to reduce the avenues 
available to unions to carry out effective strikes. 
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